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ABSTRACT 
 
DESIGNING A CREDIT SYSTEM TO MATCH BETTER PERFORMING 
STUDENTS WITH BEST FOUNDATION UNIVERSITIES 
 
TATOĞLU, Tuğçe 
M.Sc., Economics 
Supervisor: Prof. Salih Fatih ÖZATAY 
A private credit system is designed in this thesis, since there is not a system 
providing a financial support for the students, who have sufficient scores from 
university entrance exams for paid education in the best foundation universities in 
Turkey. This financial support is created for borrowing from the banks while 
necessary collateral being provided by the Education Guarantee Fund and another 
support is presented by a repayment system, in which the students make payments in 
direct proportion to their incomes after graduation. At the same time, the government 
provides interest subsidy support for the repayments of the students, thus the 
repayment cost for the student is decreased.  
This research study is composed of six sections; first section is the introduction, 
the second section is importance of higher education, the third section is the 
analyzing better performing students and best foundation universities, the fourth 
section is financing higher education with loans, the fifth section is policy suggestion 
for financing the higher education, and the sixth section is the conclusion. The 
finance need of the students, who had sufficient scores for the best foundation 
universities, was supported by a field research conducted on 253 students. In order to 
fulfill the finance need of the students, applicable credit systems were discussed and 
it was determined that the most effective credit system was Education Guarantee 
Fund. 
Key Words: Better Performing Students, Best Foundation Universities, 
Educational Financing, Income-Contingent Credit System, Education Guarantee 
Fund 
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ÖZ 
 
DAHA İYİ PERFORMANS SERGİLEYEN ÖĞRENCİLER İLE EN İYİ 
VAKIF ÜNİVERSİTELERİNİ EŞLEŞTİRMEK İÇİN ÖZEL BİR KREDİ SİSTEMİ 
TASARLANMASI 
 
 
Tuğçe TATOĞLU 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ekonomi 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Salih Fatih ÖZATAY 
Bu tezde, Türkiye’deki en iyi vakıf üniversitelerinde ücretli eğitim almak için 
üniversite sınavından yeterli puanı almış öğrencilere, eğitim ücretlerini borçlanarak 
finanse edebilme imkanı sunacak bir sistemin mevcut olmaması nedeniyle, bu imkanı 
sunan özel bir kredi sistemi tasarlanmıştır. Eğitim Garanti Fonu ile öğrencilere 
gerekli kefalet sağlanarak bankalardan borçlanma imkanı yaratılmış ve borçlarını 
mezun olduktan sonra elde edecekleri gelirleri ile doğru orantılı olarak ödeme imkanı 
sunulmuştur. Aynı zamanda öğrencilere borç geri ödemelerinde devlet tarafından 
faiz sübvansiyonu desteği sunularak öğrencilerin geri ödeme maliyetleri azaltılmıştır. 
Bu çalışma; birinci bölümde giriş, ikinci bölümde yükseköğrenimin önemi, 
üçüncü bölümde daha iyi performans sergileyen öğrenciler ile en iyi vakıf 
üniversitelerinin analizi, dördüncü bölümde kredilerle yükseköğrenimin finansmanı, 
beşinci bölümde yükseköğrenimin finansmanı için politika önerisi ve sonuç olmak 
üzere altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. En iyi vakıf okullarına gitmek için yeterli puana 
sahip öğrencilerin finansman ihtiyaçları ise 253 öğrenciye uygulanan alan araştırması 
ile desteklenmiştir. Öğrencilerin finansman ihtiyacını ortadan kaldırmak için ise 
uygulanabilir kredi sistemleri tartışılmış ve en etkin kredi sisteminin Eğitim Garanti 
Fonu olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Daha İyi Performans Sergileyen Öğrenciler, En İyi Vakıf 
Üniversiteleri, Eğitim Finansmanı, Gelir Şartlı Kredi Sistemi, Eğitim Garanti Fonu 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There were 112 state, and 68 foundation universities in Turkey as of 2016-2017 
education year, according to the data provided by CoHE(COHE, n.d.). The number 
of undergraduate students for the same period is reported as 4,071 million. Among 
these students are the ones, who had sufficient scores from the university exams for 
paid education or education with 50 % or 25 % scholarships in the best foundation 
universities that are on top of the most preferred universities list and/or on top of the 
Worldwide university ranking made by the best ten ranking institutions. Moreover, 
scores of these students outperform most of the scores of those already enrolled to 
programs of the best foundation universities with fully paid or semi-paid schemes. 
However, it was observed that most of these students could not afford the education 
fees of the best foundation universities, therefore, they had to be placed in the state 
universities lower on the list and/or not even ranked. The mirror image of this fact is 
that an important capacity of the best foundation universities are used by students 
whose performance remain well below these students. The lists of the university 
ranking institutions are based on certain criteria such as research, teaching, 
knowledge transfer and international outlook. According to this, it is assumed that 
the universities placed on top with higher scores in these criteria have better 
education compared to the ones down on the list. In this respect, these students are 
being placed in state universities down on the list instead of the foundation 
universities on top, limits the growth of skilled workforce in our country.  Since there 
is not a credit mechanism for these students to finance paid education in the best 
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foundation universities in Turkey, a private credit system is designed in this research 
study to provide this support.   
In the second section, the possible effects of the system, which is designed to 
match the better performing students with the best foundation universities, on the 
growth and development process of the country are handled. In this purpose, an 
extension of the Solow model was examined and it was concluded that human capital 
differences of the countries are an important reason for the differences in the income 
per capita. In the same model, it was also concluded that there is more human capital 
in the countries, where there are more educated workers, which would effect 
positively the income per capita. In the ampirical studies, it was observed that the 
human capital had a higher effect on the production difference between the rich and 
the poor countries, compared to the real capital. Moreover, not only the quantity of 
the human capital, but also the increase in quality has an increasing effect on the 
product. Within the scope of these findings, allocating more financial support to the 
successful students in higher education is expected to contribute to the development 
and growth process of our country. 
In order to desing a credit system that brings together the students whose 
university entrance exam scores are higher than those of students attending to fully 
paid or semi-paid schemes of the best foundation universities (from now on, shortly, 
“better performing students”), it is vital to determine better performing students and 
the best foundation universities in Turkey.For the 2016-2017 education year, the 
students in the Economy, and Electric-Electronics Engineering Departments were 
included in this study. These departments were determined in order to analyse 
whether there are differences in the attitudes of the social science students and 
physical science students towards borrowing program.  
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As is examined  in section three, better performing students in the selected 
departments were determined according to the data provided by the CoHE about the 
score rankings of the students placed at certain universities: Accordingly, better 
performing students in the selected departments are composed of the ones, who had 
more than sufficient scores for education in the best foundation universities with 
non-scholarship, 25%, or 50% scholarship. The three basic criteria for determining 
the best foundation unviersities are: the most preferred universities by the students 
published by the CoHE, the university ranking list conducted by the ten university 
ranking institutions in the world, and the results of the survey conducted on the 
university students. When all of the criteria were analyzed together, it was concluded 
that the best foundation universities in Turkey were Bilkent and Koç Universities. In 
the survey study, 253 students were asked to evaluate four foundation unversities and 
fourteen state universities. According to the results, the education quality of Koç and 
Bilkent Universities was evaluated as "very well" by 66,4% and 54,5% by the 
students, respectively. Additionally, it was asked to the students whether they would 
accept education in these universities if they had full scholarship chance, and 87% of 
the students answered  as "Yes, I would".  These students, who evaluated these 
universities as "very well" and, who would accept these universities if they had 
sufficient scores for full scholarship, evaluated the education quality of the 
universities that they were placed as "medium level" (they did not prefer paid 
education in Koç and Bilkent Universities). This proved that they did not have 
sufficient finance to afford the education fees in these foundation universities. When 
the students were asked whether they would accept the paid education via a credit 
system for financing the education fees, most of the students thought negative about 
borrowing program. The motive behind this preference can be explained by that one-
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third of the students could not predict their incomes after graduation, while two-third 
of them mentioned that the main criterion for their university preference was the 
employment opportunity after graduation. 
In order to design an ideal credit system for financing the education needs of the 
students, current credit systems in the world were examined in the fourth section. As 
the conclusion of examining, it was determined that higher education finance is 
generally provided by the public sector. It is observed that the income-contingent 
credit system, which was firstly implemented in Australia in 1989 for the students to 
to make the repayments easily, has also been implemented in countries such as the 
UK, New Zealand, Sweden, Scotland, and South Africa (Johnstone 2005, 9). 
Particularly in the USA, the mortgage type system turned into a real financial burden 
for the students, many of whom could not make the repayments. In this point, the 
public sector stepped in, creating new systems for the students with high debts but 
fewer incomes or no income to make income-contingent repayments. 
In Turkey, it is observed that the finance provided by the public sector to the 
students for their higher education is not sufficient to afford the education fees of 
these universities. Therefore, it is considered that the banks can provide the 
necessary finance instead of the public sector. However, as is discussed in the fifth 
section in detail, the risks and uncertinties regarding the future incomes of the 
students cause the banks to be reluctant in opening credits for the students. 
Therefore, if the public sector steps in by providing guarantee for a part of or for 
complete loans of the students, the banks will participate in the system. In this 
purpose, it is expected that creating an opportunity to borrow from the banks by 
generating a fund for education (Education Guarantee Fund), will contribute to the 
growth and development of Turkey. On the other hand, in the suggested system, in 
5 
 
order for the students to make repayments simply, it was projected that the 
repayment be a percent of the income of the students after graduation. In this sense, 
in case the students cannot repay fixed installments determined by the banks due to 
low income, they will be able to make repayments to the bank by borrowing from the 
fund, and will repay the amount taken from the fund after their incomes increase. 
Therefore, the support of the fund for the students is not unpaid, it is expected that 
the interest rate subsidy will be unpaid which will be paid by the own sources of the 
fund. In the fifth section of the study, it was asserted that Education Guarantee Fund 
(EGF) is an efficient mechanism in order for the system to function sustainably for 
both the students and the banks.   
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CHAPTER II 
IMPORTANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
Studies that emphasize the importance of education on growth of countries have 
recently become more important, since the countries that invest in human capital 
have faster growth processes. In this sense, education is one of the main determining 
factor on the growth of Eastern Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Taiwan. Human capital covers not only educated labor but also all 
investments in the labor, which develop the skills such as parental education, 
schooling and learning-by-doing. In this section, the effect of education on the 
growth performance of countries is analyzed.  
2.1. Extending the Solow Model to Include Human Capital
1
 
2.1.a. The Model 
Output is determined by human capital, physical capital and technology. The 
production function that shows the relation among these variables is Cobb-Douglas 
type:  
    𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡
𝛼(𝐴𝑡𝐻𝑡)
1−𝛼                                                                                                 (1) 
where Y is output, K is capital, and A is the effectiveness of labor (technology). H is 
the total amount of productive services supplied by workers. It includes the 
contribution of both raw labor and human capital: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐿𝑡 G(E)                                                                                                          (2) 
                                                          
1
 This section is largely based on Romer (2012, 132-144) 
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where L is the number of workers. The amount of resources allocated to human 
capital accumulation determines the amount of human capital. G(.) is a function that 
represents human capital per worker (H/L) as a function of years of education per 
worker (E). E is assumed to be constant. Note that each worker obtains the same 
amount of education. G
′
(E) > 0, which basically means that the more a worker is 
educated, the more human capital he/she has. 
Savings rate (s) is exogenous. Capital stock depreciates at an exogenous rate δ. 
The accumulation of physical capital is given by 
𝐾?̇? = 𝑠𝑌𝑡 −  𝛿𝐾𝑡                                                                                                     (3)  
Note that a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. The technological 
progress changes over time at the exogenous rate g: 
𝐴?̇? = 𝑔𝐴𝑡                                                                                                                                                                        (4)   
The last assumption of the model is that the number of workers grows at an 
exogenous rate n: 
?̇?𝑡 = 𝑛𝐿𝑡                                                                                                                                                                          (5)      
The main difference from the Solow model is the human-capital accumulation 
given by (2). Now define physical capital per unit of effective labor services as 
𝑘 = 𝐾 (𝐴𝐺(𝐸)𝐿)⁄ . Take the time derivative of this definition (time indices are 
dropped): 
?̇? =
?̇?
𝐴𝐺(𝐸)𝐿
−
(?̇?/𝐴)𝐾
𝐴𝐺(𝐸)𝐿
−
(?̇?/𝐺)𝐾
𝐴𝐺(𝐸)𝐿
−
(?̇?/𝐿)𝐾
𝐴𝐺(𝐸)𝐿
  
Since G is taken as constant, using (4) and (5), one obtains 
    ?̇?𝑡 = 𝑠𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + δ)𝑘𝑡                                                                               (6)     
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Now define output per unit of effective labor as 𝑦 = 𝑌 𝐴𝐺(𝐸)𝐿⁄ . Use this 
definition in (1): 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡
𝑎
                              (7) 
Substituting this in (6) yields: 
?̇? = 𝑠(𝑘𝑡)
𝑎 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + δ)𝑘𝑡                                                                                 (8)                
At the steady state ?̇? = 0. Thus at the steady state k is determined as: 
 𝑘∗ = 𝑠 (𝑛 + 𝑔 + δ)⁄
1/(1−𝑎)
                                     (9)                                                                
This is the same result obtained in the Solow model. Using (9) and the definition 
of y in (7) gives the steady state value of output per labor 
 (𝑌/𝐿) =  𝑠 / (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝑎/(1−𝑎) 𝐴𝐺(𝐸)                                 (10)                                                                
Thus, as the number of the years of education per worker (E) increases, output per 
worker (Y/L) rises on the balanced growth path. This increase in proportional to 
G(E). In other words, this simple specification shows that one of the underlying 
reasons behind large differences in income per capita among countries is their 
different levels of human capital. 
2.2. Human Capital in Growth Regressions 
2
 
Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodriquez-Clare (1997) analyze how 
income differences among countries are explained by differences in physical-capital 
accumulation, differences in human-capital accumulation, and other factors. They 
assume Cobb-Douglas production function as follows: 
  𝑌𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖
𝑎(𝐴İ𝐻İ)
1−𝑎                                                                                             (11) 
                                                          
2
 This section is largely based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, 515-541) and Romer (2012, 132-144) 
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where i indexes countries and A represents all forces that determine output  for given 
amounts of physical capital and labor services. Dividing both sides of (11) by 
number of workers (Li) and taking natural logs yields: 
  𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑖/𝐿𝑖) = 𝑎 𝑙𝑛 (𝐾𝑖/𝐿İ)  +  (1 − 𝑎) 𝑙𝑛 (𝐻İ/𝐿İ)  +  (1 − 𝑎) 𝑙𝑛 𝐴İ                (12)             
which shows the contribution of physical capital per worker (𝐾𝑖 𝐿𝑖⁄ ), labor services 
per worker (𝐻𝑖 𝐿𝑖⁄ ), and a residual (represented by the last term: ((1 − 𝑎) ln 𝐴𝑖) to 
output per worker. These studies estimate (12) by using data provided by the Penn 
World Tables
3
, for physical-capital stock (K) and years of schooling (H). 
Furthermore, they assume that a is around 1/3 and Hi takes the form e
G(Ei) 
Li, where Ei 
is the average number of years of education of workers in country i. According to the 
results, the average output per worker in the richest group exceeds the average in the 
poor group by a factor of 31.7, on a log scale, this is a difference of 3.5. Furthermore, 
the difference in the average physical-capital intensity between two groups is 0.6, it 
is 0.8 in labor services per worker, and it is 2.1 in ln A. Therefore, the gap in log 
output per worker between richest and poorest countries is primarily due to 
differences in residuals, secondly it is due to differences in schooling, in other words 
education periods of workers in years, and lastly it is due to differences in physical-
capital intensity. It can be clearly observed that differences in human capital are 
more effective than differences in physical-capital intensity in explaining cross-
country income differences. When other determinants of human capital--such as 
differences in school quality, on-the-job training, informal human-capital acquisition, 
child-rearing, and a like- are taken into consideration, the impact of the human 
capital on the overall gap in log income between the richest and poorest countries 
increases.  
                                                          
3
 These data are available online from the National Bureau of Economic Research  
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Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) conducts an econometric study on per capita 
growth rates. They estimate a series of regressions. Each regression is of the 
following type: 
Dyt = F(yt-1, ht-1, x) 
where Dyt denotes a country’s per capita growth rate in period t, yt-1 is initial per 
capita GDP, and ht-1 is initial human capital per person -represented by average years 
of school attainment and life expectancy- and x is a vector of control variables. They 
carry out regressions for 72 countries between 1965-1975, 86 countries between 
1975-1985, and 83 countries between 1985-1995. The estimations use initial per 
capita GDP (yt-1), male upper-level schooling (as the determinants of educational 
attainment), life expectancy, fertility rate, government consumption ratio, rule of law, 
democracy, international openness, terms of trade, investment ratio, inflation rate, 
and dummy variables for 1975-1985 and 1985-1995 periods as the determinants of 
the growth rate.  
11 
 
Figure 2.1.The Partial Relationship Between Economic Growth and School-Attainment Variable 
(Barro and Sala-i Martin 2004, 524) 
 
The estimated coefficient on male upper-level schooling is calculated as 0.0036 
(s.e.=0.0016)
4
. This result means that the one-standard-deviation increase in male 
upper-level schooling raises the growth rate by 0.0036. Besides, when the analyses 
for low-income countries and high-income countries are examined, it can be clearly 
observed that the estimated coefficients of male upper-level schooling is positive for 
both groups of countries. Moreover, the striking finding is that the positive effect of 
educational attainment on growth rate is conspicuous for low-income countries, 
which is 0.0056 while it is 0.0020 for high-income countries. It means that the one-
standard-deviation increase in male upper-level schooling raises the growth rate for 
low-income countries far more then high-income countries. Additionally, there is a 
                                                          
4
 See Barro and  Sala-i-Martin (2004, Figure 12.4) 
12 
 
positive partial relationship between economic growth and the school-attainment 
variable, which means that the increase in male upper-level schooling raises growth 
rate of per capita GDP (Figure 2.1.). 
2.3. Education and Middle Income Trap  
Studies published in recent years on middle income countries, which struggle to 
get rid of the middle income trap, emphasize that these countries should develop 
some characteristic features such as increasing national saving rates, raising R&D 
investment and innovation capacity, enhancing public sources which are used for 
increasing human capital quality, making a reform in labor market, raising total 
factor productivity, and so on.  
For example, Eichengreen, Park, & Shin (2013) analyze growth slowdowns in 
fast-growing middle-income countries. They aim at determining basic reasons of 
such slowdowns that undermine convergence attempts. They show that there is a 
strong negative correlation between university attendees and graduates and growth 
slowdown. That is, an increase in the number of university attendees and graduates, 
leads to a decline in the possibility of a slowdown. It is further clarified in this study 
that this situation can be explained in economical terms as follows: more advanced 
education may be significant for countries abstaining from slowdown by producing 
technologically more sophisticated services and goods. In other words, the 
importance of technology is emphasized to avoid middle income trap, and it is stated 
that high levels of secondary and tertiary education is the most important means for 
that.  
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2.4. Education Performance of G-20 Countries 
2.4.a. Average Year of Schooling 
In this section, Barro and Lee’s dataset5 is used in order to quantitatively analyze 
education attainment among G-20 countries.  
 Education Attainment for Population Aged 15 and Over 
When the percentage of the population aged 15 and over is analyzed for the year 
2010 in completing primary school, it is observed that the G-20 countries are ranked 
from the highest rate (% of population aged 15 and over) to the lowest rate as: 
Turkey, Argentina, Indonesia, Brazil, Italy, Mexico, France, India, Saudi Arabia, 
China, United Kingdom, Japan, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Australia, Russian 
Federation, Germany, Canada and USA, respectively
6
.  
Similarly, when the percentage of the population aged 15 and over in completing 
secondary school (for the year 2010) is examined, the G-20 countries are ranked 
from the highest rate  to the lowest rate as Germany, South Africa, United Kingdom, 
Japan, Australia, France, USA, Republic of Korea, Italy, Canada, Argentina, Saudi 
Arabia, Brazil, India, Russian Federation, China, Indonesia, Turkey, and Mexico, 
respectively
7
.  
Lastly, the G-20 countries are ranked according to the percentage of the 
population aged 15 and over in completing tertiary education (for the year 2010) in 
descending order the following scheme emerges: Republic of Korea, USA, Russian 
Federation, Canada, Japan, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Mexico, 
                                                          
5
  This dataset is available online from Barro-Lee Dataset 
6
 see appendix A.1., Highest Level Attained: Primary Completed 
7
 see appendix A.1., Highest Level Attained: Secondary Completed 
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Italy, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Argentina, China, and South 
Africa, respectively
8
.  
 Education Attainment for Population Aged 25 and Over 
If G-20 countries are ranked according to the portion of population which only 
completed primary school in descending order the following list emerges: Turkey, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Italy, France, China, Saudi Arabia, India, United 
Kingdom, Republic of Korea, Japan, South Africa, Australia, Argentina, Russian 
Federation, Canada, USA, and Germany, respectively
9
.  
The G-20 countries with highest percentage of the population aged 25 and over in 
completing secondary education (for the year 2010) are Germany, South Africa, 
United Kingdom, Japan, France, USA, Australia, Republic of Korea, Italy, 
Argentina, Canada, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Russian Federation, India, Indonesia, 
China, Turkey, and Mexico, respectively
10
.  
Lastly, the G-20 countries with highest percentage of the population aged 25 and 
over in completing tertiary education (for the year 2010) are Republic of Korea, 
USA, Canada,  Russian Federation, Australia, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, France, Italy and Brazil (with the same figure), Turkey, India, 
Indonesia, Argentina, China, and South Africa, respectively
11
. Figure 2.3 shows a 
similar comparison among OECD countries. Turkey is one of the countries with 
lowest figures in terms of adults completing tertiary education; moreover, the 
average of Turkey is far below the OECD average.  
                                                          
8
see appendix A.1., Highest Level Attained: Tertiary Completed 
9
 see appendix A.2., Highest Level Attained: Primary Completed 
10
 see appendix A.2., Highest Level Attained: Secondary Completed 
11
 see appendix A.2., Highest Level Attained: Tertiary Completed 
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2.4.b. Quality of Education 
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a study, in which 
scholastic performance of the 15-year-old school pupils on mathematics, science and 
reading is evaluated (OECD 2015).  It is conducted by the OECD and it includes 
both OECD members and non-member countries (OECD n.d.). In this section, the 
latest PISA results published in 2015 are shown for the G-20 countries in order to 
analyze qualitative educational performance of these countries (Table 2.1.):
16 
 
Country Science Reading Mathematics 
Science, Reading and 
Mathematics 
  
Mean 
score in 
PISA 
2015 
Average 
three-year 
trend 
Mean 
score in 
PISA 
2015 
Average 
three-year 
trend 
Mean 
score in 
PISA 
2015 
Average 
three-year 
trend 
Share of top 
performers in 
at least one 
subject 
 (Level 5 or 6) 
Share of low 
achievers in all 
three subjects 
(below Level 2) 
Australia 510 -6 503 -6 494 -8 18.4 11.1 
Canada 528 -2 527 1 516 -4 22.7 5.9 
France 495 0 499 2 493 -4 18.4 14.8 
Germany 509 -2 509 6 506 2 19.2 9.8 
Italy 481 2 485 0 490 7 13.5 12.2 
Japan 538 3 516 -2 532 1 25.8 5.6 
Turkey 425 2 428 -18 420 2 1.6 31.2 
USA 496 2 497 -1 470 -2 13.3 13.6 
United 
Kingdom 
509 -1 498 2 492 -1 16.9 10.1 
China 518 M 494 M 531 M 27.7 10.9 
Indonesia 403 3 397 -2 386 4 0.8 42.3 
Republic of 
Korea 
516 -2 517 -11 524 -3 25.6 7.7 
Russia 487 3 495 17 494 6 13 7.7 
CABA 
(Argentina) 
475 51 475 46 456 38 7.5 14.5 
Brazil 401 3 407 -2 377 6 2.2 44.1 
Mexico 416 2 423 -1 408 5 0.6 33.8 
Saudi 
Arabia  
  
 
  
 
  
  
India 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
South 
Africa  
  
 
  
 
  
  
Table 2.1. PISA 2015
12
 
 
 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) Test Results: 
PISA 2015 was conducted for around 540,000 participating students in 72 
countries (OECD n.d.). According to the results, Singapore was the top performer 
                                                          
12 Further Information: Results in Focus (PISA 2015) 
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country in all categories (This was not shown on the Table 2.1. since the table only 
portrayed the G-20 countries). The ranking according to mean scores of the countries 
are shown on Table 2.2. (Since there is no test results for Saudi Arabia, India and 
South Africa, only the results of 16 countries are listed): 
Order Science Reading Mathematics 
  Country Score Country Score Country Score 
1  Japan                    538 Canada              527 Japan                      532 
2  Canada                528 South Korea         517 China                     531 
3  China                     518 Japan                     516 South Korea         524 
4 South Korea           516 Germany            509 Canada                 516 
5 Australia          510 Australia              503 Germany               506 
6 
United 
Kingdom   
509 France                  499 Russia                  494 
7 Germany              509 
United 
Kingdom   
498 Australia              494 
8 USA                        496 USA                     497 France                493 
9 France                     495 Russia                        495
United 
Kingdom   
492 
10 Russia                     487 China                 494 Italy                    490 
11 Italy                        481 Italy                        485 United States        470 
12 Argentina              475 Argentina           475 Argentina         456 
13 Turkey                      425 Turkey                   428 Turkey             420 
14 Mexico                   404 Mexico                423 Mexico                  408 
15 Indonesia              403 Brazil                   407 Indonesia              386 
16 Brazil            401 Indonesia           397 Brazil                  377 
Table 2.2. Country Rankings by Categories (PISA 2015) 
It is clearly seen on the Table 2.2 that Japan, Canada, China, and South Korea are 
the four highest-performing G-20 countries in science. Canada, South Korea, Japan, 
and Germany are, respectively, at the top of the list in reading. Lastly, Japan, China, 
South Korea, and Canada are the four countries having highest-performing in 
mathematics.  
On the other hand, when both the rankings for all OECD countries and G-20 
countries are examined, it is observed that the relationship between highest education 
performance and rapid growth of the Asian countries is not a coincidence. These 
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countries produce and export high value-added products thanks to their qualified 
trainings. In this regard, it will be useful to compare Turkey and South Korea. 
2.4.c. Case Study: Turkey vs South Korea  
Once had been behind Turkey in terms of many socio-economic indicators until 
the 1980s, South Korea was better than Turkey in the 2000s in terms of national 
income and industrialization. From the early 1960s to the 1980s, GDP per capita in 
Turkey was more than South Korea (Figure 2.2.). In 1965, GDP per capita of South 
Korea was $108.704 while GDP per capita of Turkey was $385.641. It means that 
GDP per capita in Turkey was 3,5 times as high as that of South Korea in 1965. In 
2016, GDP per capita of South Korea was $27,539 while GDP per capita of Turkey 
was $10,800 and it was 2,5 times as high as that of Turkey.  
Figure 2.2.GDP Per Capita (Current US$), Turkey vs South Korea (Worldbank 2017) 
 
 
Moreover, output-side real GDP per capita at chained PPPs (in mil. 2011US$) of 
South Korea was $39,427 in 1965, while that of Turkey was $159,447. In 1980, GDP 
19 
 
per capita PPP of Turkey was $331,021, while that of South Korea was $189,564. 
Finally, in 2014, it increased to $1,750.372 in South Korea, while it increased to 
$1,525.255 in Turkey (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer 2015).  
 South Korea Turkey 
Average years of total 
schooling (aged 15 and 
over, in 2010)
13
 
12.05 7.05 
Average years of tertiary 
schooling (aged 15 and 
over, in 2010)
14
 
1.43 0.29 
PISA Test Score (in 
2015)
15
 
Score 
World Ranking 
Science 
516 
11 
 
Reading 
517 
7 
Maths 
524  
 
7 
 
Science 
425 
54 
 
Reading 
428 
49 
Maths 
420 
 
50 
 
High Tech Exports in 
2015 (% of manufactured 
exports)
16
 
26.84 2.16 
Gross Capital Formation  
in 2016 
 (% of GDP)
17
 
29.21 28.68 
Table 2.3. South Korea vs Turkey 
Table 2.3. points out that there is a significant difference in particularly 
educational statistics between Turkey and South Korea. The first and second lines of 
the table show the educational statistics quantitatively, while third line shows the 
comparison of educational quality in South Korea and Turkey. Another striking 
difference is in the ratio of high-tech exports to total exports: 26.84 in South Korea, 
2.16 in Turkey in 2015. Similarly, innovative structure of South Korea can also be 
seen in the following statistics: South Korea is the fourth in the world according to 
the total number of patents, second in the world regarding the number of per capita 
                                                          
13
 see appendix A.1., Avg. Years of Total Schooling 
14
 see appendix A.1., Avg. Years of Tertiary Schooling 
15
 see PISA (2015) 
16
 Data is available online from Worldbank (2017) 
17
 Data is available online from Worldbank (2017) 
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patents, and seventh in the world in terms of R&D expenditures. Most of these 
achievements are explained by the researches with the educated qualified labor force 
and an education policy supporting this quality (such as Arslanhan S.and  Kurtsal 
Y
18
., Dominguez G. and Mazumdaru S.
19
, Gupta N., Healey D., Stein A. and Shipp 
S.
20
) In this context, there are 420 universities and colleges in South Korea, while 
there are around 200 of them in Turkey. Moreover, approximately 84% of 
individuals graduating from high school enroll at the university or college, and 40% 
of university students carry out scientific researches in South Korea.  
2.5. Private and Public Costs and Benefits of Education 
2.5.a. Private Costs and Benefits  
Higher education has become the most important component of personal 
education in recent times. “‘New growth theory’ points the human capital formation 
as a key driver of economic growth, and higher education appears to be especially 
important in industrialized economies” (Chapman and Greenaway 2003, 2). As 
explained by growth theories, ideas and inventions affect growth rates. In this respect 
and in parallel with ‘knowledge-based economy transition’, the demand for personal 
higher education has increased all over the world. The increase in the demand for 
personal higher education in the world can be seen from the statistics on the gross 
enrollment ratio in tertiary education (Table 2.4.). 
  
                                                          
18
 See: “To what South Korea Owes Success in Innovations? Implications for Turkey”  
19
 See: “Why Innovation Is King in South Korea” 
20
 See: “Innovation Policies of South Korea” 
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Region 1970 1980 1990 2014 
North America 47.37% 53.78% 72.61% 84.03% 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
33.27% 31.92% 35.07% 62.07% 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
5.96% 13.12% 16.2% 43.3% 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
5.65% 10% 12.71% 36.47% 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
1.43% 3.24% 5.21% 36.47% 
South Asia 4.28% 4.48% 5.42% 20.84% 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1.43% 2.12% 3.2% 8.59% 
Table 2.4. Gross Enrollment Ratio in Tertiary Education (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2018)
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Personal demand for higher education has been consistently increasing all over 
the world. Along with the increment of personal demand for higher education, 
improvements in the universities both quantitatively and qualitatively have recently 
become more important than ever. Therefore, many countries give priority to 
allocating more financial resources for higher education and to providing substantial 
economic support. However, increasing demand for higher education versus 
increasing scarcity of public resources has obliged countries to seek private resources 
(Özekicioğlu 2013, 33). Additionally, it also includes considerable private benefits 
for graduates, as well as public benefits of higher education. This is the reason why 
countries look for new higher education funding schemes. On the following tables 
are shown separately the private and public benefits and costs for a man and a 
woman attaining tertiary education (2012) in the OECD countries.  
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 Total enrollment ratio in tertiary education, regardless of age, is expressed as a percentage of the 
total population of the five-year age group 
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OECD Countries Total Costs Total Benefits 
Internal Rate of 
Return 
 Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman 
Australia 75 800 76 700 285 400 223 800 9% 9% 
Canada  56 100 57 300 225 500 238 500 9% 12% 
Denmark 54 600 55 100 200 700  129 400 9% 7% 
Finland 64 600 66 600 253 100 169 300 10% 7% 
France m m m m m M 
Germany m m m m m M 
Italy 50 500 48 000 233 200 159 200 9% 8% 
Japan 111 000 110 700 355 000 144 300 8% 3% 
Netherlands 102 200 102 500 336 700 281 800 8% 7% 
New Zealand 66 200  64 600 169 500 147 300 7% 7% 
Sweden m m m m m M 
Turkey m m m m m M 
The United Kingdom m m m m m M 
The United States 86 300 88 300 544 100 386 200 15% 12% 
OECD Average 54 200 54 300 312 600 221 900 14% 12% 
Table 2.5. Private Costs and Benefits for a Man and a Woman Attaining Tertiary Education in 2012 
(OECD 2016)
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When the table above is examined, we can clearly state that the highest total 
private cost takes part in Japan for a man and a woman in 2012. On the other hand, 
the United States has the highest total private benefits for both a man and a woman. 
Furthermore, the total private benefits for a man and a woman are higher than the 
total private costs for all of the countries on the table. The United States has also the 
highest private internal rate of return for a man, which is 15%, and this is above the 
OECD average calculated as 14%. Similarly, Canada and the United States have the 
highest private internal rate of return for a woman equally, which is 12%, the same 
with the OECD average. 
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 m means that data is not available. 
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2.5.b. Public Costs and Benefits  
OECD Countries Total Costs Total Benefits 
Internal Rate of 
Return 
 Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman 
Australia 35 000 35 100 163 700 125 000 9% 10% 
Canada  44 800 44 900 268 200 96 400 9% 6% 
Denmark 96 300 96 400 238 600  122 000 9% 3% 
Finland 90 400 90 400 219 800 137 000 10% 4% 
France m m m m m m 
Germany m m m m m m 
Italy 43 600 43 200 218 800 117 600 9% 6% 
Japan 11 100 11 200 152 900 144 600 8% 28% 
Netherlands 78 700 78 700 272 700 192 800 8% 7% 
New Zealand 38 000 37 800 76 600 52 900 7% 4% 
Sweden m m m m m m 
Turkey m m m m m m 
The United Kingdom m m m m m m 
The United States 64 200 64 500 328 300 176 800 15% 8% 
OECD Average 53 500 53 500 197 200 127 600 14% 8% 
Table 2.6. Public Costs and Benefits for a Man and a Woman Attaining Tertiary Education in 2012 
(OECD 2016)
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According to table 2.6. Denmark has the highest total public costs for a man 
within the OECD countries on the table, which is 96 300. Total public benefits for a 
man are also high but the highest country that the men benefited from the tertiary 
higher education is the United States. As for a woman, Denmark again has the 
highest total public costs. Netherlands has the highest total public benefit for a 
woman in 2012. When countries are examined for the public internal rate of return, it 
is observed that the United States has the highest public internal rate of return for a 
man whilst Japan has the highest public internal rate of return for a woman with a 
further ratio (%28), which is excessively above the OECD average.  
 
                                                          
23
 m means that data is not available. 
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According to both of the tables, total costs are calculated as, 
Total Costs=Direct Costs + Foregone Taxes on Earnings 
Total Benefits are calculated as; 
Total Benefit=Income Tax Effect + Social Contribution Effect + Transfers Effect                              
+ Unemployment Benefits Effect 
Based on the Education at a Glance Report (2016, 47), the definitions are   
indicated as follows: 
 Private Direct Costs: Households' total expenditure on education, including 
net payments to educational institutions as well as payments for educational 
goods and services apart from educational institutions. 
Income Tax Effect: The income tax effect is the discounted sum of 
additional level of income tax paid by the private individual or earned by the 
government over the course of a lifetime and associated with a higher level of 
education.  
Social Contribution Effect: The social contribution effect is the discounted 
sum of additional employee social contribution paid by the private individual 
or received by the government over the course of a lifetime and associated with 
a higher level of education. 
Social Transfers Effect: The transfers’ effect is the discounted sum of 
additional social transfers from the government to the private individual 
associated with a higher education level over the course of a lifetime. Social 
transfers include two types of benefits: housing benefits and social assistance. 
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Unemployment Benefit Effect: The unemployment benefit effect is the 
discounted difference between the added earnings from unemployment (net 
unemployment benefit) associated with a higher level of attainment and the 
loss in net earnings from work when unemployed. 
Total Private Benefits: The additional net income expected from an 
additional level of education, given that the individual successfully enters the 
labor market. 
Total Public Benefits: The additional tax receipts expected by the state from 
an additional level of education, given that the individual successfully enters 
the labor market. 
Internal Rate of Return is the interest rate on the investment in education at 
which the added earnings from education exactly cover the cost making an 
individual indifferent between investing in an additional degree and entering 
the labor market.  
Consequently, with the increasing demand by the students for higher education 
and with increasing demand by the market for qualified human capital, more 
resources have begun to be transferred to higher education in recent years. This 
process has drastically increased particularly in Asian countries such as China, Japan, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. Armstrong and Chapman (2011, 10) expressed 
this increment as follows:  
Notably, the percentage of national education expenditure to gross domestic 
product (GDP) increased from 2.4 per cent in 2001 to 3.8 per cent in 2007, but 
this is still well below other countries in the region such as Malaysia (8.1 per 
cent) and Thailand (4.6 per cent).   
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Thus, it can be clearly stated that the transfer of more resources to higher 
education has a positive effect on the growth of Asian economies. One of the most 
significant tools of delivering financial support to higher education is the design of 
higher education credit systems; thereby, more funds are being created for higher 
education.  
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYZING BETTER PERFORMING STUDENTS AND BEST 
FOUNDATION UNIVERSITIES 
It is necessary to determine which foundation universities have the highest 
rankings and which students are better performing in Turkey in order to design a 
credit system to match better performing students and best foundation universities. In 
this section, firstly, foundation universities with the highest rankings in Turkey will 
be determined according to three indicators, which are University Rankings made by 
the top ten university ranking agencies in the world, the most successful students’ 
preferences as a result of university entrance exam, and the results of the 
questionnaire conducted to the students. Secondly, we will determine which students 
are better performing according to data from the Council of Higher Education 
(CoHE) indicating the university entrance exam success ratings of students placed at 
certain universities. Thus, we aim to point out that these students have the necessary 
scores from the university entrance exams to enter without scholarships to the 
foundation universities with the highest rankings. After these determinations are 
made, the credit system to be designed will be discussed in the next chapters. 
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3.1. Foundation Universities with the Highest Rankings in Turkey (The Best 
Foundation Universities)  
3.1.a. University Rankings Made by the Top Ten University Ranking Agencies in the 
World 
The ranking results published by the top ten university rating agencies in the 
world for the year 2016 was analyzed to determine best foundation universities in 
Turkey. These rankings are based on the core missions of universities like research, 
teaching, knowledge transfer and international outlook (Times Higher Education 
[THE], 2018). These agencies are Times Higher Education (THE), Webometrics, 
Scimago, Us News and World Report, Quacquarelli Symonds (QS), Leiden, Centre 
for World University Rankings (Cwur), Round University Ranking (RUR), 
Academic Ranking of World Universities (Arwu), University Ranking by Academic 
Performance (URAP).  Moreover, the top 11 universities for Turkey listed by the top 
10 university rating institutions in the world are shown on the Appendix A.3. In 
order to achieve impartial and comprehensive rankings for Turkey, we regenerated 
the ranking list by weighting the data as follows: 
- According to rankings; if the university is on the top of the list among all 
universities in Turkey, we added 10 points. 
- If the university is ranked as the second, we added 9.5 points and so on… 
- If the university is not ranked on the lists of any of the abovementioned 10 
institutions' rankings, we do not add points (Table 3.1.). 
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University Rankings in Turkey in 2016 
Rank1 10 
Rank2 9.5 
Rank3 9 
Rank4 8.5 
Rank5 8 
Rank6 7.5 
Rank7 7 
Rank8 6.5 
Rank9 6 
Rank10 5.5 
Rank11 5 
Not in Rankings 0 
Table 3.1. Method of Calculation To Identify Best Universities In Turkey 
As an example to make the analysis more descriptive: Middle East Technical 
University (METU) is ranked at the top of two rating agencies and is also ranked as 
the second of the list of four institutions.  Since THE listed METU as the 10
th
 we add 
5.5 points, Webometrics listed it as the 1
st
 we add 10 points, Scimago ranked it as the 
second we add 9.5 points, US News and World Report listed it as the second we add 
9.5 points, QS listed it as the 4
th
 we add 8.5 points Leiden listed it as the 4
th
 we add 
8.5 points, CWUR listed it as the 1
st
 we add 10 points, RUR listed it as the second 
rank we add 9.5 points, since METU is not included into the list of ARWU we do not 
add any points, and finally URAP listed it as the second we add 9.5 points. Thus, the 
score of METU is calculated as follows: 5.5+10+9.5+9.5+8.5+8.5+10+9.5+0+9.5= 
80.5. When other universities in the list are calculated with the same method, we get 
the following final universities ranking list for the year 2016:    
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Rank University Total Score 
1 Metu 80.5 
2 Istanbul Technical University 75.5 
3 Istanbul Univ. 72 
4 Hacettepe Univ. 69.5 
5 Bilkent Univ. 65 
6 Ankara Univ. 57 
7 Boğaziçi Univ. 53.5 
8 Gazi Univ. 45.5 
9 Ege Univ. 42.5 
10 Koç Univ. 38.5 
11 Sabanci Univ. 29 
12 Erciyes Univ. 19 
13 Dokuz Eylül Univ. 16.5 
14 Çukurova Univ. 12 
15 Atilim Univ. 8.5 
16 Çanakkale 18 Mart Univ. 7 
17 Anadolu Univ. 6.5 
18 Izmir Institute of Technology 6 
19 Selçuk Univ. 5.5 
20 Tobb University of Economics and Technology 5 
21 Bahçeşehir Univ. 5 
22 Mersin Univ. 5 
23 Atatürk Univ. 5 
24 Marmara Univ. 5 
Table 3.2. Best Universities in Turkey According To The Top 10 Rating Agencies For The Year   
2016 
 
When the results published by the top ten university rating agencies are taken 
together, we reach the results presented on the table 3.2. Therefore, the universities in 
the top ten are most rated and highest rankings in Turkey. Eventually, according to 
this indicator, there are two foundation universities in the top ten of the Table 3.2.: 
Bilkent and Koç Universities.  
3.1.b. The Most Preferred Foundation Universities by the Most Successful Students  
Data published by CoHE for the year 2016 demonstrates the average success 
rankings of the students settled in the universities (Yükseköğretim Program Atlası 
[YOKATLAS], 2018)
24
. In this section; according to this data, we investigate 
                                                          
24
 This data is accessable online from https://yokatlas.yok.gov.tr/index.php 
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whether students with the highest points from university entrance exams prefer the 
universities on the Table 3.2. These pieces of data are shown separately for 
Department of Economics and Departments of Electric and Electronics Engineering 
for 2016 academic year. It is considered that one of these departments is chosen from 
the Social Sciences and the other from the Institute of Sciences. 
Students can be settled in the Economics Department with their Turkish 
Mathematics-1 (TM-1) scores of the university entrance exam. The order of the top 
ten universities with the highest average success rankings for the Economics 
Department is shown on Table 3.3. 
  
Success rankings of students  
(TurkishMathematics-1 scores) 
Universities Scholarship Highest Average Lowest 
Koç Univ. Full scholarship Program 51 145 324 
Boğaziçi Univ. State University 3 1055 1650 
İhsan Doğramaci Bilkent Univ. Full scholarship Program 20 1769 2771 
Koç Univ. 50% Scholarship Program 1936 3097 4540 
Özyeğin Univ. Full Scholarship Program 3006 3531 4843 
Galatasaray Univ. State University 2112 3581 4558 
TOBB University  Full Scholarship Program 3660 5356 8105 
Middle East Technical Univ. State University 35 9266 12380 
Istanbul Technical University (English) State University 5293 10470 14088 
Istanbul Bilgi Univ. Full Scholarship Program 7942 14495 16840 
Table 3.3. Top Ten Universities Mostly Preferred by Most Successful Students for Economics 
Department in 2016 
On Table 3.3., Koç University (Full Scholarship Program) is the first university 
chosen by the most successful students. Then, the most successful students prefer to 
take education in Boğaziçi, Bilkent (full scholarship), Koç (50% scholarship), 
Özyeğin (full scholarship), Galatasaray, TOBB, METU, Istanbul Technical 
University, and Istanbul Bilgi University, respectively. Koç, Boğaziçi, Bilkent, 
TOBB, METU and Istanbul Technical University also take place in Table 3.2.  When 
Table 3.2. and 3.3. are examined together, it is observed that two foundation 
universities are in the top ten of the both lists: Bilkent and Koç Universities.  
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It should also be noted that despite the observation that some of the successful 
students have also settled in Sabancı University, we cannot make comparison with 
these foundation universities because they are accepting students with Turkish 
Mathematics-3 taken from the university entrance exam. Besides, Sabancı University 
is not ranked as one of the top ten universities in Turkey in the ranking list by the top 
university ranking institutions in the world. For this reason, we could not evaluate the 
Sabancı University as one of the best foundation universities in Turkey. 
           Success rankings of students  
         (MathematicsScience-4 scores) 
Universities Scholarship Highest Average Lowest 
Boğaziçi Univ. State University 12 237 530 
Koç Univ. Full Scholarship Program 11 301 578 
Ihsan Doğramaci Bilkent Univ. Full Scholarship Program 8 338 711 
Middle East Technical University State University 47 1557 2402 
Tobb University Full Scholarship Program 406 2617 3638 
Ihsan Doğramaci Bilkent Univ. %50 Scholarship Program 1002 2710 3821 
Koç Univ. %50 Scholarship Program 2243 3375 4380 
TOBB University %75 Scholarship Program 6176 6620 7395 
Özyeğin Üniv. Full Scholarship Program 7881 9016 9965 
Koç Univ. %25 Scholarship Program 4796 14455 19204 
Table 3.4. The Top Universities Mostly Preferred By Most Successful Students for Electric and 
Electronics Engineering Department in 2016 
Electric and Electronics Engineering Department accepts students with 
Mathematics Science-4 (MF-4) scores. On table 3.4., the top ten universities that are 
preferred by the most successful students are listed according to average scores of the 
accepted students from highest to lowest. According to Table 3.4., Boğaziçi 
University is the first university preferred by the most successful students in 2016. 
When Table 3.2. and 3.4. are examined together, it is observed that two foundation 
universities are involved in the top ten of the both lists: Bilkent and Koç Universities. 
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3.1.c. Meeting the Finance Need of the Higher Education: A Field Research on 
Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Çukurova University, and Eskişehir Osmangazi 
University  
3.1.c.i. Universe and Sample of the Research 
With a survey study, the reactions of students to the borrowing system were 
analyzed, who had enough scores for the highest foundation universities (such as 
Bilkent and Koç Universities) but chose universities with lower rankings (such as 
Yıldırım Beyazıt, Çukurova, and Eskişehir Osmangazi Universities). In this context, 
the universe of this research study is composed of the 1
s
t and 4
th
 grade students, who 
chose Ankara Yildirim Beyazit (students in Economy, and Electric and Electronics 
Engineering Departments), Çukurova (students in Economy Department), and 
Eskişehir Osmangazi University (Electric and Electronics Engineering Departments) 
and who gained sufficient scores from the exams, but did not prefer receiving 
education in the Bilkent and Koç Universities in 2013 and 2016. It is stated in the 
literature that all individuals related with the research problem should be involved in 
the research (Lin, 1976, 146). In this research study, this method was used, which is 
called as complete counting. Therefore, the field research was not conducted on the 
sample, which represented a smaller portion, but on all of the students in the 
mentioned universe. 
In determining these schools, the data provided by the Council of Higher 
Education (CoHE) about the student rankings for the year 2016 was used. There 
were also students, who had the sufficient scores for Bilkent and Koç, but chose 
Boğaziçi University, METU, Galatasaray University, Hacettepe University, Yıldız 
Technical University, Istanbul Technical University etc. However, since a part of 
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these universities are among the most preferred ones on the world ranking list of the 
abovementioned ten ranking institutions (see section 3.1.a and 3.1.b), the students in 
these schools were not included in the field research. Therefore, it was demanded 
that the general scope of the study should be composed of several state universities, 
which were not included in the world ranking list and/or the most preferred 
universities list. In this context, the students in Economy Departments in 2016 can be 
included in this study, who had sufficient scores for Bilkent and Koç Universities but 
preferred Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Anadolu University, Istanbul 
Medeniyet University, Çukurova University (English Program), Çukurova University 
(Turkish Program and Daytime Education), Ondokuz Mayıs University (English 
Program), Kocaeli University, Akdeniz University, Uludağ University, Sakarya 
University, Pamukkale University etc. The students in Electric and Electronics 
Engineering Department in 2016 can be included in this study, who had sufficient 
scores for Bilkent and Koç Universities but preferred Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt 
University, Anadolu University (English Program), Eskişehir Osmangazi University 
(English Program), Çukurova University (English Program) etc.  
The research study was limited to the first three state universities (in order to 
reach more students with sufficient scores) with the highest average scores of their 
students in TM-1 (Economy Department) and MF-4 (Electric and Electronics 
Engineering Department) which was formed by the CoHE. These universities for the 
Economy Departments in the year 2016 are, respectively, Yıldırım Beyazıt 
University (English Program), Anadolu University (English Program), and Çukurova 
University (English and Turkish program, daytime education); for the Electric and 
Electronics Departments (for the year 2016) Anadolu University (English Program), 
Yıldırım Beyazıt University (English Program), and Eskişehir Osmangazi University 
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(English Program). However, the presidency of the Anadolu University did not give 
permission for the survey study, therefore the two universities below the Anadolu, 
which were Çukurova and Eskişehir Universities, were included. Therefore, for the 
field research regarding the Economy Departments, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt 
University (English Program) and Çukurova University (English and Turkish 
program, daytime education); for Electric Electronic Department, Ankara Yıldırım 
Beyazıt University (English Program) and Eskişehir Osmangazi University (English 
Program) were determined (Survey Disallowance of Presidency of Anadolu 
University is presented in the Appendix A.4.).  
For the year 2016, there were 57 students placed in the Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt 
University (English program) in the Economy Department, 152 students placed in 
the Çukurova University (English and Turkish program, daytime education) in 
Economy Department, 49 students in the Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University 
(English program) in the Electric and Electronics Engineering Department (English 
program) and for the same department (English program) there were 90 students 
placed in the Eskişehir Osmangazi University. For the year 2013, there were 47 
students placed in the Yıldırım Beyazıt University (English program) in Economy 
Department, 170 students placed in the Çukurova University (English and Turkish 
program, daytime education) in Economy Department, 47 students in the Yıldırım 
Beyazıt University (English program) in Electric and Electronics Engineering 
Department (English program) and for the same department (English program) there 
were 93 students placed in the Eskişehir Osmangazi University 25.  
 
                                                          
25
 For the number of students placed at mentioned universities see: 
https://dokuman.osym.gov.tr/pdfdokuman/2013/OSYS/Tablo4.pdf 
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3.1.c.ii. Method of the Research Study 
Survey method, which is one of the quantitative research methods, was used in 
this research study. 
In order to reach the maximum number of students selected from the universe 
explained in 3.1.c.i, field research was conducted on the students in the classrooms of 
the universities before the start of the classes, and survey study was applied 
comprising of six questions and demographic information of the students. The 
questions addressed to the students in the survey form were elaborately chosen to be 
clear and simple. Moreover, the number of the questions was limited to a figure in 
order not to take too much time of the students.    
3.1.c.iii. Survey Form 
A sample of the survey form is presented in the Appendix A.5. It was comprised 
of two parts: University choice and demographic information. The first part 
(university choice) was composed of six questions regarding influential factors on 
their choices, regarding their education quality perceptions of the first two 
foundation universities of the Table 3.2. (Bilkent and Koç Universities) and the state 
universities below the list in the Table 3.2., whether their financial limitation was an 
obstacle for placing in the foundation universities, concerning their financial 
limitations and borrowing as a solution to their financial limitations. The last part 
(demographic information) was formed to determine the demographic features of the 
subjects. 
37 
 
The third question of the survey was open-ended. The data obtained from this 
question was interpreted by transforming it into closed-ended via grouping the 
answers.  
The answer choices of the survey questions were prepared as yes/no, gradation, 
and multiple-choice.  
3.1.c.iv. Data Analysis of the Research Study and Statistical Methods Used 
The analysis of the survey was conducted via SPSS 21 package program. The 
results of the research study were formed by using frequency, percentage, and 
crosstab analyses. The frequency results explain the frequency of the answers given 
by the students in terms of the amount, number, total etc. of the choices; while the 
percentages explain the distribution of the same answers. Chi-square independence 
tests were applied in the crosstab analyses.  
3.1.c.v. General Information about the Sample of the Research Study  
The universe of the research was determined based on the number of the students 
placed in 2013 and 2016 years in the Çukurova University (Economy Department, 
daytime education and English program), Eskişehir Osmangazi University (Electric-
Electronics Engineering Department), Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University 
(Economy and Electric-Electronics Engineering Department). Accordingly, among 
the 705 students only 253, whose scores were sufficient for the Bilkent and Koç 
Universities but who preferred not to place there, were included in the survey. 
General information about the students participating in the survey is presented in the 
Appendix A.6.a.  
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3.1.c.vi. Findings of the Research Study 
There are the findings of the questions addressed to the students concerning their 
perspectives about their basic criteria for university choices, their city preference in 
choosing the university, their income expectations after graduation, and their 
viewpoints about suggested borrowing system. The data regarding the demographic 
features of the students are presented in the Appendix A.6.  
 Frequency and Percentage Distribution Analyses 
 Percentage Distribution Analysis of the Answers Regarding University 
Choices 
The percentage distribution of the evaluations regarding the basic criteria of the 
students in making their university choices are on Table 3.5.  
Basic Criteria in Choosing the 
University 
Completely 
not 
Important 
Not 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Important 
Too 
Important 
Total 
 
Percent  
The City of the University 1,6 2,0 11,1 47,8 37,2 99,6 
Employment Opportunity  
After Graduation  
0,4 2,0 3,6 25,3 68,8 100,0 
Facilities of the University 3,2 4,7 34,0 41,5 16,6 100,0 
Choices of Fast Friends 19,4 39,1 25,3 11,5 4,7 100,0 
Internship Opportunity of the University 2,8 7,9 18,6 39,9 30,8 100,0 
Education Language 0,4 0,8 9,5 43,5 45,5 99,6 
Sufficiency of the Academic Cadre 0,8 1,2 7,1 37,5 53,4 100,0 
General Image of the University 1,2 1,6 15,0 43,5 38,7 100,0 
Scholarship Opportunity 4,7 14,2 31,2 27,7 21,7 99,6 
Education Fees 3,6 9,5 22,9 33,2 30,8 100,0 
Student Dormitory Opportunity 7,9 15,4 15,4 37,5 23,7 100,0 
Interest of the Administrative  Staff 2,4 7,5 15,0 36,8 37,9 99,6 
Social and Cultural Activities  2,8 9,5 30,0 30,8 26,5 100,0 
Table 3.5. Evaluations of the Basic Criteria that the Students Grounded on While Making Choice 
  
39 
 
Graphic 3.1. Distribution Graphic of the Students About University Choices as Important and Too 
Important 
 
The first five criteria that the students attached the most importance are, 
respectively, employment opportunity after graduation, sufficiency of academic 
cadres of the university, education language, the city of the university, and general 
image of the university.   
 Frequency and Percentage Distribution Analyses of Student Answers 
Regarding City Preference 
The distribution graphic of the cities that the students mostly preferred and not 
preferred is on Graphic 3.2. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Important and Too Important (%) 
40 
 
 
    Graphic 3.2. Distribution Graphic of the Cities that the Students Preferred 
 
According to the Graphic 3.2., the distribution of the students who answered as 
“I'd prefer” for Ankara was 66,4 %, while it was 61,3 % for Izmir, and 49 % for 
Istanbul. Moreover, the rate of the students preferring and not preferring Istanbul is 
quite close to each other.  
 Frequency and Percentage Distribution Analyses of Student Answers 
Regarding Their Monthly Income Expectations in the First Five Years 
After Graduation 
Graphic 3.3. shows the distribution of student answers regarding their monthly 
income expectations in the first five years after graduation. 
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     Graphic 3.3. Monthly Income Predictions of the Students in the First Five Years After Graduation 
It is observed on Graphic 3.3., that one third of the students participating in the 
survey did not have any predictions about their monthly income in the first five years 
after graduation. 11,5 % of them expected an amount around 2,500 TL, while 10,7 % 
predicted to have around 3,500 TL, and 10,3 % around 4,000 TL.  
 Distribution Analyses of the Student Perceptions Regarding the Quality of 
the Universities 
The students were asked for scoring the education quality of eighteen universities 
according to their perceptions. There were fourteen state universities, and four 
foundation universities, such as Koç, Bilkent, Sabancı, and TOBB Universities 
among the ones to be scored. In determining the fourteen state universities, it was 
based on that most or a part of the students in these state universities had sufficient 
scores from the entrance exams for the four foundation universities but they did not 
prefer to be placed in these foundation universities, instead chose lower ranked state 
universities on the list presented in 3.1.a. Accordingly, the perceptions of the 
students regarding the education quality of the state and foundation universities were 
examined, aiming to analyze whether the motive behind the refusal for the 
foundation universities was their perception of the quality in these universities. 
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Percentage distribution of the student answers regarding the mentioned universities 
are presented on Table 3.6.    
 % 
 Very Bad Bad Medium Well Very Well No Idea 
Anadolu Uni. 2,00 4,70 29,2 37,9 10,7 15,4 
Bilkent Uni. 0,00 0,80 5,10 22,1 54,5 17,0 
Çukurova Uni.. 2,80 10,7 28,1 25,7 10,3 22,5 
Ege Uni. 0,40 1,20 13,0 44,7 22,1 18,2 
Erciyes Uni. 2,80 11,1 33,6 11,9 0,80 39,1 
Eskişehir Osmangazi Uni. 2,00 7,50 30,0 32,0 7,10 20,9 
Gazi Uni. 2,40 5,10 19,4 39,9 22,5 10,3 
İst. Medeniyet Uni. 5,10 8,30 14,6 5,90 5,10 59,3 
Koç Uni. 0,40 0,40 4,30 16,6 66,4 11,9 
Marmara Uni. 0,00 0,40 12,3 37,5 34,4 15,0 
Pamukkale Uni. 4,30 16,2 27,7 8,70 0,80 41,9 
Sabancı Uni. 0,00 0,80 7,10 22,5 42,3 27,3 
Sakarya Uni. 5,50 13,0 33,6 9,10 1,60 37,2 
Selçuk Uni. 4,70 11,1 34,0 17,8 2,00 30,4 
Süleyman Demirel Uni. 3,60 15,4 28,5 9,10 1,60 41,9 
TOBB Uni. 0,80 3,60 5,90 24,5 33,2 30,8 
Uludağ Uni. 1,60 7,10 39,1 23,3 4,00 24,1 
Yıldırım Beyazıt Uni. 5,90 7,10 29,2 17,0 7,10 33,2 
Table 3.6. Percentage Distribution of the Students Regarding the Quality of the Universities 
Ranking of the Universities Stated as "Medium Quality" by the Students: 
 
Graphic 3.4. Ranking of the Universities Stated as "Medium Quality" by the Students 
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The ranking of the "medium quality" universities according to the answer of the 
students are shown on Graphic 3.4. According to the graphic, almost one-third of the 
students evaluated Uludağ, Selçuk, Sakarya, Erciyes, Eskişehir Osmangazi, Anadolu, 
Yıldırım Beyazıt, Süleyman Demirel, Çukurova, and Pamukkale Universities, 
respectively, as the "medium quality" universities. These universities comply with 
the rankings of the best ten ranking institutions and they are not among the best 
ranked universities, either ranked below on the list or not ranked at all.   
Ranking of the Universities Stated as "Very Well" by the Students: 
 
Graphic 3.5. Ranking of the Universities Stated as "Very Well" by the Students 
The ranking of the "very well" universities according to the answer of the students 
are shown on Graphic 3.5. The universities that were evaluated as "very well" by 
more than 30% of the students were, respectively, Koç, Bilkent, Sabancı, Marmara, 
and TOBB Universities. According to these results, it was observed that all of the 
four foundation universities included in the survey were ranked in the first five 
according to the answers of the students. Koç and Bilkent Universities among these 
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four, were both in the ranking list of the best ranking institutions (Table 3.2.) and in 
the best ten universities list preferred by the best students (Table 3.3. and 3.4.). 
When the answers regarding the education quality of the universities were 
examined, it was observed that more than half of the students preferred universities 
evaluated by their own as "medium quality", although they had sufficient scores for 
paid education in Bilkent and Koç Universities, whose education quality was 
evaluated by the same students as "very well". This fact proves that the motive 
behind refusing these mentioned foundation universities is not the education quality, 
it is due to financial limitations of the students.    
 Percentage Distribution of the Student Attitudes Towards Education in Koç 
and Bilkent Universities with Full Scholarship  
 
      Graphic 3.6. Preferences Concerning Education in Bilkent and Koç Universities with %100            
Scholarship 
In this question, the attitudes of the students concerning the possibility of 
education in Bilkent and Koç Universities with full scholarships (without making any 
payments) were analyzed. As observed on Graphic 3.6., 87% of the students stated 
that if they had sufficient scores for these universities with full scholarship, they 
would prefer, 12,6 % of the students mentioned that they would not.  
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Additionally, the students, who mentioned 'no', were asked to state the reason of 
their refusal. The refusal reasons of 29 out of 32 students, who said 'no', is presented 
on Graphic 3.7.  
 Graphic 3.7. Refusal Reasons of the Students for Education with 100% Scholarship in Bilkent and  
Koç Universities 
According to Graphic 3.7., several of the most common reasons for the students to 
refuse education with 100% scholarship are as follows;  
a) Anticipation about being unable to adapt to the social atmosphere,  
b) Preference in favor of quality state universities in case they have sufficient 
scores for full scholarship,  
c) Anticipation of a possible cut in their scholarship payments in case they fail to 
be successful, thus having to pay for education, which they cannot finance.    
 Percentage Distribution Analyses of the Students Regarding Their Attitudes 
Towards Education in Bilkent and Koç Universities via Borrowing 
The attitudes of the students towards education in Koç and Bilkent Universities 
via borrowing are shown on Graphic 3.8.  
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     Graphic 3.8. Student Attitudes Towards Education in Koç and Bilkent Universities via Borrowing. 
According to the results on Graphic 3.8., 32,8% and 23,7% of the students think 
positive about receiving education via borrowing in Koç and Bilkent Universities, 
respectively. The rate of the ones, who oppose this idea, is 48,6 % for Koç University 
and 52,5 % for Bilkent University. 
Although the students ranked Koç and Bilkent Universities as "very well" and 
87% of them preferred to receive education with full scholarship in these 
universities, a reason of their refusal for paid education via borrowing might be that 
30,8% of them could not predict their income in the first five years after graduation. 
Since approximately 30% of them predict a monthly salary in between 2,500-4,000 
TL, the refusal for borrowing might be because of apprehension that they will be 
unable to repay the loan. In this point, the most important factor is to form the 
repayment system for the students as flexible as possible in order to encourage them 
to borrow for education. The fact that one-third of the students predicted lower 
incomes particularly for the first years after the graduation makes it crucial to arrange 
the repayments as income contingent. 
On the other hand, that 68,8% of the students consider employment after 
graduation as an answer for the question regarding the university choices, manifests 
their anxiety about employment. Therefore, one of the reasons of their refusal for 
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paid education might be their anxiety about being unable to repay the loan, since they 
will be jobless after graduation. 
It is considered that the students, who said 'I cannot decide', would think positive 
about borrowing system if the possible borrowing program would be more flexible 
for the students.    
 Crosstab Analyses  
In this part of the study, the systematic relation among some of the survey 
questions was analyzed. In this context, H0 hypothesis was hypothesized on the 
assumption that there was no relation between the variables. The statistical 
significance of the H0 hypothesis was analyzed via Chi-square test conducted on the 
variables on the crosstab. The crosstab analyses were presented under certain sub-
titles via groupings.     
 Crosstabs According to the Education Quality of Koç and Bilkent 
Universities 
The relation between the perceptions of the students about the education quality of 
Koç and Bilkent Universities and their full scholarship education preferences was 
analyzed, and the results are as follows. 
 %100 scholarship 
Koç University 
 Yes No Missing 
Very Bad 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
Bad 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Medium 72,7% 27,3% 0,0% 
Well 83,3% 16,7% 0,0% 
Very Well 91,7% 8,3% 0,0% 
No Idea 73,3% 23,3% 3,3% 
 Total 87,0% 12,6% 0,4% 
Table 3.7. The Preference of the Students About Education with 100% Scholarship in the Koç 
University Considering its Education Quality 
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According to the results of the analysis on the Table 3.7., 91,7 % of the students, 
who stated that the education quality of the Koç University was "very well", accepted 
education with 100% scholarship. However, 8,3% of them refused, although they 
stated "very well". 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23,447a 10 ,009 
Table 3.8. Chi-Square Tests for the Education Quality of Koç University and Education Preference in 
This University with 100% Scholarship 
 
The results obtained from the Chi-Square Test regarding the survey results are 
on Table 3.8. According to this, since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is p=0,009<0,05, 
H0 (Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is rejected, thus, it is determined that there is a 
relation between the perceived education quality of the Koç University and 
education preference with 100% scholarship in this university.  
 
 %100 Scholarship 
Bilkent University 
 Yes No 
Bad 50,0% 50,0% 
Medium 84,6% 15,4% 
Well 85,7% 14,3% 
Very Well 92,8% 7,2% 
No Idea 74,4% 25,6% 
 Total 87,3% 12,7% 
Table 3.9. The Preference of the Students Regarding Education with 100% Scholarship in the Bilkent 
University Considering its Education Quality 
 
According to the Table 3.9., 92,8% of the students, who consider that the 
education quality of the Bilkent University is "very well", preferred education with 
100% scholarship. However, 7,2% of them refused education with 100% 
scholarship, although they think that the quality is "very well". 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12,860a 4 ,012 
Table 3.10. Chi-Square Tests for the Education Quality of the Bilkent University and Education 
Preference in this University with 100% Scholarship 
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According to Table 3.10., since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is p=0,012<0,05, H0 
(Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is rejected, thus, it is determined that there is a 
relation between the perceived education quality of the Bilkent University and 
education preference with 100% scholarship in this university.  
 
  Koç Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd 
not prefer 
I'd not 
prefer 
I cannot 
decide 
I'd prefer 
I'd definitely 
prefer 
Koç Üniv. 
Very Bad 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Bad 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Medium 18,2% 18,2% 27,3% 27,3% 9,1% 
Well 33,3% 26,2% 23,8% 14,3% 2,4% 
Very Well 25,0% 17,3% 16,7% 18,5% 22,6% 
No Idea 46,7% 23,3% 20,0% 3,3% 6,7% 
 Total 29,2% 19,4% 18,6% 16,2% 16,6% 
Table 3.11. Preferences of the Students Regarding Education in the Koç University via Borrowing 
Considering its Education Quality 
According to Table 3.11., 42,3% of the students, who mentioned that the 
education quality of the Koç University was "very well", thought positive about 
paid education via borrowing, while 41,1 % of them opposed.  
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28,218a 20 ,104 
Table 3.12. Chi-Square Tests for Education Quality of the Koç University and Education Preference 
in this University via Borrowing 
According to Table 3.12., since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is p=0,104>0,05, H0 
(Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is not rejected, thus, it is determined that there is no 
relation between the perceived education quality of the Bilkent University and 
education preference via borrowing in this university. 
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Bilkent Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd 
not prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer 
I'd definitely 
prefer 
Bilkent Uni. 
Bad 0,0% 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 50,0% 
Medium 25,0% 41,7% 25,0% 8,3% 0,0% 
Well 36,4% 23,6% 21,8% 9,1% 9,1% 
Very Well 26,1% 17,4% 23,9% 17,4% 15,2% 
No Idea 44,2% 27,9% 20,9% 4,7% 2,3% 
 Total 31,2% 21,6% 23,2% 12,8% 11,2% 
Table 3.13. Preferences of the Students Regarding Education in the Bilkent University via Borrowing 
Considering its Education Quality 
 
According to Table 3.13., 32,6 % of the students, who mentioned that the 
education quality of the Bilkent University was "very well", thought positive about 
paid education via borrowing, while 43,5% of them opposed. Compared to the 
results concerning the Koç University, these results manifest that more students 
than the ones who mentioned "very well" were indecisive about education in 
Bilkent University via borrowing and even thinking negative about this idea.   
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25,028a 16 ,069 
Table 3.14. Chi-Square Tests for Education Quality of the Bilkent University and Education 
Preference in this University via Borrowing 
The results obtained from the Chi-Square Test regarding the survey results are 
on Table 3.14. According to this, since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is 
p=0,069>0,05, H0 (Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is not rejected, thus, it is 
determined that there is no relation between the perceived education quality of the 
Bilkent University and education preference via borrowing in this university.  
When the attitudes of the students towards borrowing program were evaluated, it 
was observed that among the students, who mentioned "very well" for the Koç and 
Bilkent Universities, the proportion of the ones who thought positive about paid 
education via borrowing were almost half the number of the students, who preferred 
to receive education in these schools without paying. This fact proves the financial 
limitations that these students face while making preferences. Accordingly, in order 
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to encourage students to participate in a possible borrowing program, the repayment 
conditions should be formed as flexible as possible.   
 Crosstabs Concerning Education via Borrowing Program 
  Koç Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd 
not prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer 
I'd definitely 
prefer 
Household 
Income 
500-1000 33,3% 41,7% 25,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
1001-1500 40,7% 11,1% 7,4% 14,8% 25,9% 
1501-2000 32,1% 17,9% 14,3% 17,9% 17,9% 
2001-3000 36,5% 15,4% 21,2% 19,2% 7,7% 
3001-4000 23,0% 24,6% 24,6% 18,0% 9,8% 
4001-5000 14,3% 14,3% 22,9% 25,7% 22,9% 
5001+ 32,4% 18,9% 10,8% 5,4% 32,4% 
 Total 29,4% 19,0% 18,7% 16,3% 16,7% 
Table 3.15. Preferences of the Students Regarding Education in the Koç University via Borrowing 
Considering the Household Income 
It is observed on Table 3.15. that as the household income increases, the figure 
of the students, who are thinking negative about education in the Koç University via 
borrowing, decreases in a vast scale. As per the students thinking negative about 
education via borrowing, only the figure of the students increases, who are in 2001-
3000 TL and 5001 TL and over income groups. However, almost half (48,6%) of 
the students, who are in 4001-5000 TL income groups, think positive about 
education via borrowing in the Koç University.  
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 38,068a 24 ,034 
Table 3.16. Chi-Square Tests for Monthly Household Income and Education Preference in the Koç 
University via Borrowing 
The results obtained from the Chi-Square Test regarding the survey results are 
on Table 3.16. According to this, since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is 
p=0,034<0,05, H0 (Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is rejected, thus, it is determined 
that there is a relation between the monthly household income and education 
preference in the Koç University via borrowing.  
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  Bilkent Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd 
not prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer 
I'd definitely 
prefer 
Household 
Income 
500-1000 33,3% 41,7% 25,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
1001-1500 40,7% 11,1% 7,4% 14,8% 25,9% 
1501-2000 35,7% 25,0% 17,9% 10,7% 10,7% 
2001-3000 41,2% 17,6% 25,5% 11,8% 3,9% 
3001-4000 26,2% 23,0% 34,4% 8,2% 8,2% 
4001-5000 14,7% 20,6% 20,6% 32,4% 11,8% 
5001+ 32,4% 21,6% 18,9% 8,1% 18,9% 
 Total 31,6% 21,2% 23,2% 12,8% 11,2% 
Table 3.17. Preferences of the Students Regarding Education in the Bilkent University via Borrowing 
Considering the Household Income 
It is observed on Table 3.17. that as the household income increases, the figure 
of the students, who are thinking negative about education in the Bilkent University 
via borrowing, decreases in a vast scale. As per the ones thinking negative about 
education via borrowing, only the figure of the students increases, who are in 1501-
2000 TL, and 5001 TL and over income groups. The students, who think positive 
about education via borrowing in the Bilkent University, are composed of the ones 
in 4001-5000 TL income groups. 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 42,355a 24 ,012 
Table 3.18. Chi-Square Tests for Monthly Household Income and Education Preference in the Bilkent 
University via Borrowing 
The results obtained from the Chi-Square Test regarding the survey results are 
on Table 3.18. According to this, since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is 
p=0,012<0,05, H0 (Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is rejected, thus, it is determined 
that there is a relation between the monthly household income and education 
preference in the Bilkent University via borrowing. 
It is an expected result that there is a relation in between the household incomes 
of the students and their attitudes towards borrowing program. Moreover, since 
there is a positive relation, it is considered that the more the household income, the 
higher number of students will think positive about education via borrowing. 
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Although the existence of the positive relation is generally presented on Table 3.15. 
and 3.17., it is not manifested clearly.  
 
Koç Paid Education 
 
 
 
%100 
Scholarship 
 
Definitely I'd 
not prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer 
I'd definitely 
prefer 
Yes 24,1% 20,0% 19,5% 18,2% 18,2% 
No 62,5% 15,6% 12,5% 3,1% 6,3% 
Missing 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 Total 29,2% 19,4% 18,6% 16,2% 16,6% 
Table 3.19. Preferences of the Students Regarding Education via Borrowing in the Koç University 
Considering 100% Scholarship Preferences 
According to Table 3.19., 36,4% of the students, who preferred education in the 
Koç University with 100% scholarship, thought positive about paid education via 
borrowing. 44,1% of the students, who preferred education with 100% scholarship, 
thought negative about education via borrowing, which showed their negative 
attitudes towards financing their education via borrowing. According to this, almost 
half of the students participating in the survey did not want to establish a lien on the 
long term via borrowing.      
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23,846a 8 ,002 
Table 3.20. Chi-Square Tests for Education Preference in the Koç University with 100 % Scholarship 
and Education Preference in this University via Borrowing 
According to Table 3.20., since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is p=0,002<0,05, H0 
(Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is rejected, thus, it is determined that there is a 
relation between education with 100% scholarship in the Koç University and 
education via borrowing in this university. 
Bilkent Paid Education 
 
 
 
%100 
Scholarship 
 
Definitely I'd 
not prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer 
I'd definitely 
prefer 
Yes 27,1% 22,5% 23,9% 14,7% 11,9% 
No 59,4% 15,6% 18,8% 0,0% 6,3% 
Missing 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 Total 31,5% 21,5% 23,1% 12,7% 11,2% 
Table 3.21. Preferences of the Students Regarding Education via Borrowing in the Bilkent University 
Considering 100% Scholarship Preferences 
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According to Table 3.21., 49,6% of the students, who preferred education in the 
Bilkent University with 100% scholarship, thought negative about paid education 
via borrowing. The majority of the students, who do not prefer education in the 
Bilkent University with 100% scholarship, as expected, do not prefer paid 
education in this university via borrowing, either. Moreover, compared to the 
Bilkent University, it was observed that more students than the ones, who prefer 
education in the Koç University with 100% scholarship, think positive about 
education via borrowing in the same university.    
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17,887a 8 ,022 
Table 3.22. Chi-Square Tests for Education Preference in the Bilkent University with 100 % 
Scholarship and Education Preference in This University via Borrowing 
According to Table 3.22., since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is p=0,022<0,05, H0 
(Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is rejected, thus, it is determined that there is a 
relation between education with 100% scholarship in the Bilkent University and 
education via borrowing in this university. 
  
55 
 
Koç Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd 
not prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer 
I'd definitely 
prefer 
Income 
Prediction 
I cannot give 
a clear range 
38,5% 16,7% 19,2% 15,4% 10,3% 
1500 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
1600 50,0% 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
1800 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
2000 50,0% 25,0% 12,5% 0,0% 12,5% 
2250 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
2450 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
2500 24,1% 20,7% 24,1% 13,8% 17,2% 
2800 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
3000 19,0% 28,6% 23,8% 23,8% 4,8% 
3500 22,2% 22,2% 14,8% 18,5% 22,2% 
3800 0,0% 50,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
4000 30,8% 7,7% 23,1% 19,2% 19,2% 
4500 28,6% 57,1% 14,3% 0,0% 0,0% 
5000 31,8% 9,1% 9,1% 27,3% 22,7% 
5500 0,0% 33,3% 0,0% 33,3% 33,3% 
6000 33,3% 11,1% 22,2% 0,0% 33,3% 
6500 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
7000 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 50,0% 50,0% 
7500 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 50,0% 
8000 0,0% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0% 66,7% 
10000 25,0% 25,0% 0,0% 25,0% 25,0% 
15000 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
17000 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
 Total 29,2% 19,4% 18,6% 16,2% 16,6% 
Table 3.23. Education Preferences of the Students in the Koç University via Borrowing Considering 
the Income Predictions in the First Five Years After Graduation 
As is observed on Table 3.23., more than half of the students, who cannot give a 
range about their incomes in the first five years after graduation, think negative 
about education in the Koç University via borrowing. The students, who predict 
higher incomes in the first five years after graduation, think positive in a vast scale 
about education in the Koç University via borrowing.  
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 90,724a 92 ,518 
Table 3.24. Chi-Square Tests for Monthly Income Predictions in the First Five Years After 
Graduation and Education Preferences in the Koç University via Borrowing 
According to Table 3.24., since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is p=0,518>0,05, H0 
(Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is not rejected, thus, it is determined that there is no 
relation between monthly income predictions of the students in the first five years 
after graduation and education preference in the Koç University via borrowing. 
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Bilkent Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd 
not prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer 
I'd definitely 
prefer 
Income 
Prediction 
I cannot give 
a clear range 
40,3% 16,9% 26,0% 10,4% 6,5% 
1500 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
1600 50,0% 0,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
1800 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
2000 50,0% 25,0% 12,5% 0,0% 12,5% 
2450 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
2500 24,1% 27,6% 27,6% 10,3% 10,3% 
2800 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
3000 23,8% 23,8% 28,6% 19,0% 4,8% 
3500 25,9% 18,5% 29,6% 11,1% 14,8% 
3800 0,0% 50,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
4000 30,8% 26,9% 15,4% 11,5% 15,4% 
4500 28,6% 71,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
5000 31,8% 9,1% 22,7% 31,8% 4,5% 
5500 0,0% 0,0% 33,3% 33,3% 33,3% 
6000 44,4% 11,1% 0,0% 0,0% 44,4% 
6500 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
7000 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 50,0% 50,0% 
7500 50,0% 50,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
8000 0,0% 33,3% 33,3% 0,0% 33,3% 
10000 25,0% 25,0% 0,0% 25,0% 25,0% 
15000 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
17000 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
 Total 31,5% 21,5% 23,1% 12,7% 11,2% 
Table 3.25. Education Preferences of the Students in the Bilkent University via Borrowing 
Considering the Income Predictions in the First Five Years After Graduation 
As is observed on Table 3.25., 57,6% of the students, who cannot give a range 
about their incomes in the first five years after graduation, think negative about 
education in the Bilkent University via borrowing. That the students cannot predict 
their incomes after graduation can be the motive behind their refusal to receive 
education in this university via borrowing.  
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 99,279a 88 ,193 
Table 3.26. Chi-Square Tests for Monthly Income Predictions in the First Five Years After 
Graduation and Education Preferences in the Bilkent University via Borrowing 
According to Table 3.26., since Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) value is p=0,193>0,05, H0 
(Null Hypothesis) hypothesis is not rejected, thus, it is determined that there is no 
relation between monthly income predictions of the students in the first five years 
after graduation and education preference in the Bilkent University via borrowing. 
The results on Table 3.23. and 3.25., even if not statistical, manifest the 
importance of the future income predictions on the attitudes of the students towards 
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borrowing program. Similarly, majority of the students, who either cannot give a 
range or predict a lower income, think negative about the borrowing program. This 
result manifests the importance of starting the repayments after the graduate begins 
to gain an income and organizing it as income-contingent, in order to encourage the 
students to participate in the program. Thus, it is considered that the negative 
approach of the students towards borrowing program due to anticipation about 
being unable to repay the debt can be prevented.   
3.1.c.vii. Survey Results 
Result 1: The rankings made by the students about universities based on their 
perceptions concerning education quality match up with the rankings of the ten 
ranking institutions and/or the preferences in the university placements. Although 
quite a few number of students think that Çukurova, Eskişehir Osmangazi, and 
Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Universities are "very well", and though half of the students 
had sufficient scores for Bilkent and Koç Universities, about which they thought 
"very well", they did not prefer these universities. Moreover, the vast majority of the 
students mention that they think positive for education in Koç and Bilkent 
Universities without payments. This fact proves that the motive behind refusing these 
universities is not the education quality performances of the universities, but it is due 
to financial limitations of the students.    
Result 2: A big portion, such as 87%, of the students thinks positive about 
education without payment in Koç and Bilkent Universities; however, almost half of 
them think negative about education via borrowing. This proves that at least half of 
the students make short-term preferences and do not prefer establishing a lien on the 
long term. 
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Result 3: The most important criterion that the students take into consideration in 
university preference is the employment and approximately one-third of them cannot 
predict their monthly income in the first five years after graduation. This can be a 
reason for the students to refuse education via borrowing in the Koç and Bilkent 
Universities, although they perceive the quality of education in these universities as 
"very well". Accordingly, this is an indicator of their apprehension about 
employment after graduation and an indicator of their being unable to predict their 
future incomes. Therefore, it is considered that repayments beginning after 
employment and installments being directly proportional with the income will 
encourage most of the students to think positive about borrowing program.  
Result 4: At least one of every four students mentioned that they would prefer the 
Koç and Bilkent Universities in case they have financial support. In this sense, if the 
refusal of these students for these universities due to financial limitations is 
prevented by creating a borrowing program, these students will have the opportunity 
to receive education in these schools. Thus, the inequality of opportunity these 
students face would be eradicated.  
3.2. Better Performing Students in Turkey  
Better performing students are composed of the ones, who had sufficient scores 
from university entrance exam for paid education in the best foundation universities 
but preferred the lower universities on the ranking list stated in part 3.1 instead of 
foundation universities. For example, they are the students whose scores are not 
sufficient for the universities higher on the list such as METU, ITU, and Boğaziçi, 
but whose scores are sufficient for paid education in the best foundation universities 
such as the Bilkent and Koç. Refusing paid education in these foundation 
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universities, these students receive education in lower universities on the list such as 
Uludağ, Ankara, Yıldırım Beyazit, Akdeniz, Anadolu etc. Although the students of 
only Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt, Çukurova, and Eskişehir Osmangazi Universities are 
included in the survey, all of the better performing students examined in this part are 
in Economy and Electric-Electronics Engineering Departments.  
3.2.a. University Entrance Exam Results 
In this part; based on the data published by CoHE, the students will be analyzed, 
who had sufficient scores from the university entrance exam for the best foundation 
universities, but did not prefer these universities. Moreover, they have a higher score 
than the scores of students who are placed in these foundation universities. The 
students from Department of Economics and Departments of Electric and Electronics 
Engineering will be subjects of the analysis. Firstly, the data about the students in 
Economics Department will be analyzed, and secondly, the data for the students in 
Electric and Electronics Engineering Department will be analyzed.  
3.2.a.i. Results for the Department of Economics 
The scores of some or all of the students in universities below the list mentioned 
in section 3.1 are sufficient for education in Bilkent and/or Koç Universities. On the 
table below, the highest, average and lowest score rankings of the students in these 
schools are presented. 
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                   Score rankings of students  
                  (TurkishMathematics-1 scores) 
Universities Highest Average Lowest 
Yıldırım Beyazıt Univ. (English) 53,132 96,450 110,921 
Anadolu Univ. (English) 71,136 117,081 131,734 
Çukurova Univ. (English) 85,204 161,222 189,881 
Kocaeli Univ. 97,704 194,625 223,130 
İzmir Katip Çelebi Univ. 133,052 203,265 229,714 
Yalova Univ. 174,760 222,204 238,080 
Uludağ Univ. 84,445 203,958 243,159 
Akdeniz Univ. 1,610 198,257 243,345 
Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Univ. (English) 133,792 210,325 244,151 
Sakarya Univ. 138,062 233,018 267,121 
On Dokuz Mayıs Univ. 137,944 227,746 270,778 
Pamukkale Univ. (English) 155,862 252,921 293,094 
Selçuk Univ. 81,581 249,761 295,833 
Erciyes Univ. 61,526 250,670 296,156 
Kırıkkale Univ. 152,554 266,326 309,539 
Gaziantep Univ. 114,288 269,307 338,448 
İstanbul Medeniyet Univ. 152,309 302,692 343,032 
Mersin Univ. 142,696 294,258 347,499 
Table 3.27. Score Rankings of Students Placed in Economics Department in State Universities with 
Lower Rankings 
 
 
 
Success rankings of students  
    (TurkishMathematics-1 scores) 
Universities Scholarship Highest Average Lowest 
Koç University non-scholarship 1,973 49,491 72,566 
Koç University %25 scholarship 4,616 20,459 32,200 
Bilkent University non-scholarship 59,683 116,61 167,109 
Bilkent University %50 scholarship 8,374 44,292 57,669 
Table 3.28. Score Rankings of Students Placed in Economics Department in the Best Foundation 
Universities 
Some of the state universities with lower rankings or without any rankings are 
given on Table 3.27. (See: Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.6). Accordingly, all of the 
students placed in these universities with the highest scores can be placed in the 
Bilkent University at least via paid education (Table 3.28). All of the students of 
Yıldırım Beyazıt, Anadolu (English Program) and Istanbul Medeniyet Universities 
would receive paid education in the Bilkent University. Even some of these students 
could be placed in the Bilkent University with 50% scholarship, and some other part 
of them could be placed in the Koç University via paid education. The scope of this 
study comprises these students, who are called as better performing students. For 
61 
 
instance; the lowest score of student placed in Bilkent University via paid education 
is 167,109, but there are students having higher scores (such as the students with the 
scores between 50,000 and 100,000) and also they preferred the universities with the 
lower rankings.  
3.2.a.ii. Results for the Electric and Electronics Engineering Department 
In this section, we aim to determine which students are better performing for the 
Electric and Electronics Engineering Department. When 2016 data is analyzed; it is 
observed that students in Çukurova, Abdullah Gül, Erciyes, Anadolu, Yıldırım 
Beyazıt and Eskişehir Osmangazi Universities are better performing. The score 
rankings of the students studying at these universities range from approximately 
20,000 to 90,000. These are shown on the table 3.29. 
             Score rankings of students  
            (MathematicsScience-4 scores) 
Universities Highest Average Lowest 
Çukurova Univ. 22,350 46,576 53,816 
Abdullah Gül Univ.(English) 10,053 15,660 18,317 
Eskişehir Osmangazi University(English) 23,491 43,424 47,925 
Anadolu University(English) 24,532 37,841 41,953 
Yildirim Beyazit University (English) 18,706 36,977 42,168 
Erciyes Univ. 32,168 67,137 80,671 
Table 3.29. Score Rankings of Students Placed in State Universities with Lower Rankings in Electric 
and Electronics Engineering Department 
                              Score rankings of students  
(MathematicsScience-4 scores) 
Universities Scholarship Highest Average Lowest 
Koç University non-scholarship 467 16,951 34,813 
Koç University %25 scholarship 4,796 14,455 19,204 
Bilkent University non-scholarship 4,642 17,667 26,706 
Bilkent University %50 scholarship 1,002 2,710 3,821 
Table 3.30. Score Rankings of Students Placed in the Best Foundation Universities in Electric and 
Electronics Engineering Department 
The students studying at these universities are better performing according to 
success rankings. Moreover, these universities do not meet the criteria when deciding 
the best state universities in Turkey. For instance, all of the students of Abdullah Gül 
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University would receive education in the Koç University with 25% scholarship, or 
receive paid education in the Bilkent and Koç Universities. However, refusing 
education in these universities, the students preferred Abdullah Gül University, 
which is lower on the list in section 3.1. Moreover, all of the students with the 
highest rankings in the universities on Table 3.29. could receive education in these 
mentioned foundation universities (See: Table 3.30.). As an example, score of the 
student with highest ranking at Yıldırım Beyazıt University is 18,706. However, this 
student could get into Bilkent University with non-scholarship program or Koç 
University with %25 scholarships, but she/he did not prefer to study in these 
universities. In addition, the student had a much higher score than students placed in 
these foundation universities via paid education. These students are characterized as 
the better performing students for the Electric and Electronics Engineering 
Department.     
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CHAPTER IV 
FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION WITH LOANS 
4.1. Private and Public Student Loans 
Student loans, an essential part of financing tertiary education, are widely used in 
a significant number of countries such as Canada, the United States, several 
European countries, most of the Latin American countries, the Caribbean, and some 
of the African and Asian countries (Woodhall 2001). There are basically two types of 
student loan schemes: private and public. 
According to Eurostat (2009), classification of loans as private or public is based 
on three main criteria: 
1. Who controls the managing institution of the loan scheme? If 
managing institution is independent, loan schemes are sorted as private, but if 
managing instution is controlled by the government it is considered as public.  
2. Where does the fund come from? If more than fifty percent of the 
revenues are provided by private sources, loan scheme is classified as private. 
But if the private resources are lower than 50%, it is classified as public.   
3. Who undertakes most of the risk? It is actually about the goverments’ 
role as a guarantor. If the government does not provide guarantee to financial 
instutions, the scheme is sorted out as private. If the government provides 
guarantee completely or significantly, the loan scheme is considered as 
public, as well (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training 
[CEDEFOP] 2012, 27). 
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4.1.a. Private Student Loan Schemes 
As defined in The Institute for Higher Education (IHEP) Policy Report (2006, iii); 
private loans are the schemes which are outside the government funding and also are 
not guaranteed by the government in case of a default. Banks, some agencies, some 
loan companies or other financial institutions may provide these loans to students. In 
a broad sense, private student loans can be defined as the loans funded by private 
commercial financial institutions.  
    There are many features of private student loans. First of all, students are 
required to meet certain credit criteria in order to benefit from these loans. Secondly, 
credit limits for private loans are determined by the creditor and do not exceed the 
amount of university costs minus any financial aid the student receives (Ionescu and 
Simpson 2016, 8). Thirdly, interest rates are variable based on the credit history of 
the student, the repayment period, and the total amount of the loan. Finally, the 
private student loans are either not guaranteed by the government or the government 
guarantee is limited (Ionescu and Simpson 2016, 8). Furthermore, the sustainability 
and the success of the private student loans depend on market conditions. Significant 
deterioration in these conditions can highly affect the student loan market. 
  There are many reasons why some countries generally prefer implementing 
private loans to public loans. First of all, it is argued that private sector works more 
efficiently than the government (Özekicioğlu 2013, 52). Secondly, private financial 
institutions generally have less administrative costs than the government 
(Özekicioğlu 2013, 52). Thirdly, banks are more specialized in lending compared to 
(non-bank based) the government schemes (Albrecht and Ziderman 1992, 74). 
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Fourthly, total amount of public loans are generally limited, therefore students have 
to search for private funding.   
The first usage of private student loans historically dates back to the 1960s. The 
United States Aid Fund was the earliest example that enabled  students to borrow 
from commercial sources (IHEP 2006, 5). Since 1960s, the USA has become one of 
the leading countries in private student lending (further discussed in section 4.2.). 
More than the half of the undergraduate students in the United States borrow through 
private loans to finance their higher education (Ionescu and Simpson 2016, 1). Other 
countries which implement private loan schemes are Canada, Thailand, Austria, 
Hungary, Netherlands, Cyprus, Germany (master loans), Slovenia, Portugal, Spain 
(CEDEFOP 2012, 29).  
Country 
Managing 
institution is 
controlled by 
Main source of 
income is 
provided by 
Main providers 
of the loans 
Government 
guarantee to 
loans 
Austria Independent Private, deposits 
Building society 
banks 
No 
Hungary 
Government 
control is limited, 
institution is 
largely 
independent 
Private bonds and 
international 
support 
Special public 
instution 
Yes, but for the 
institution, not for 
separate loans 
Netherlands 
private loan 
not controlled by 
the government 
Private banks Retail banks No 
Cyprus  Private Retail banks No 
Germany master 
loans 
 Private Retail banks No 
Slovenia  Private Retail banks No 
Portugal  Private Retail banks Yes but limited 
Spain(Catalonia)  Private Retail banks No 
Table 4.1. European Countries Classified As Private Loan Schemes (CEDEFOP 2012, 29) 
Table 4.1. summarizes some of the basic features of European private loan 
schemes.  
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The main disadvantages of private schemes for the borrower compared to public 
schemes are  as follows: 
First, since a collateral is required, accesibility of private student loans is more 
difficult than public loans. Besides, credit history of a student, which closely depends 
on  the student’s and his/her parents’ economic/credit background, is important as 
well. Therefore, low-income students face serious obstacles in access to loans. Most 
of the low-income students can not borrow from the private system (Ionescu and 
Simpson 2016, 34).  
The second disadvantage of a private loan system is that it is based on market 
interest rates. Furthermore, market interest rates can increase in real terms 
particularly in stressful  times, elevating  the costs for a new borrower.  Fluctuations 
in market interest rates affect loans in changing interest rates. Moreover; the 
borrowing costs of a student may differ, depending on her/his credit history. In other 
words, students who have never used credit before and/or students with low credit 
ratings can find themselves borrowing with higher interest rates. Furthermore, they 
need a cosigner most of the time. In addition to these disadvantages, market interest 
rates are generally higher than interest rates of public loans. 
   The third disadvantage of a private loan scheme compared to a public loan 
scheme is that it has a shorter repayment period. This means that each repayment of a 
certain amount in a private loan scheme is higher than each repayment of the equal 
amount in a public loan scheme. 
 Fourth; while it is possible to arrange  repayments as a percentage of annual 
income of a graduate in public loans, particularly in ICL (Income-contingent loan); 
repayments are generally independent of future income of graduates in private loan 
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schemes. It is argued that this can be a significant disadvantage especially for low-
income graduates:  
Because repayments are based on time, those who enter the workforce in a 
low-paying job or who have poor labour-market outcomes at some stage will 
face a large repayment hardship, which could force default. There is also credit 
risk for default for the students as it can ruin their credit rating and ability to 
finance into the future (Armstrong and Chapman 2011, 4).  
Fifth; while public schemes allow payment deferments in the case of death, 
permanent disability or a bankruptcy, this is generally not the case for private loan 
schemes. On the other hand, there are some private lending institutions that may 
defer repayments in case of temporary payment difficulties stemming from economic 
conditions (IHEP 2006, 11).  
There is disadvantage for lenders as well,which mainly arises due to absence of or 
limited guarantee in case of a borrower default. This mainly generates from the fact 
that borrowing to students is too risky for lenders due to uncertainties in student 
loans. The first is the uncertainty about the success of the student to graduate from 
the university. The second is the uncertainty about finding a job after graduation 
within the specified period to repay the loan. The third is about the sufficient income 
of the graduate student to be able to repay the loan. These explain the reluctance of 
lenders.  Therefore, the government guarantee is required in order to remove this  
reluctance. On the other hand, one way to reduce default risk is hedging. For this 
reason, private loan originator can issue of securities backed by student loans, 
generally by bundling student loans with other types of loans. These student loans 
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are being sold to the investors afterwards, which helps a lender instution to enlarge 
its funding source.   
4.1.b. Public Student Loan Schemes 
According to Eurostat’s criteria; the managing institution is generally controlled 
and funding is commonly provided by the government in a public loan scheme. For 
example, if a management institution is private but more than fifty percent of the 
resources or a full/significant loan repayment guarantee are provided by the 
government, it is classified as a public loan scheme (CEDEFOP 2012, 27). In a 
public loan scheme, there are both direct and indirect government supports. For 
instance, providing a full or partial guarantee for repayments of a graduate borrowing 
from a private instution, loan scheme corresponds to an indirect support; whereas if 
the government charges below market interest rates or writes off a loan, it is called a 
direct support.  
 Table 4.2. provides some important features of public loan schemes in Europe. It 
is notable that pure public loan schemes are observed in a limited number of 
countries. What’s more common is that private loan schemes are supported (either 
funded or repayments guaranteed) by the government. 
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Country Managing 
institution is 
controlled by 
Main source of 
income is 
provided by 
Main providers 
of the loans 
Government 
guarantee to 
loans 
France Government Private banks Retail banks Yes 
Poland Government Public Retail banks Yes 
Germany   
(Federal 
Education and 
Training 
Assistance Act) 
 Public 
Special public 
institution 
No 
United     
Kingdom 
Government Public 
Special public 
institution 
No 
Estonia  Private Retail banks Yes 
Italy  Private Retail banks Yes 
Latvia  Private Retail banks Yes 
Lithuania  Private 
Retail banks and 
credit unions 
Yes 
Luxembourg  Private Retail banks Yes 
Slovekia  Public Public instutions No 
Bulgaria  Public Retail banks Yes 
Iceand  Public 
Special public 
institution 
Yes 
Turkey  Public 
Special public 
institution 
No 
Table 4.2. Public Loan Classification of European Countries (CEDEFOP 2012, 29) 
There are important advantages of public loan schemes compared to private loan 
schemes. First, in some cases, repayments start above a prespecified threshold. 
Second, credit history of a student is not taken into account, which facilitates access 
to credit for students. Third, there is no requirement for a collateral and/or a cosigner. 
Fourth, since borrowing conditions are affected less by current economic conditions, 
students do not face with significant uncertainities. Fifth, general interest rates  
charged for a  typical student loan is much lower than the market interest rates. Sixth, 
in some cases repayments are indexed to CPI provided that a graduate income 
increases at least at the rate of consumer inflation. Such an indexation offers 
advantages for the borrower. Seventh, repayment periods are considerably longer. 
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4.2. Repayment Types of Loans  
There are three types of student loan schemes based on repayment methods: 
mortgage-type, income-contingent, and hybrid loan schemes. All of these loan 
schemes are  implemented as public or private student loans.  
4.2.a. Mortgage-Type Loans  
In mortgage-type loan programs interest rates, payment installments, and the term 
of loan are generally fixed. Furthermore, this type of loans are generally provided by 
private institutions with the government providing direct or indirect support. 
The implementation of mortgage-type loan dates back to the 1990s. The United 
Kingdom was the first country to introduce this scheme (Barr 1993, 724). United 
States and Canada are two countries that implement effectively this type of loan 
schemes (Amatya 2009, 6). 
The specific features of mortgage-type loan are:  
Fixed Repayments: In a typical mortgage-type loan, the borrower makes equal 
repayments on a monthly basis (Özekicioğlu 2013, 57). While this feature is an 
advantage for a lender, it is a disadvantage for a borrower, and particularly for the 
low-income students. Considering the fact that a typical wage of a new graduate is 
usually low and then gradually increases through her/his working life, fixed 
repayments pose a problem for a borrower. 
Repayment Period: There is a certain repayment period varying from 10 to 20 
years. Repayment period is specified according to total debt and the number of 
installments.  
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Interest Rates: Interest rates are generally fixed (Amatya 2009, 6).  
Lenders: This types of loans are generally provided by private institutions such as 
commercial banks and loan companies. As discussed in section 4.1. the government 
can support private loan schemes by providing funding or acting as a guarantor. For 
an example see Albrecht and Ziderman (1991, 7) for USA.  
Collateral or Cosigner Requirements: Since these loans are generally provided by 
private institutions, they demand a collateral or a cosigner for the lending contract in 
order to reduce high default risk   in case of a default. Obviously, a collateral or a 
cosigner requirement creates significant disadvantages for borrowers, especially for 
those from low income families. 
 Risks and uncertainties: In establishing the credit systems, minimizing the risks 
and uncertainties with regards to both borrower and lender is the primary goal of 
these systems. In fact, minimizing the risks for the borrower means minimizing the 
risks for the lender as well, regarding the credit repayment. 
For the Lender: There is less risk for the lender in mortgage type systems within 
the student loan systems, since a co-signer or a collateral is demanded by the lender 
for a credit in these systems. This, in turn, allows the lender to meet the liquidity 
needs in a short time by converting the collateral into cash in case the student is 
unable to afford repayments. In case of absence of the collateral in opening the 
credit, the co-signer is expected to cover the expense determined in the contract. 
Therefore, in case the student cannot repay the credit, the risks and uncertainties the 
lender faces are lower in this credit type (As discussed in 4.2.b., income-contingent 
credit type, which is another student credit type, the student is expected to pledge 
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his/her future incomes as collateral and the absence of collateral or co-signer 
increases the risk for the lender in case the borrower goes default).  
Student loans include many uncertainties for the borrower; 
- Will the student be able to graduate completing the fulfillments of her/his 
branch?  
- Will the student be able to find a job after graduation within the specified period 
to repay the loan?  
- Will the graduate be able to earn sufficient income to repay the loan? 
For the Lender: Benefiting from the credit, the borrowing student anticipates 
earning a higher income in the future. Investing in her/his education today, the 
student will qualify her/his labor, and will sell it in a higher price. Thus, she/he 
anticipates earning a higher income through her/his life compared to the condition 
that she/he doesn’t invest in the education. However, this includes many risks and 
uncertainties as well;    
- The branch that she/he planned to graduate might have become less 
important in the work market by the time she/he graduates. In other words, the 
labor demand of the employers might have been decreased with regards to that 
vocation. This, in turn, may cause the graduate to find a job with more 
difficulty and to be able to earn much less than she/he anticipated.   
- While choosing the branch to professionalize, the student doesn’t have 
necessary information about the incomes after the graduation due to the 
absence of a satisfactory communication with the graduates of that branch. 
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Accordingly, the wages regarding her/his vocation may be low, or the 
graduate cannot earn the income she/he anticipated.  
- If the labor supply regarding the vocation selected is high, finding a job 
and earning the anticipated income for the graduate can take a longer time. If 
the labor supply is much more than the demand of the employers, lower 
payments are possible. Thus, the student may earn less than she/he anticipates.   
- If most of the graduates invested in their education in order to have more 
income, there is a high level competition in the labor market. The student has 
less or no information about the labor investments of her/his rivals. If the 
skilled labor is much higher among the graduate jobseekers, finding a job may 
take a longer time. And again, if there are too many nominees with the 
demanded qualifications applying for the job, the wages will be lower than 
anticipated.   
While borrowing for education, the student faces with these alternatives instead of 
investing in the education: to find a job as a high school graduate, to start a business, 
to go to the university finding a credit or without finding a credit. When we evaluate 
results of the other two choices apart from going to the university, the results are as 
follows; 
- Instead of getting indebted with a student loan, to start a business with a 
credit: when we examine results for the newly started businesses in Turkey, it 
is observed that the risks for the newly started businesses are higher. 
According to a research conducted by the World Bank, 80 % of the businesses 
are liquidated in the fifth year and 96 % of them even could not reach the tenth 
year in Turkey (Fırat 2007).  
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- Instead of investing in the university education, participating in the labor 
market as a high school graduate: according to the research results on 
transition of the young to the labor market conducted by TURKSTAT 
(Turkish Statistical Institute) in the 2
nd
 quarter of the year 2016, 
unemployment rate of the population between 15-34 ages was 13.2 %; the rate 
was 13.3 % among the college levels and graduates; and it was reported to be 
15.5 % for the high school graduates in general. According to the results 
reported; the employment rate among the college levels and graduates is 73.7 
%,  while it is 43.6 % for the high school graduates in general (TURKSTAT 
2016). According to the Income Structure Research conducted by the 
TURKSTAT (2015) it is observed that the wages of both female and male 
wageworkers increase generally in direct proportion to their educational 
status. According to the educational status, the highest annual gross income 
belongs to the ones with college and higher levels of graduation. The incomes 
in this level of education are reported to be 55.633 TL for the males, 45.483 
TL for the females, and 51.405 TL in total. It is reported that the annual gross 
income for the high school graduates is 21.222 TL. Abovementioned research 
studies and statistics prove that the college and above level graduates can find 
a job in a shorter period of time and obtain higher incomes.   
Despite the mentioned uncertainties regarding the future of the graduate, it seems 
to be the most effective choice for the students to invest in their education. 
Moreover, the student loans for their education are more repayable credits with less 
risk, compared to the other credit types.    
Mortgage-type loans are more risky and have more uncertainties for the borrower 
compared to income-contingent loans. Pledging her/his future incomes as collateral 
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in income-contingent loans, the student will repay a certain percentage of her/his 
income. This, in turn, will create fewer uncertainties compared to mortgage loans, 
which are generally repaid in fixed installments. The logic behind this is that the 
student could not predict the time period that she/he will be able to find a job, and the 
wage she/he will earn. 
4.2.b. Income-Contingent Loan Schemes 
Income-contingent loan (ICL) schemes are repaid on a pre-arranged installment 
plan depending on graduates’ annual income. Under the ICL, there is a certain 
threshold for repayments and graduate begins making repayments when his/her 
income reaches over the threshold. Furthermore, the payment installments are 
calculated in proportion to the graduate’s income and the installments are paid to 
public or private institutions. 
The income-contingent loan scheme was firstly implemented in Australia in 1989. 
In recent years, the UK, New Zealand, Sweden, Scotland, South Africa and Australia 
have been the countries where ICLS has been carried out (Johnstone 2005, 9). 
 The specific features of these schemes are: 
Variable Repayments: There is variable repayment in the ICL, while mortgage-
type loans have a fixed repayment system. The ICL is based on the annual income of 
graduates. There is a certain threshold for payment installments and if graduates’ 
annual income is above this threshold, he/she makes repayments in a certain 
percentage of her/his income. On the other hand, if graduates’ annual income is 
below this threshold, he/she does not make repayments (until his/her income rises 
above this threshold). Moreover, borrowers generally start repayments after finding a 
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job that provides an income above the specified threshold. This generates an 
important advantage for students. Firstly, if graduate has found a job but his/her 
annual income is below this threshold, he/she does not start repayments. Secondly, if 
graduate entered a labour-market providing a poor income at the beginning, in other 
words if the graduate’s income is low but over the threshold, he/she will make less 
repayments compared to those of the mortgage-type loans, which reduces the risk of 
graduate’s going into default. Supporters of the ICL have stated that students, 
especially those in the low-income groups, will access the loans easily and thanks to 
convenience of repayment participation to post-secondary education will increase.  
Repayment period: Within the scope of ICL, repayment periods vary depending 
on the incomes of graduates. Namely, there is not a specified repayment period in 
ICL, while there is a fixed period varying from 10 to 20 years in mortgage loans. 
Ultimately, high-income graduates make repayments at higher amounts and pay off 
the total debt in a shorter period, whereas low-income graduates make repayments at 
lower amounts and in longer periods. 
Interest Rates: While mortgage-type loans have generally fixed interest rates 
which are generally based on nominal interest rates, interest rates in ICL are usually 
based on CPI. Since CPI is usually lower than nominal interest rates, the total cost of 
the debt in ICL is less than mortgage-type loans for students. 
Lenders: In this system, loans are usually provided by the government. 
Furthermore, countries implementing ICL collect repayments through tax system or 
social security system. The repayment mechanism in the tax system, which is 
implemented by Australia, works as follows: 
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 Total debt amounts are recorded via tax file number. The tax file number, which 
is also used in pension procedures, is unique and special for each student. The 
recorded information is reported to the unit of higher education of the Ministry of 
Finance. When graduates start to work, the employer begin to have access to their 
debt information and make monthly payments to the relevant  tax department 
calculated as a percentage of the annual income. It is also mentioned that repayments 
are made in two ways as withholding tax and income tax repayments. The tax 
department sends the relevant repayments to the unit of higher education of the 
Ministry of Finance. When the debt is totally repaid, the Ministry of Finance gives 
the information to the employer that the total debt is over (Özekicioğlu 2013, 59).  
Repayments via these mechanisms make it difficult for students to avoid 
repayments, thus, reduce the risk of loss for the government stemming from refusal 
of payment. Armstrong and Chapman (2011, 5) emphasized on the importance of 
income-contingent loan system’s implementation: 
Of course, the overarching issue with income-contingent loan schemes 
relates to implementation. Regional and global experiences suggest that this 
issue has been the key cause of failure in many income-contingent loan 
schemes. These lessons must, for example, be carefully applied to the unique 
institutional and historical environment that categorizes each East Asian 
economy. In particular, they must be designed in reference to the 
administrative capacity of the relevant country.  
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Collateral and Cosigner Requirements: In this scheme, students borrow the loan 
only after pledging their future incomes as collateral. On the other hand, collateral, 
which is based on a fixed asset, is not required in ICL. Additionally, since borrowing 
is based on the students’ future income, the economic background of the students’ 
family is not considered as a negative situation in order to benefit from the loans. 
Furthermore, students from low-income families have lower risk appetite; these 
students are protected against excessive risk (Özekicioğlu 2013, 60). In addition, this 
facilitates access to credit for low-income students. The essential feature of the ideal 
credit systems is accessibility; this is taken into account, credit used by low-income 
students is the most significant advantage of this scheme. 
Risks and uncertainties:  
For the borrower: The risks and uncertainties are lower in this system for the 
borrower compared to mortgage-type loan system, since the repayment installments 
are determined in proportion to the income of the graduate. While a fixed repayment 
is demanded from the graduate independent of her/his income in the mortgage-type 
systems, the risk of failure to make repayments or uncertainties based on this are 
decreased in ICL, since there is a threshold for the repayments, and the repayments 
increase as the income of the individual increases.  
For the lender: the risk for the lender can be handled in two ways in this system. 
Firstly, the student pledges her/his future income while borrowing through the ICL. 
In this system, in case the student goes default, the lender doesn’t have a fixed asset 
to convert instantly into cash in order to cover the losses. Secondly, since a 
convenience provided for the students in repayments in this system, the risk for the 
lender based on the graduate’s being unable to make the repayments is low.  
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4.2.c. Hybrid (Fixed Schedule-Income Contingent) Loans 
Hybrid schemes are arrangements in which mortgage-type loans and income-
contingent credits are implemented together. These schemes are not implemented in 
common.  
Fixed and Variable Repayments: Hybrid schemes usually consist of fixed 
repayment schemes, but changes in repayment period may occur depending on 
increments in the income. Graduates can make fixed repayments, while those who do 
not earn an income for a period of time or low-income graduates make their 
repayments to an income-contingent basis (Özekicioğlu 2013, 62) The graduates 
begin to pay fixed installments after finding a job or a wage increase. In this system, 
the schedule offers a chance to make repayments on an income-contingent basis for 
graduates with low-income, as it also offers a chance for  those with sufficient 
income to repay the total debt in fixed installments and in shorter periods. 
Additionally, these schedules provide exemption from repayment of the debt for the 
graduates in certain conditions. The advantage of such a scheme is that it does not 
require income verification but makes fixed repayments, which is an administratively 
simpler method (Johnstone 2005, 11). 
Repayment Period: There is not a specifed period for repayment of the total debt. 
Repayment periods generally change since income-contingent scheme is also 
implemented concurrently.  
Interest Rates: The determination of interest rates varies in different countries. 
Lenders: Loans are provided both by private institutions and the government; 
however, it is observed that loans are generally provided by the government in 
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practice. It is because the government guarantee is generally demanded even if the 
loan is provided by private institutions.   
Collateral and Cosigner Requirements: A collateral or a cosigner is not generally 
required in this type of loans.  
Risk and uncertainities:  
For the borrower: Risk and uncertainties are minimum in income-contingent loan 
schemes with regards to repayment convenience. In hybrid schemes, risk and 
uncertainties change according to the implementation. For example, if the income-
contingent and fixed repayments are seasonal as applied in Iceland (further 
explanation in 4.3.c.), although the borrower has less risks and uncertainties 
compared to mortgage-type systems regarding the repayment, the risks and 
uncertainties are much more compared to income-contingent systems. If she/he is a 
low-income individual, then she/he makes low repayments during income-contingent 
periods. Since it’s known that fixed repayments will be made in certain periods 
(fixed installments are assumed to be higher than the income-contingent 
installments), she/he can allocate some money during income-contingent repayment 
periods in order for not having difficulty in making repayments during fixed 
installments period. This, doubtlessly, creates less risk compared to mortgage-type 
systems, where the graduates only make fixed installments. However, this system 
includes much more risks and uncertainties for the borrower compared to income-
contingent loan systems.  
On the other hand, in a system like IBR in the US, which determines the income-
contingent and fixed repayments depending on the income threshold of the 
individual, there is less risk of absence in the repayment. Since the repayments are 
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grounded on income, this system provides convenience in repayment and decreases 
the risk of default in the absence of repayment.  
For the lender: Since there is not a collateral or a cosigner requirement in the 
system, the risk and uncertainties of the borrower in case of a default are much more 
compared to income-contingent loan systems. However, the default risk of the lender 
stemming from the absence of payment by the borrower is less compared to 
mortgage-type loans, since there are fixed installments and more repayment 
convenience is provided for the borrower (compared to mortgage-type systems) in 
certain times (Iceland example) or for certain income levels (IBR example of the 
US).  
4.3. Case Studies  
4.3.a. USA 
The structure of financing higher education in the US is based on the knowledge 
about the costs and living expenses of students. Majority of the students in the US 
borrow to finance these costs. Borrowing instutions are mostly composed of 
commercial banks. These banks finance the students with fixed interest rates 
depending on market interest rates to be repaid in a certain period of time after 
graduation. Borrowing schemes are based on mortgage type loan programs which 
repayments are collected with fixed installments (further explanation in 4.3.a.iii.). 
This system puts the graduates without high income into a heavy debt burden and it 
can be deterrent at the beginning for students who do not anticipate earning 
sufficiently in the future. For this reason, students with lower economic backgrounds, 
usually don’t want to borrow (Özekicioğlu 2013, 73). Meanwhile, substitution of 
mortgage type loans with income-contingent loans can abolish the inequality in the 
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access process since income-contingent loan programs facilitate repayments. Thus, 
low income students can easily benefit from the loans, as well. Furthermore, income 
contingent loans reduce the burden of installments, therefore decrease the  risk of a 
default compared to mortgage-type loans.  
Students in colleges or universities can benefit from federal supports, 
commonwealth supports, institutional grants or student loans for financing higher 
education. Student loans are basically consisted of two parts as private student loans 
and federal loans (U.S. Department of Education [ED], n.d.).  
4.3.a.i. Private Student Loan Schemes 
Seeking new financial resources for funding higher education in the United States 
was motivated by increasing population growth, rising demand for higher education, 
and escalating educational costs. For this reason, additional financial sources for 
students were searched for and privatization was introduced in the 1990s in financing 
higher education.  
There are two types of private student loans in the USA: school-channel and 
direct-to-consumer private loans. In school-channel loans, the funded borrowing 
amount is directly transferred to the schools and loans are ‘certified’. In other words, 
school certifies that borrowing amount will be used only for educational expenses 
and agrees to hold them. On the other hand, in direct-to-consumer loans, borrowing 
amount is transferred directly to students. When compared to school-channel loans, 
direct-to-consumer loans allow simpler access to funds but with higher interest rates 
(“Comparison of Federal,” 2014). Furthermore, direct-to-consumer private loans are 
preferred more often in the US. 
83 
 
Private loans are provided to students as mortgage-type loans, therefore the basic 
features of private loans are further explained in section 4.3.a.iii.   
4.3.a.ii. Public Loan Schemes 
The Government-backed student loans in the US were first proposed in 1958 and 
extended broadly in 1960 (The Higher Education Act of 1965 [HEA], 1965). Today, 
public loan schemes in the United States are provided as Federal Direct Student 
Loans. These are mainly funded by the US Government.  
There are three types of Federal loans: Stafford Loans, Perkins Loans, and PLUS 
(Parent Loan for Undergraduate Students). These loans have lower borrowing limits 
than private loans. On the other hand, PLUS has higher borrowing limit than Stafford 
and Perkins Loans (Federal Student Aid [FSA] n.d.). Additionally, the amount of the 
loan is transferred directly to the students in Stafford and Perkins loans, while it is 
transferred to parents in PLUS (FSA n.d.). There is no requirement for the credit 
history of student in Stafford and Perkins loans, while it is a necessity in PLUS loans. 
The fact that many students have no credit history indicates that this facilitates access 
to credits by students. Thus, access to Stafford and Perkins loans is easier than 
PLUS. Students are responsible for the total debt in Stafford and Perkins loans, while 
parents are responsible in the PLUS. For that matter, parents make the repayments in 
PLUS because they have the signitures on the  borrowing contract (FSA n.d.). 
Some features of federal loans are as follows:  
First, when students enter the repayment process, a standard repayment plan is 
determined. These are generally fixed monthly repayments that borrower has to 
repay within 10 years (“How Standard Repayment Works,” 2010). 
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Second, interest rates are fixed, which are determined by the Congress, and are 
lower than private loans.  
Third, FDLP is funded by public capital originating from the United States 
Treasury (International Business Publications [IBP] 2013, 145). These loans are 
either subsidized by the US Government (Direct Subsidized) or  unsubsidized (Direct 
Unsubsidized). Both  of them are guaranteed by the US Department of Education 
either directly or through a guarantee office (FSA n.d.). The interest payments of the 
subsidized federal loans are made by the government which means that the 
government pays the interest of the debt while the student is focused on her/his 
education (Money Magazine 2008). The students repay only the amount wihtout the 
interest. For example, if the students’ total debt is $7,500, student only pays $7,500 
whereas students pay $7,500 plus interest in the unsubsidized loans. 
Fourth, a cosigner or a collateral is not demanded in federal loans. 
Fifth, there is less risk of absence in the repayment of the borrower in this system. 
As mentioned before, in case the borrower is unable to make fixed monthly 
repayments, she/he has the possibility to make the repayment on an income-
contingent basis. Moreover, the loan repayment relief is more flexible in this system.     
Additionally, since the loans are provided by the public capital, a collateral or a 
cosigner is not generally demanded. This, in turn, means that the risks and 
uncertainties of absence in the repayments are much more for the lender compared to 
private loans. On the other hand, there is not a complete debt cancellation in federal 
loans. However, there is an opportunity for the borrower to make income-contingent 
repayments or a loan repayment relief. Since this opportunity decreases the risk of a 
default of the borrower, the risk of a possible loss for the lender is low, as well.      
85 
 
4.3.a.iii. Types of Loans in the USA 
 Mortgage-Type Loans 
In the US, mortgage type loan schemes are implemented as private student 
funding (The income-based repayment schedule is not possible for private loans). In 
the context of mortgage-type loan schemes, graduates repay fixed annual 
installments including the interest. On the other hand, higher interest rates, penalties, 
and fees, and less flexible payment terms can be the motives behind why mortgage-
type loans are less preferred. Despite the fact that these loans have high risk of a 
default and increased administrative costs, the implementation rate of these loans has 
escalated in the last 10 years in the US. The main reason is that access  to public 
loans are more difficult and the borrowing amount is limited.  
The specific features of mortgage-type loan schemes in the U.S. are as follows: 
Fixed Repayments: There is only fixed repayment schedule without providing an 
additional income-based repayment. 
Repayment Period: There is generally a specified period for repayments, and 
repayments are often begun within the next six months (sometimes within the next 
twelve months) after graduation.  
Interest Rates: Interest rates are higher compared to the federal loans. 
Furthermore, interest rates are not fixed; thus, it can fluctuate drastically depending 
on financial markets. Additionally, interest rates vary according to the credit history 
of the students and the cosigners. Therefore, borrowers and cosigners with a clean 
credit history can benefit from lower interest rates. There is also an initial charge 
determined in parallel with the debt amount for the implementation of the loans.
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Lender: Loans are funded by banks, other companies,organizations, or online 
lenders. In contrast to federal loans, there is no government guarantee.   
Collateral and cosigner: A collateral or a cosigner are usually demanded. 
Moreover, lender takes into account the income and credit history of the cosigner and 
student, as well. If the cosigner has a high income and a clean credit history, 
applicant’s chance is higher to benefit from the loans. 
Risk and uncertainties: 
For the borrowers: Since the interest rates of the private loans are higher, the cost 
that the student has to cover while repaying is also higher. Moreover, since the 
repayments are independent of income and made in fixed installments in a certain 
period of time, the risk and uncertainties that the students, particularly the ones who 
do not anticipate earning much in the future, have to bear is higher.   
For the lenders: Since a collateral or a cosigner is demanded from the students in 
exchange for  providing the credit in private loans, the risk that the lender is exposed 
in case of a default of the borrower is lower. On the other hand, since this type of 
credits involve more risks and uncertainties for the borrower regarding the 
repayments, the risk and uncertainties that the lender is exposed is less regarding the 
repayments of the loan. 
 Income-Based Repayment Loan Schemes 
Income-based repayment schedules in the US are only available for federal loans 
(for public loans). There are four types of income-driven repayment plans; income-
based repayment (IBR), pay as you earn (PAYE), revised pay as you earn 
(REPAYE), income contingent repayment (ICR) (FSA 2016, 2). If the debt is high 
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and the graduate has insufficient or no income, she/he may benefit from one of the 
the repayment plans mentioned above. 
Variable Repayments: Borrowers repay a certain percentage of discretionary 
income instead of fixed repayments specified in the standard repayment plan. 
Repayment amounts are up to 10%, 15% or 20% of discretionary income and vary 
according to the program selected. Different from the other programs, the repayment 
amount at REPAYE program may be higher than the 10-year standard repayment 
amount.   
Repayment Period: There is no fixed repayment period for the payment of full 
debt because repayments are based on discretionary incomes of the borrowers. Since 
monthly repayments of the borrowers are in lower amounts, the repayment of the 
total debt takes a longer period of time.   
Interest Rates: Since repayment periods are longer, borrower pays more for the 
interest compared to the other federal loan programs. On the other hand, interest rates 
are lower than private loans because these loans are provided by the government. 
Lender: Loans are provided by the US Government. 
Collateral and cosigner: A cosigner or a collateral is not demanded. Instead, 
borrowers are to give information about their family sizes and incomes in order to 
benefit from the loans.  
Risk and uncertainties: 
For the borrower: For the borrower, these implementations are the ones with the 
least risks and uncertainties among all of the loan systems, regarding absence in the 
repayments. Since the borrower makes the repayments in proportion to her/his 
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income, this system has less risk stemming from absence in the repayment compared 
to fixed-monthly-installment systems.   
For the lender: Since the risk is lower regarding the absence in the repayment of 
the borrower, the risk of a default for the lender is lower as well. On the other hand, 
since a collateral or a cosigner is not demanded, this system involves much more risk 
and uncertainties compared to private loans.     
 Hybrid (Fixed Schedule-Income Contingent) Loans: Income Based 
Repayment (IBR) 
Hybrid (Fixed Schedule-Income Contingent) Loans within the IBR were firstly 
implemented in 2009 (Johnstone and Marcucci 2010, 155). This loan scheme is 
essentially based on the government guarantee for the students and it includes fixed 
and variable repayment schedule. The most essential feature of IBR is that it is also 
possible to make repayments on an income-contingent basis for students with low 
incomes.  
Fixed and Variable Repayments: Borrowers make fixed repayments if the 
borrowers income exceeds the specified income threshold. Namely, there is certain 
threshold to benefit from income-contingent loan schemes determined by the income 
and family size of the graduates. If graduate’s income is over this threshold, the 
borrower cannot benefit from income-contingent repayments, instead, she/he can 
make fixed repayments determined by 10-year Standard Repayment Plan. Moreover, 
even if the graduate earns too much income over this threshold, they continue to 
make fixed repayments. Therefore, IBR offers a great advantage for low-income 
earners and encourages the students, especially those coming from lower economic 
backgrounds, to apply for the loans to finance their education. 
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Besides, the installments to be repaid by the graduate must be recalculated and 
reapproved depending on graduates’ updated income and family size information 
each year even if graduate did not make income-based repayments. 
Repayment period: Repayment periods are variable according to total debt but 
generally it takes 10 years or more.  Under the IBR Plan, students who borrowed 
after 2014, make repayments within 20 years while those borrowed before 2014 
make repayments within 25 years. On the other hand, if graduates make income-
based repayments with lower installments it means that they  repay the total debt 
within a longer period of time. Moreover, a relief is also possible for the remaining 
debts after 25 years within this plan (Johnstone and Marcucci 2010, 155).   
Interest rates: Interest rates are close to the interest rates of Federal Direct Student 
Loans and lower than that of private loans. However, graduates who make income-
based repayment in a long period of time, repaying the total debt in a longer period, 
accordingly, they have to put up with higher interest rates. Additionally, the 
government can also provide interest subsidy to students.  The government can pay a 
certain percantage of monthly interest amounts for subsidized loans, while borrowers 
pay the monthly interest amount for unsubsidized loans.  
Lender: IBR is funded by the US Government.  
Collateral and cosigner: A cosigner or a collateral is not demanded. 
Risk and Uncertainties: 
For the borrower: This is the system with the least risk and uncertainties 
regarding the repayments of loans for students among all student loan programs. This 
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system diminishes the risk of a default for the student, since it provides income-
contingent repayment for the graduates with lower incomes.    
For the borrower: This is the system with the least risk and uncertainties 
regarding the repayments of loans for students among all student loan programs. This 
system diminishes the risk of a default for the student, since it provides income-
contingent repayment for the graduates with lower incomes.    
As an example , a single graduate single a total debt of $40,000 on income-based 
repayment basis will pay a total of $45,000 including the capitalized interest as the 
first repayment is initiated. In this case, the monthly repayment amount is calculated 
as $552, based on a total debt of $45,000 at an interest rate of 8.25% (FSA 2016, 7). 
If IBR Plan payment amount of the graduates is less than $552, payments can be 
made according to the Income Based Repayment Plan (FSA 2016, 7). 
4.3.b. Australia 
Student loan system in Australia basically depends on the income-contingent loan 
system. Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), an income-contingent loan 
system, was firstly implemented in Australia in 1989. This scheme was later 
introduced in New Zealand in 1991, Chile in 1994, South Africa in 1996, United 
Kingdom in 2005, and Thailand in 2006 (Chapman and Ryan 2005, 491). Moreover, 
there is a significant tendency in some countries to design income-contingent loan 
schemes such as Germany and Canada. Although some countries also carried out 
such an income based scheme, Australia has remained the most successful country to 
implement this scheme. It should also be mentioned that public administration was 
the main reason why this scheme was firstly implemented in Australia and had 
successful outcomes. “The reasons for this are that the public administration systems 
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of these countries feature a strong legal framework, a universal and transparent 
regime of income taxation and/or social security collection, and an efficient 
repayment mechanism” (Armstrong and Chapman 2011, 89). Armstrong and 
Chapman (2011, 89) have also presented that there must be a strong legal framework 
for the collection of credits. 
4.3.b.i. Public Student Loans 
Student loans in the Australia are mainly funded by Australian Government and 
also administrated by the Department of Education and Training. In other words, 
students can borrow from the government through Higher Education Loan Program 
(HELP) to finance their education. There is no role of private sector in this system 
and it is fully controlled by the government.  
The repayment system is also under government control. The government collects 
the loans through Australian Taxation Office via automatic deduction. 
 In the context of HECS system, Australia has lower administrative costs. Less 
than three percent of $A800 million collected from repayments each year is used for 
administrative costs. According to Chapman and Greenaway (2003, 12), the reason is 
that student debts and collections are traceable, and the mechanisms of Australian 
Taxation Office are well-functioning.      
Commonwealth Supported Places: The key issue within this scheme is the 
Commonwealth Supported Places. According to Information for Commonwealth 
Supported Students published by Australian Government, Commonwealth Supported 
Places cover all of public universities and some private providers (HECS-HELP 
2016, 1).  
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Students who want to make use of the scheme should also be eligible for 
Commonwealth Supported Places and this is only available for domestic students. 
Students who will benefit from this scheme within the Commonwealth Supported 
Place, must be an Australian citizen or a New Zealand citizen/a permanet visa holder 
and reside in Australia for the duration of students unit  (HECS-HELP 2016, 1). 
Others can not benefit from this scheme and they bear the learning costs and living 
expenses by themselves (Özekicioğlu 2013, 77). In short, the government only 
finances the Commonwealth Supported Students within the scope of HECS-HELP 
scheme, which means that students who don’t enroll as  Commonwealth Supported 
Places should enroll as fee paying students.     
Students who wish to benefit from the scheme must make their application within 
a certain period of the year. Eligible applicants for this scheme will receive 20% 
discount for $A500 or more up-front payments (HECS-HELP 2016, 2). According to 
Information for Commonwealth Supported Students published by Australian 
Government (2012, 19): 
After then, Australian government funds Commonwealth supported places 
by paying grants to approved providers. In addition to this Government 
contribution, Commonwealth supported students pay a student contribution 
amount for each unit of study they undertake.  
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Students’ contribution amounts required for payment is shown in the following 
table: 
Student Contribution Band 
Student Contribution Range 
(per EFTSL) 
Band 3 
Law, dentistry, medicine, 
veterinary science, accounting, 
administration, economics, 
commerce 
$0 – $9,425 
Band 2 
Computing, built environment, 
other health, Allied health, 
engineering, surveying, 
agriculture 
$0 – $8,050 
Band 1 
Humanities, behavioral science, 
social studies, education, 
clinical psychology, foreign 
languages, visual and 
performing arts, nursing 
$0 – $5,648 
National Priorities Band Mathematics, statistics, science $0 – $4,520 
Table 4.3. Students Contribution Amounts (HECS-HELP 2016, 11) 
Students contributions are determined according to anticipated future income of 
the students.  Furthermore, HECS-HELP helps eligible students, who enrolled in the 
Commonwealth Supported Places, pay their student contribution amounts (HECS-
HELP 2016, 13).  
4.3.b.ii. Private Student Loans 
We could not access any source manifesting the existence of a private student 
loan program in Australia. All current student programs are managed and also funded 
by the Australian Government. 
4.3.b.iii. Types of Loans in the Australia 
 Mortgage-Type Loans 
Student loan types in Australia are only based on income-contingent schemes. 
There is no source available for the implementation of mortgage-type student loans. 
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 Income Contingent Loan Schemes 
As Chapman and Greenaway (2003, 12) mentioned in their study, the scheme had 
the following characteristics in 1989:  
 a charge of $A1800 (in 1989 terms) pro-rated by course load, but with 
no variation by discipline;   
 on enrolment students could choose to incur the debt, to be repaid 
through the tax system depending on personal income, or; 
 students could avoid the debt by paying up-front, which was 
associated with a discount of 15 percent (later increased to 25 percent); 
 those students choosing to pay later faced no repayment obligation 
unless their personal taxable income exceeded the average income of 
Australians working for pay (about $A30,000 per annum, in 1989 terms); 
 at the first income threshold of repayment, a former student’s 
obligation was 2 percent of income, with repayments increasing in percentage 
terms above the threshold; and 
 HECS could be paid up-front with a discount, but there was no 
additional interest rate, although the debt and the repayment thresholds were 
(and remain) indexed to the CPI. 
But, some of the features were changed over time. For instance, tuition fees were 
differentiated by discipline and the minimum income threshold was changed 
(Özekicioğlu 2013, 74).  
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Some current features of HELP  are as follows:  
Variable Repayments: Graduates’ repayments depend on their annual income 
instead of fixed repayment schedule. The repayment rates for the 2011-2012 periods 
are presented in the following table: 
Repayment income in the range 
Repayment rate 
(% of repayment income) 
Below $47,196  Nil 
$47,196–$52,572 4.0% 
$52,573–$57,947  4.5% 
$57,948–$60,993  5.0% 
$60,994–$65,563 5.5% 
$65,564–$71,006 6.0% 
$71,007–$74,743 6.5% 
$74,744–$82,253 7.0% 
$82,254–$87,649 7.5% 
$87,650 and above 8.0% 
Table 4.4.2011-2012 Repayment Rates (HECS-HELP 2016, 27) 
Firstly, it is stated that repayment income is calculated as: 
(Taxable income for an income year)+(total net investment losses)+(any total 
reportable fringe benefit amounts showed on graduates’ payment 
summary)+(reportable super contributions)+(any exempt foreign employment 
income from the current income year) (H&R Block 2017). 
According to the table 4.4., minimum threshold in order to start repayments is 
$47,196 for 2011-2012 financial year. If graduates’ income is below this threshold, 
he/she will not pay any repayment and the debt is postponed for the relevant year. 
But if graduates’ income is above this threshold, for instance between $47,196 and 
$52,572, he/she must begin to his/her repayments. For this range, he/she will repay 
4.0% of his/her annual income, this range from $1,887 to $2,102. It can be clearly 
seen from the table; as graduates’ annual income increases, repayment amounts are 
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also increase according to his/her annual rate of income. Moreover, compulsory 
repayment will proceed until his/her amount of total debt is completely paid back.  
2017-2018 repayment schedule is revised as shown on the following table: 
2017-2018 Repayment Threshold Repayment % Rate 
Below $55,874 Nil 
$55,874-$62,238 4.0% 
$62,239-$68,602 4.5% 
$68,603-$72,207 5.0% 
$72,208-$77,618 5.5% 
$77,619-$84,062 6.0% 
$84,063-$88,486 6.5% 
$88,487-$97,377 7.0% 
$97,378-$103,765 7.5% 
$103,766 and above 8.0% 
Table 4.5. 2017-2018 Repayment Rates (Australian Government StudyAssist n.d.) 
When compared table 4.4. with table 4.5., we can explicitly observe that 
minimum income threshold for repayments is raised, which is $47,196 on the  Table 
4.4. (in 2011-2012 financial year) whilst it is $55,874 on Table 4.5. (in 2017-2018 
financial year). Accordingly, graduates who have an annual income of $55,874 will 
start compulsory repayments and beginning to pay 2,235$ in 2017-2018 financial 
year. Besides, maximum income threshold is also raised from $87,650 to $103,766, 
which means that the owner of this amount and over will repay 8 percent of her/his 
annual income. We can observe from the two tables that in spite of the increment in 
repayment intervals, repayment rate is fixed for years.  
In addition to abovementioned information, graduates’ income is only grounded 
on for compulsory repayments, instead of his/her parents’ income etc. Furthermore, 
compulsory repayments start when graduates’ income is above the threshold even if 
he/she continues to study (HECS-HELP 2016, 27). Graduates can also make 
voluntary repayments in addition to his/her compulsory repayments. But voluntary 
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repayments don’t reduce the compulsory repayment, only reduce the total debt. 
However; repayment  interval  and repayment rates are revised every year and 
compulsory repayment threshold are adjusted accordingly. 
It should also be noted that compulsory repayments are made to Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) and are collected through income tax system. ATO calculates 
graduates’ compulsory repayments for the year and adds it to graduates’ income tax 
notice (ATO 2017).  
About the functioning of the system, in order for the graduate to make 
repayments, graduates firslty must inform the employer that he/she have  
HECS/HELP debt which is done through tax declaration form before starting work 
(H&R Block 2017). Hence, the country has an effective taxation system, which is the 
main reason that system functions are performing effectively (Özekicioğlu 2013, 84).  
Repayment Period: There is not a specified repayment period. Since repayment 
changes according to income level, repayment periods also change.  
Interest Rates: There is no interest; instead, total debt is calculated by adding CPI 
on 1 June each year.  
Lender: Loans for higher education are funded by Australian Government. In 
addition, the Department of Education is responsible for administering this funding. 
Collateral and cosigner: Students borrow from the government by pledging their 
future income as collateral. 
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Risk and Uncertainties: 
For the borrower: Income-contingent repayment systems decrease the risks and 
uncertainties that a graduate face compared to fixed repayment services. Including 
completely income-contingent repayments, HELP means a quite low level of risk 
and uncertainties that the low-income graduates bear in the repayment. Providing the 
opportunity to make high repayments for the high-income graduates and low or no 
repayments for the low-income graduates, this system creates equal opportunity in 
repayments of the graduates.   
For the lender: Although it seems that the future income of a student being 
pledged as a collateral is a high risk for the lender, the default rate of students 
resulted from absence in the repayments in income-contingent systems are higher 
compared to that of fixed installment systems. Accordingly, the lenders of the fixed 
installment system suffer a loss. The motive behind this is that convenience is 
provided for the graduates in repayments and that the lenders suffer fewer losses 
since the loans are generally paid back in income-based systems, as in the HELP. 
Therefore the risks and uncertainties that the lender faces are lower. 
Eventually, advantages of the ICLS are encouraging students, let alone deterring  
the tendency to participate  in higher education. Encouraging role of HECS can be 
observed from the participation rates in higher education in Australia. Along with 
implementation of such a scheme, the government has significantly increased the 
total number of students in the country since 1989. Higher education student figure 
was approximetly 400.000 in 1989, while it reached around 500.000 in 2000s 
(Armstrong and Chapman 2011, 91). Armstrong and Chapman (2011, 94)  reported 
in their research that with introduction of HECS, the number of enrolled students in 
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the universities increased. In this sense, the number of students enrolled in higher 
education in Australia increased by 50% from 1989 to 2006 (Özekicioğlu 2013, 76). 
Chapman and Greenaway stated that the reason of the increment was that there was 
no deterrent effect of the system and the government had increased its expenditures 
for higher education with the expectation of an increment in the government’s future 
revenue, because HECS provided $A6 billion revenue over the 13 years since its 
introduction (Chapman and Greenaway 2003, 13). 
 Hybrid (Fixed Schedule-Income Contingent) Loans:  
Existing student loan programs are based solely on the graduates’ income. The 
source for a system that also includes fixed repayments could not be accessed.  
4.3.c. Iceland 
Student loan scheme which is referred as the Icelandic Student Loan Fund have 
been carried out for several decades. The fund provides assistance either for the 
period of study, or in general, for two semesters of equal length for full time studies 
(“Iceland- Financial support,” 2009). 
In Iceland, public and private universities are mostly funded by the government 
(OECD 2016). However, higher education institutions, both private and public, can 
charge different fees.  The loans are given at low interest rates to cover the living 
costs and tuition fees (OECD 2016).   
4.3.c.i. Private Loans 
Icelandic Student Loan Fund is mainly regarded as public student loan scheme.  
Iceland does not have any private student loan system.  
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4.3.c.ii. Public Loans 
Icelandic Student Loan Fund is a public loan scheme which is run and funded by 
the government. The Fund only provides loans to Icelandic citizens. 
4.3.c.iii. Types of Loans in Iceland 
 Mortgage-type Loans 
Only the repayment terms are similar to mortgage-type loans. For this reason, 
only the repayment terms will explained in this section . 
Fixed and Variable Repayments: Repayments are made as fixed and variable 
payments. Payments in the first half of the year are similar to mortgage-type loans 
with fixed repayments. These repayments are made regardless of the income of the 
graduates. 
 Income-Contingent Loan Schemes 
The repayment terms in the second half of the year and interest rate which is 
indexed to CPI are basic features of the income-contingent loan schemes. Therefore, 
only repayment terms and interest rates will be discussed in this section. 
Fixed and Variable Repayments: Supplementary payments are made in the second 
half of the year and they are based on incomes of the graduates in the previous year. 
Income-based repayments are made according to certain percentage of previous 
year’s tax base for municipal income tax purpose. Besides, fixed payments are 
deducted from the supplementary payments.  
Interest Rates: Interest rates are determined by the CPI of the Central Bank of 
Iceland. 
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 Hybrid (Fixed Schedule-Income Contingent) Loans:  
Icelandic Student Loan Fund is the only scheme among countries that bear all of 
the main characteristics of hybrid schedule. 
The specific features are as follows: 
Application conditions: Students’ academic achievements as well as other criteria 
are also taken into account for implementation of the loans. Individuals must be 
between 18 and 50 years of age, excluding the family members. For legal entities, 
approval of the government or the financial institution is required. In addition, those 
who are permanently resident in Iceland for five years before the application date can 
apply for loans. After all conditions are met and the application is approved, the 
loans are paid into a commercial or saving bank account. 
Fixed and Variable Repayments: Installments are made in two forms as annual 
fixed repayment and certain percentage of graduates’ income, which is determined 
by the previous years’ municipal tax base and graduates’ investment revenues.  Fixed 
annual sum was €831 in 2006 and the average annual repayment amount was 3.75% 
of the graduates’ previous-year-income (“Iceland- Financial support,” 2009). This 
system differs from others in that repayments vary over time, instead of varying 
according to the income of the graduates. In this regard, graduates make fixed 
repayments in the first half of the year and make income-contingent repayments in 
September, which are calculated over a certain percentage of previous year’s annual 
income. Moreover, the fixed payment shall be deducted from the supplementary 
payment. If graduates’ income is below a certain threshold, income-contingent 
repayment is not calculated.  
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Repayment Period: Borrowers begin to make repayments after two years from 
graduation, furthermore, it is also possible to defer installments temporarily.   
Interest Rates: Interest rates are set at 1.2% by the Fund for 2017-2018 school 
years; it can be variable but it is never higher than 3% per year.  Besides, interest 
rates are based on Consumer Price Index of the Central Bank of Iceland. 
Lender: The fund is public study loan programme and based on the government 
subsidies and bank loans. 
Collateral or cosigner requirement: There is cosigner requirement. Students issue 
a bond in students’ own name as a guarantee to the loan  apart from the students, an 
individual or a legal entity is required as a guarantor of the repayments. 
Risk and Uncertainties: 
For the borrower: Including both the fixed payments and the income-contingent 
payments, the program decreases the risk and uncertainties for the borrower 
stemming from absence in the repayments, compared to the programs with fixed 
payments.    
For the lender: The risk and uncertainties being lower for the borrower in the 
repayments decreases the risk for the lender in absence in collection of the 
repayments, as well. On the other hand, an individual or a legal entity shown as a 
collateral in the system means that the lender can withdraw the loan from these 
individuals in case of a default of the borrower. This, in turn, minimizes the risk for 
the lender stemming from absence in the collection of the repayments.  
103 
 
CHAPTER V 
POLICY SUGGESTION FOR FINANCING THE HIGHER 
EDUCATION 
5.1. Private System 
5.1.a. Income-Contingent Credit Type Provided by Private Banks 
The main objective of this study is to meet the financing needs of students, who 
have sufficient scores from the university exams to apply for foundation universities, 
via a special credit system to be designed. Because it is observed that the budget 
allocated for the higher education students by the public sector is insufficient to 
cover the expenses in these universities. Therefore, this  study focuses on the finance 
that will be provided by the private banks for the educational expenses of the 
students. However, it is a necessity to optimize the necessary conditions both for the 
banks to provide credits and for the students to demand these credits. In fact, the 
interest rates, repayment conditions, and/or repayment periods determined by the 
banks might be a disincentive for the students in using these loans. Such kinds of 
problems complicating the functioning of the system for both the students and the 
banks are further detailed in the following parts.      
5.1.a.i. Possible Problems in the Credit System 
For Lenders: Providing loans for the students in higher education might be a 
factor incorporating high risks for the private banks. Behind this lay many reasons 
such that the students do not have a regular income while using these credits, or that 
there is the possibility for the students to fail to meet the collateral or the co-signer 
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condition demanded by the banks (in other words, if the students had sufficient 
collateral they would convert it into cash and finance their education without the 
loan), or that there is a high risk (compared to other borrowers) for the students to be 
unable to repay the credit due to the uncertainty of the future income, and that there 
are similar uncertainties in the employment processes of the students after 
graduation. Due to such kinds of factors, the banks are reluctant to provide loans for 
the students. Despite these risks and uncertainties, even if the banks consented to 
provide loans for the students, they would agree to provide credit only if a higher 
interest rate that would compensate the risks was determined. Moreover, they would 
demand the students to repay the loans in a shorter period with higher installments. 
However, these are observed to be disincentives for the students to finance their 
higher education via loans.  
For the Students in Higher Education: The most important reason for the 
students to remain undecided or to refuse using credits in financing their higher 
education expenses via bank loans in such a system is the uncertainty that they 
anticipate about their future income. In such a system (where the credits are provided 
by the private banks with high interest rates, within short repayment periods, and 
with higher installments), the students might not demand the credits or the number of 
students that demand loans might be in low levels since they cannot foresee the cost-
revenue analysis based on the abovementioned uncertainties. However, in order to 
encourage the students to finance their higher education expenses via private loans, 
the banks can provide conveniences in particularly repayment systems, thus, the 
banks can decrease the risks and uncertainties for the students.        
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5.1.a.ii. Solution Suggestion:  
 In Order for the Students to Participate in the System: Income Based 
Repayment Schedule 
In order to provide convenience to the students in repayments, the installments 
can be collected based on a percentage of their future incomes, rather than collecting 
fixed installments. Within this system, either an annual income level can be 
determined as the threshold, or without a threshold, an income-based progressive 
repayment system can be applied.  
System 1.a.: Income Based Repayment Schedule with Repayment Threshold 
The application of the income-contingent system on a threshold basis is as 
follows: the repayment installments would be in lower levels for the ones, who earn 
less then the threshold level, while it is expected that the more income they have the 
increased the installments would be.  
Income Threshold Repayment % Rate 
Below X TL %A 
X TL– 1.5X TL %1.1A 
(1.5X+1) TL–2.25X TL %1.2A 
(2.25X+1) TL – 3.37X TL %1.3A 
(3.37X+1) TL and above %1.4A 
Table 5.1.Income Based Repayment Schedule with Repayment Threshold 
The income threashold was determined as X Turkish Liras (TL) on the table 5.1. 
Accordingly, the students who earn less than X TL are expected to make repayments 
as A percent of their incomes. As their incomes increase, the percentage of the 
repayments increases as well. As per the students who earn a certain income level 
106 
 
(3.37X+1 TL) and above are expected to make repayments as 1.4A percent of their 
incomes.      
In such a policy proposal, it's for certain that the most important issue is 
determining factors of this X TL threshold and its amount. In this framework, X 
value might be determined according to the Earnings Structure Survey of the 
TURKSTAT (2015). According to the results of the survey, the annual average gross 
earnings of the individuals, who are college or higher level graduates, can be 
determined. For example, according to the results of a survey conducted in 2014, the 
annual average gross earnings of college or higher level graduates were 55,633 TL 
for males, 45,483 TL for females, and 51,405 TL in total (TURKSTAT 2015). 
Considering that the graduates will earn less in the initial phases of their careers, the 
threshold should be determined in a lower level than the annual average gross 
earning amount. Thus, the graduates earning less have the chance to make most of 
the repayments. According to this, a new average value is created based on the 
average gross earnings of the new graduates (for example, 1,5 times the minimum 
wage per person) and this value is determined as the threshold level.    
System 1.b. Income Based Repayment Schedule without Threshold 
A problem that may occur in the System 1.a. is that all of the students below the X 
TL level may have to pay the same installments (as A% of their earnings). However, 
the repayments would be diversified for the graduates who earn various amounts 
below the threshold level (Table 5.2.). 
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Annual Income Repayment % Rate 
Minimum wage–0.7X TL % 0.6A 
(0.7X+1) TL –0.8X TL % 0.7A 
(0.8X+1) TL – 0.9X TL % 0.8A 
(0.9X+1) TL - X TL %0.9A 
Table 5.2.Income Based Repayment Schedule without Threshold 
Without an income threshold, the same system can be applied in a way that the 
repayments increase in parallel and proportion with the increase in the income. Such 
a system might provide much more convenience for the graduates with lower 
incomes compared to the threshold system.  
This system, which includes income-based repayments rather than fixed 
installments, definitely provides convenience in repayment for the students. It is 
possible particularly for a new graduate to earn initially a lower wage and afterwards 
higher wages in his/her career. In this context, most of the new graduates will be in 
the lower-income group and they;  
 - (if the threshold system is applied) will mostly remain under the threshold, 
and the majority will not begin making repayments (A value might be '0'), or will 
make repayments in a fixed proportion to their income. 
 - (if the income based increasing repayment system is applied) most of them 
will make repayments in lower installments.  
On the other hand, such a system, which will ultimately increase the credit 
demand of the students because of the convenience provided in repayment, might 
cause banks to behave reluctant in providing loans. In this system, the banks will not 
be interested in the convenience for the students in repayment; however, they will 
demand collecting the loans as soon as possible. Therefore, the banks will probably 
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refuse to participate in this system, which will impede the functioning of the system 
in prospect.   
 In order for the banks to participate in the system: The risks and 
uncertainties are undertaken by other institution(s) 
 Another factor that causes the banks to refuse participating in this system is that, 
as mentioned above, students are in the high-risk group for the banks (with regards to 
repayment of the credits). The private banks will not participate in such a system and 
it will not work unless other institution(s) undertake(s) these risks. Therefore, firstly 
it should be provided that the risks and uncertainties arising from the students be 
undertaken by other institution(s), after which the banks will participate in the 
system.   
System 1.c. Income-conditional Credit System Where the Credits are Provided by 
Private Banks and Guaranteed by the Insurance Companies  
The banks will voluntarily participate in this system only if a third party 
guarantees the repayments, in other words, when another institution commits to pay 
all or most of the loan amount in case the borrower cannot make repayments. In this 
point, let's suppose that insurance companies undertake the risk of the loan, in other 
words, the insurance companies guarantee the loans of the students. In this case, the 
main problem is who will provide the payment for the insurance company to 
undertake the risk. In case a student goes into default, the insurance company repays 
all or part of the loan amount to the bank in behalf of students, and in return either 
the student or the state can make payments to the insurance company in the system.  
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- Students making necessary payments to the insurance company to 
undertake the risk: This alternative is definitely disincentive for the students in 
using the credit, since he/she has already got into a debt and is facing a high-level 
uncertainty for the future. In fact, the students would not like to shoulder any 
incremental cost other than the credit. Moreover, since the students do not have a 
regular wage as long as they are 'student' they cannot make payments to the 
insurance companies to undertake the risk. That is why these payments can only be 
made by the families of the students. Even in this situation, most of the students 
would not like to use a credit. 
- State making necessary payments to the insurance company to undertake 
the risk: In order for the insurance companies to undertake the risks of the students 
(in order for the companies to participate in the system), a payment made by the state 
to the insurance companies would catalyze the participation of both the banks and the 
insurance companies. When the state make the necessary payments to the insurance 
companies, it may contribute to the insurance companies to cover the loans of the 
students. As explained in the second part, the state can invest in education in this way 
in order for the human capital to qualify and contribute to the growth and 
development process of the country. However, if the state participates in this system 
by making payments to the insurance companies, both this system becomes costly for 
the state (the state would like to participate in the system directly, rather than 
participating via the insurance companies, as will be further explained in the part 
5.2), and the sustainability of the system becomes more difficult. Additionally, like 
the lending banks, the insurance companies would not like to undertake the risk and 
uncertainties (without the state's conntribution) stemming from the students, thus the 
system will not work effectively. 
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Due to the reasons mentioned above, both the banks and the insurance companies 
will not participate in the system without the state contribution, thereby either the 
system will not work or it will not be sustainable. Therefore, in the following parts, 
the effectiveness of the system will be analyzed by involving the public sector into 
the system.      
5.2. Hybrid System 
As discussed in detail in part 5.1, forming a credit system without the state 
support impedes the functioning of the system. Constituting a hybrid credit system, 
which includes the state support to the system in different forms, in order to provide 
the operability of the system will be held in this part. Accordingly, the scope of the 
state support for the students is limited to interest subsidy, repayment support, and 
pledge support which are thought to be the most important factors of the 
sustainability of the system.  
5.2.a. Providing Real Interest Rate Subsidy for the Students by the State 
Interest rate subsidy support by the public sector is important since it will reduce 
both the repayment cost that the students shoulder and the risk and uncertainties 
stemming from the market fluctutaions. Interest rate support is necessary since: while 
the banks are lending money to the students at the market rate of interest, the 
students (having borrowed at the market rate) will face high costs in repayments and 
this situation will be a disincentive for the students, who have uncertain future 
incomes, to finance their education expenses via credit. However, particulary in the 
countries where income contingent credit system is in use (such as Australia, look: 
Chapter 4.3.b.ii.), the borrowed amounts are indexed to CPI and the students are 
expected to make additional payments generated by the inflation rate differences. In 
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this context, the additional amount generated from the inflation differences might be 
covered by the state in order for the credit system not to be disincentive for the 
students. The costs for the state to cover a part or complete amount of the difference 
between market interest rate and the inflation are presented in part 5.2.a.i. 
5.2.a.i. The Cost of Interest Subsidy, Provided by the Public Sector, for the 
Government Budget  
The scope of interest subsidy support for the students include not only the ones 
who earn less than the X TL threshold but also the ones earning above the threshold. 
The functioning of the system with the interest support is explained on Table 5.3.   
Thousand TL             
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Inflation (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Credit and Repayment             
1 35 35 35 35 0 0 -35 -35 -35 -35   
2  35 35 35 35 0 0 -35 -35 -35 -35  
3   35 35 35 35 0 0 -35 -35 -35 -35 
4    35 35 35 35 0 0 -35 -35 -35 
5     35 35 35 35 0 0 -35 -35 
6      35 35 35 35 0 0 -35 
7       35 35 35 35 0 0 
8        35 35 35 35 0 
9         35 35 35 35 
10          35 35 35 
11           35 35 
12            35 
Total Credit and Repayment 35 70 105 140 140 140 105 70 35 0 0 0 
Table 5.3.Calculation for 2-Year-Non-Payment, 4-Year-Repayment-Based Period (For the Students 
in Paid Education) 
About the data on Table 5.3., it was supposed that annual education fee is 35 
thousand TL, and considered that the student borrowed credit for a four-year 
education, began repayments two years after graduation and completed the 
112 
 
repayments in four years. The calculations were made supposing the inflation rate as 
zero and considering that the students borrowed whole of the education fee.  
In this context, while the banks are providing credits for only the freshmen in t=1, 
they provide credit for the first and second classes in t=2. In t=7, the banks begin to 
collect the repayments. In this situation, the students who borrowed in t=1 are 
beginning to make repayments of 35 thousand TL. 
The total credit amounts and repayments on a semester basis are summerized in 
the last line of the Table 5.3. According to this, since the repayments begin in t=7 the 
costs of the credit decreases afterwards: decreasing to 105 thousand TL in t=7, and to 
70 thousand TL in t=8. At the end of the decreasing costs, since the amount of the 
credit lended and the credit collected is the same after t=10, the cost of the credit 
decreases to '0'.  
Table 5.3. explains the functioning of the system for the students in paid 
education. As per the students who are receiving semi scholarships, they will borrow 
half of their education expenses and the functioning of the system in this situation 
will be as shown on Table 5.4.   
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Thousand TL 
            
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Inflation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Credit and Repayment             
1 17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 0 0 -17,5 -17,5 -17,5 -17,5   
2  17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 0 0 -17,5 -17,5 -17,5 -17,5  
3   17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 0 0 -17,5 -17,5 -17,5 -17,5 
4    17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 0 0 -17,5 -17,5 -17,5 
5     17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 0 0 -17,5 -17,5 
6      17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 0 0 -17,5 
7       17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 0 0 
8        17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 0 
9         17,5 17,5 17,5 17,5 
10          17,5 17,5 17,5 
11           17,5 17,5 
12            17,5 
Total Credit and 
Repayment 
17,5 35 52,5 70 70 70 52,5 35 17,5 0 0 0 
Table 5.4.Calculation for 2-Year-Non-Payment, 4-Year-Repayment-Based Period (For the Students 
with Semi Scholarships) 
Since the student will pay only half of the education fee (17,5 thousand TL), the 
functioning of the system for this amount is explained in Table 5.4.  
 Cost of the Interest Subsidy, Provided to a Non-Scholarship Student, for the 
Government Budget  
The calculations regarding the situation, where the state provides interest subsidy 
for the difference between the market interest rate and CPI, are shown on Table 5.5. 
Considering that the real interest rate is 5%, per-student cost is shown on the last line 
of Table 5.5. for the situation where the state provides interest subsidy. According to 
this, the total interest payment is 42 thousand TL in t=10 and afterwards. 
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Thousand 
TL             
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Inflation 
(%) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Real 
interest 
(%) 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Interest 
payment 
of the 
state 
 
1,75 3,5 5,25 7 7 7 5,25 3,5 1,75 
  
   
1,75 3,5 5,25 7 7 7 5,25 3,5 1,75 
 
    
1,75 3,5 5,25 7 7 7 5,25 3,5 1,75 
     
1,75 3,5 5,25 7 7 7 5,25 3,5 
      
1,75 3,5 5,25 7 7 7 5,25 
       
1,75 3,5 5,25 7 7 7 
        
1,75 3,5 5,25 7 7 
         
1,75 3,5 5,25 7 
          
1,75 3,5 5,25 
           
1,75 3,5 
            
1,75 
Total 
interest 
payment 
 
1,75 5,25 10,5 17,5 24,5 31,5 36,75 40,25 42 42 42 
Table 5.5.Calculation for Interest Subsidy in 2-Year-Non-Payment, 4-Year-Repayment-Based Period 
(5% Interest Support) 
According to Table 5.5., in case the state provides 5 % interest subsidy to a single 
student, its cost to the government budget will be 42 thousand TL.  
Considering that 2016 year budget expenditures were 583,7 billion TL; in case 
5% interest subsidy is provided, the share of its cost among the budget expenditures 
is shown on Table 5.6.  
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Share for  
a single student 
0.00000001 0.00000002 0.00000003 0.00000004 0.00000005 0.00000006 0.00000007 0.00000007 0.00000007 0.00000007 0.00000007 0.00000007 
Share for 
1.000 students 
0.00001 0. 00002 0. 00003 0. 00004 0. 00005 0. 00006 0. 00007 0. 00007 0. 00007 0. 00007 0. 00007 0. 00007 
Share for 
10.000 students 
0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
Share for 
100.000 students 
0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Table 5.6.Share of Interest Subsidy among Budget Expenditures (5% Interest Support) 
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According to the Table 5.6., in case 5% interest subsidy support is provided for a 
student, share of its cost among the budget expenditures is maximum 0.00000007. In 
this scenario, the state can allocate a 0.007 share from the budget and can provide 
interest subsidy support for 100.000 students. In case the state provides interest 
subsidy support for the students with semi or 25% scholarships, this share is 
0.00000004 and 0.00000005 per student, respectively. 
Table 5.7. shows the share of the cost of the support, which will be provided for 
the students with paid education, semi-scholarship, or 25% scholarship, and total 
interest payment per-student in case the interest support is 3%
26
. According to this, 
when 10.000 students are presented credit for whole of their education expenses its 
share in the budget expenditures is 0.0004 including the interest support.  
  Paid %50 Scholarship %25 Scholarship 
Total Interest Payment of a 
Student  
25,200 12,600 18,900 
Share for 1 Student 0.00000004 0.00000002 0.00000003 
Share for 10.000 students 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 
Table 5.7.Share of Interest Subsidy among Budget Expenditures (3% Interest Support) 
5.2.b. Providing State Debiting Support for Students in Repayment of the Credits 
Providing education credit for the students enables the banks to financially 
expand. The reason of reluctancy in the banks for student credits is basically, as 
discussed before, the high risk and uncertainty factors regarding the students. 
However, if the risk and uncertainties of the students are minimized, the banks will 
voluntarily participate in the system. The most important task for the minimization of 
the risk and  uncertainties in repayment particularly falls to the state.  
                                                          
26
 The values were calculated the same with Table 5.5. and the same hypotheses. The calculations on 
Table 5.7. were conducted through maximum values which were fixed after t=10. 
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Providing income-based credit system for the students in repayment will simplify 
the collection of the credits in terms of enabling them to make repayments more 
simple.  However, the banks will not, possibly, be interested in the incomes of the 
students, demanding a fixed repayment each month. In this part is the detailed 
explanation about the situation, where the student cannot make fixed repayments 
financially, and the amount in between is financed by borrowing from the state. 
System 2.a. Credit System Including Both Fıxed Income-Threshold and Income-
Based Repayments  
The functioning of the system, where there is an income threshold (X TL), is as 
follows: the students with higher incomes than this threshold level will make fixed 
(monthly installments will be a certain percentage of this threshold) repayments to 
the bank. The students below the threshold cannot afford these repayments 
financially. In this context; a certain percentage of the student's income (a lower 
amount than the fixed installments) will be paid by this student individually. As per 
the income-based repayment system the more the student's income, the more 
repayment (still below the threshold level) he/she will individually make. For the 
repayments of the fixed installments that the banks demand, it is expected that the 
student will make the fixed repayments by borrowing the difference in between. As 
the income level of the student increases, the complete loan will mostly be paid by 
the student, and the amount to be borrowed from the state will decrease (Table 5.8).   
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Monthly repayment 
installment amount 
demanded by the 
bank  
Amount of the student 
income  
Amount of the 
installment to be 
repaid by the student  
Amount to be 
borrowed from the 
state  
B TL 0.5X TL K TL (B – K) TL 
B TL 0.6X TL L TL (B – L) TL 
Table 5.8.Credit System Including Both Fixed Income-Threshold and Income-Based Repayments (for 
the student under the X TL thereshold)
27
  
The expected increase in the repayments based on rising income, covering the 
difference by borrowing from the state, and decreasing amount to-be-borrowed based 
on increased income are shown on Table 5.8. for the stundents below a certain 
threshold level. According to Table 5.8., as the income of the student increases, the 
amount that he/she has to pay (since it will be a higher percentage of the income) 
will increase as well: while the initial income of the student is 0.5X TL, he/she 
makes K TL (a certain percentage of the income) repayments, as his/her income 
increases (0.6X TL), he/she will make (a higher percentage of the income) L TL. At 
the same time, the amount to be borrowed from the state will decrease since the 
income is increased from 0.5X TL to 0.6X TL (the amount to be borrowed will 
decrease from B-K TL to B-L TL). 
By this sytem, a convenience in repayment is provided for the students (since they 
make a repayment in direct proportion to their incomes), who have incomes lower 
than the threshold level, and they are enabled to make demanded repayments by 
borrowing from the state in the short term. These amounts to be covered by the state 
are not complimentary, it is expected in the long term that the students will repay the 
amounts they borrowed from the state. The repayments of the amount borrowed from 
the state will be made in such a way that the student, who begins to earn a higher 
income than the threshold level, will make payments in a certain amount to the state 
apart from the fixed repayments being made to the banks (Table 5.9.).  
                                                          
27
 K<L<B<0.5X<0.6X 
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Repayment Amount 
Demanded by the 
Bank  
Amount of student 
income  
Amount to be repaid 
by the student  
Amount to be paid to 
the state  
B TL 1.5X TL M TL (M-B) TL 
B TL 3.37X TL N TL (M- B) TL 
Table 5.9.Repaying the Amounts Borrowed from the State by the Students Whose Income Levels are 
Under the Threshold Level (for the students who earn higher than the X TL threshold)
28
  
Considering that the incomes of the students will be lower at the initial phases of 
their careers and increase afterwards, it is possible for them to cover the demanded 
amounts by the banks via borrowing from the state when their incomes are lower, 
and to repay the borrowed money to the state when their incomes are higher than the 
threshold level. Accordingly, the student (above the threshold level) is able to pay 
both the amounts demanded by the banks and the amount borrowed from the state. 
Within the framework of these amounts, either a fixed-repayment or an income-
based plan can be formed by the state. On Table 5.9., the repayments to the state are 
fixed. In other words, even if the income of the student increases, and even if the 
percentage to-be-repaid is increased from M TL to N TL (the percentage of the 
higher income), the student will still make the same payment (M-B TL). However, 
with a system based on the student income, a program can be generated where the 
student makes higher payments in proportion his/her increase in the income. For 
example, according to the Table 5.9., when the amount to-be-repaid increases from 
M TL to N TL in direct proportion to the increase in the student's income, the 
amount that the student will pay to the state will increase to N-B TL. In such a 
system, the state can collect the loans in a shorter period, since the higher-income 
students will make higher repayments.  
                                                          
28 B<M<N<1.5X<3.37X 
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With such a system, the banks will voluntarily participate in the system since they 
expect the state to make the payments of the difference amount if the students cannot 
afford the whole installments. Moreover, when the students cannot afford the 
repayments they will borrow from the state and will make repayments in proportion 
to their incomes. A system with such opportunities will be preferable for the students 
as well.  
Creating an additional resource for the students by borrowing from the 
government budget is an additional burden for the government budget. Moreover and 
the most importantly, this system makes it more difficult to follow-up the repayments 
of the students. Therefore, the follow-up process can be simplified and the 
sustainability of the system might be increased by launching a fund particular to 
education, transferring resources to this fund, and meeting necessary financial needs 
via this fund. Probable cost of debiting system for the state is calculated in part 
5.2.b.i.   
5.2.b.i. Cost of State Debiting Support for the Budget: 2-Period State Supported 
Debiting for the Students below the X TL Threshold Level - 2-Period State Supported 
Debiting for the Students Above the X TL Threshold Level 
The following calculations were made considering that the state provided 2-period 
debiting support for the students earning below the X TL threshold level who cannot 
financially afford the fixed installments demanded by the banks, and supposing that 
the state collected the loans (through the other two periods) when the students begin 
to earn higher than the X TL threshold level.   
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 The Situation Where the State Provides Support for Half of the Loan (for 1 
academic year)  
In this part, it was accepted that the state provided support for half of the credit 
repayments during one academic year for the students who earned below the X TL 
threshold level in t=7 and t=8. Table 5.10. explains the functioning of the system for 
one student.  
Thousand TL         
t 7 8 9 10 
Inflation (%) 0 0 0 0 
Total Debt -35 -35 -35 -35 
Borrowing from the state 
and repaying debt to the 
state 
17,5 17,5 -17,5 -17,5 
Repayment of the student to 
the bank 
-17,5 -17,5 -52,5 -52,5 
Table 5.10. 2 Periods Debiting Support, 2 Periods Repayment
29
 
On Table 5.10., it was supposed that the student borrowed half of the amount 
from the state, since he/she was earning less than the X TL threshold and could not 
financially afford making the fixed repayments (35 thousand TL). In this time period, 
the student had paid in specie 17,5 thousand TL and supplied the rest by borrowing 
from the state. It was also supposed, in the 9
th
 and 10
th
 periods, that the income of the 
student increased to above the X TL threshold level, and made 52,5 thousand TL 
repayment per period repaying the debt both to the state and the bank. In this 
situation, the maximum amount that the state can lend is 35 thousand TL (in t=8), 
and it is 0.00000006 of the budget expenditures. After the 10
th
 period, does not have 
                                                          
29
It was supposed that the inflation rate was 0 and the student repaid the loan (borrowed during four 
years) in 4 equal installments beginning 2 years after the graduation.  
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an additional burden for the budget because of collecting the loans back. Table 5.11. 
summarizes the functioning of the system.   
Thousand TL 
      
t 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Inflation (%) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Payment to 
bank 
-35 -35 -35 -35 -35 -35 
Repayment 
to the state1 
17,5 17,5 -17,5 -17,5 
  
Repayment 
to the state 2  
17,5 17,5 -17,5 -17,5 
 
Repayment 
to the state3   
17,5 17,5 -17,5 -17,5 
Repayment 
to the state 4    
17,5 17,5 -17,5 
Repayment 
to the state 5     
17,5 17,5 
Cost to the 
state 
17,5 35 17,5 0 0 0 
Share among 
budget 
expenditures 
0.00000003 0.00000006 0.00000003 0 0 0 
Table 5.11.Share of the 2-Period Repayment-Based Debiting Support among Budget Expenditures 
Carrying out calculations similar to the Table 5.11., in case the student borrowed 
the complete amount from the state in t=7 and t=8, it was observed that the share of 
debiting support among budget expenditures was maximum 0.00000006.  
5.2.b.ii. Cost of State Debiting Support to the Budget: 2-Period State Debiting 
Support Provided to the Students under the X TL Threshold Level - Students Above 
the X TL Threshold Level Repaying the State Debt in 4 Periods (cost per student)  
The functioning of the system is as follows (Table 5.12.), in case the state 
provides debiting support for half of the loan that the student borrowed from the 
bank.  
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Thousand TL                     
t 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Inflation (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Payment to 
bank 
-35 -35 -35 -35 -35 -35 -35 -35 -35 -35 
Borrowing 
from state 
and 
repayment1 
17,5 17,5 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 
    
Borrowing 
from state 
and 
repayment 2 
 
17,5 17,5 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 
   
Borrowing 
from state 
and 
repayment 3 
  
17,5 17,5 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 
  
Borrowing 
from state 
and 
repayment 4 
   
17,5 17,5 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 
 
Borrowing 
from state 
and 
repayment 5 
    
17,5 17,5 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 -8,75 
Cost to state 17,5 35 26,25 17,5 8,75 0 0 0 0 0 
Share among 
the budget 
expenditures 
0.00000003 0.00000006 0.00000004 0.00000003 0.00000001 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5.12.Share of the 4-Period-Repayment Debiting Support Among the Budget Expenditures 
Within the framework of the calculations on the Table 5.12., supposing that the 
state provided debiting support for 2 periods and collected these debts in 4 periods, 
the cost of a student to the government budget is maximum 0.00000006 and debiting 
support did not have an additional burden on the budget after the 12
th
 period. If the 
state, similarly provides support for a student in his/her complete debt, its cost to the 
budget is maximum 0.00000006.  
5.2.c. Providing State Guarantee for Repayments of the Credits  
In order for the banks to participate in the system, the state should provide pledge 
support to students for repayments. Repayment conditions should meticulously be 
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determined with regards to collecting most of the credits. However, in case a fraction 
of the students go into default, the state makes the payments on behalf of the ones 
who cannot make payments. Thus, it will be an additional burden for the budget. The 
cost of non-paying loans to the budget is shown on Table 5.13.   
Million TL               
t 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Inflation (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Loan and 
Repayment 
-35 -35 -35 -35 
   
  0 -35 -35 -35 -35 
  
  0 0 -35 -35 -35 -35 
 
  35 0 0 -35 -35 -35 -35 
  35 35 0 0 -35 -35 -35 
  35 35 35 0 0 -35 -35 
  35 35 35 35 0 0 -35 
  
 
35 35 35 35 0 0 
  
  
35 35 35 35 0 
  
   
35 35 35 35 
  
    
35 35 35 
  
     
35 35 
Total Non-Paying 
Loans 
-3,5 -7 -10,5 -14 -14 -14 -14 
Share Among 
Budget 
Expenditures 
0.000006 0.000012 0.000018 0.000024 0.000024 0.000024 0.000024 
Table 5.13.Cost of Possible 10% Non-Paying Loans to the Government Budget (for 1000 students) 
Table 5.13. shows that, in case 1.000 students cannot pay 10% of their loans, the 
non-paying loan amount will be maximum 14 million TL, which will have a share of 
0.000024 among budget expenditures. In case that 10 thousand and 100 thousand 
students go into default and the state makes the repayments on behalf of them, their 
shares among the budget expenditures are 0.00024 and 0.0024, respectively. 
In case the non-paying loan is 5%, the maximum shares among the budget 
expenditures are shown on Table 5.14.  
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Non-Paying Loan Rate (%5) 
Share Among the 
Budget 
Share Among the 
Budget 
Share Among the 
Budget 
 
(1000 student) (10.000 student) (100.000 student) 
Non-Paying Loan Rate (%5) 0.000012 0.00012 0.0012 
Table 5.14.Cost of Possible 5% Non-Paying Loans to the Government Budget 
Table 5.14. states that, in case the non-paying credit rate is 5%, 1.000 students go 
into default, and the state makes the repayments on behalf of them, its share among 
the budget expenditures is 0.000012.   
Within the framework of the abovementioned statements, the share of the support 
provided by the state among budget expenditures is summarized on Table 5.15.  
%5 Interest Subsidy 
Support 
4 Periods Repayment 
Based Debiting 
Support 
Cost Based on non-
paying credits 
(Rate of non-paying 
credit=%10) 
Total 
0.00007 0.00006 0.000024 0.00015 
Table 5.15.Share of the State Support Among Budget Expenditures (for 1.000 students)
30
 
According to Table 5.15., the cost of a thousand students that the state has to bear 
depending on its role in the credit system constitutes only 0.00015 of the 2016 
budget expenditures. The state can contribute to this system by allocating 0.015% 
from the budget expenditures.  
5.3. Launching Education Guarantee Fund (EGF) and Addressing Financial 
Needs of the Students  
As explained above, the existence of such a system for education guarantees the 
condition where the students cannot make whole of their repayments. This capacity 
will undaubtedly abolish the reluctency of the banks in providing credits for the 
students, simplifying their participation in the system (by abolishing the possible 
problems in providing credits). With Education Guarantee Fund, as is in the part 5.2, 
                                                          
30
Calculations were conducted over maximum values. 
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the debt of the students are guaranteed by the state. It is important that which 
institution(s) will transfer the necessary resources. It can be provided either by the 
Treasury or by a source such as European Investment Fund.   
The basic function of the fund is as follows: It is to provide additional financial 
support to students (by helping them borrow) and provide interest subsidy support in 
order to simplify the access of the students to financing (vouching for their 
repayments), who cannot use credit due to insufficient pledge. Thus, with the help of 
this fund, the students will be able to receive necessary financial support from the 
banks.  
System 3.a. Forming the Financial System by Bringing Together the Student and the 
Bank via EGF  
The basic functions of the EGF are explained below:  
- Providing pledge support for the students who cannot use credits due to   
insufficient pledge: 
In the system, the surety that the students pledge is their future income. However, 
the uncertainty of the future income for the banks and its risks cause banks to behave 
reluctant in providing credits for the students. Therefore, providing pledge for the 
students, the basic function of EGF is to guarantee the banks about complete or 
partial repayments in case the students do not make repayments. 
- Interest Subsidy Support: 
As explained in 5.2.a, another function of EGF apart from providing pledge for 
the students is to provide interest subsidy support for the students. The fund can 
reduce the burden of the students by covering complete or partial interest difference 
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between market interest rate and CPI, decreasing the cost originating from credit. 
The interest subsidy support is complimentary, and it's financed by the own sources 
of the fund. The state is expected to transfer the interest subsidy to the banks. 
Students only pay the amount originating from inflation.  
- Enabling Borrowing from EGF in Repayment: 
As explained in detail in 5.2.b, the support of this fund in repayment functions in a 
way that the EGF makes the payments to the banks on behalf of the students who are 
below the threshold level and cannot afford the fixed installments demanded by the 
banks. The difference between the amount demanded by the banks and the certain 
percentage of the student's income is covered by the fund. This amount, which will 
be lended by the fund to the students, is not fixed and varies according to the 
student's income. When the income of the student is over the threshold, the 
difference between the certain percentage of the income and the repayment amount is 
used in repaying to the fund.  
What important in repayments is an accurate following-up process of the 
repayments. Therefore, certain specialists can be employed in the fund for following-
up the loans. Moreover, after the graduate started in the business, the repayments can 
be made via automatic checkoffs by the employer in certain times and in certain 
amounts. In this point, the employer can transfer the amouont collected via automatic 
checkoff to the account of the fund or the bank. Such a system helps collect the loans 
simpler and in time.  
In cases such as death of the student, leaving the school for a while, interruption 
of education, lack of employment, etc., the details of who will make the payments to 
the banks should be determined in detail by the borrower. Since there is the state 
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guarantee in such cases, either the fund can undertake the complete loan, or the fund 
can partially cover and the rest can be paid by the family of the student. A certain 
period can be allowed for the students for employment. As examined in the 4
th
 part, 
in the income-based credit systems, the student begins making repayments two years 
after the graduation. The task falls to the grovernment in that the banks demanding 
the repayments two years after graduation. 
The functioning of the system can be designed in such a way: the students who 
are eligible for the private foundation universities apply to the banks for credit. The 
applications matching the criteria (the student having a sufficient score for the 
relevant university etc.) are conveyed to the EGF. As EGF approved the applications, 
the bank transfers the credit amount to the account of the university that the student 
will receive education. Transferring the amount to the account of the university 
rather than the student provides prevention of its use for other purposes.      
5.4. Comparison of Private, Hybrid System and Education Guarantee Fund  
As discussed in detail in the previous parts, it seems impossible for a private 
system to function alone (without state support). Particularly for participation of the 
students and banks in the system and sustainability of the system, other institution(s) 
should undertake the risks and uncertainties of the students. Therefore, it is evaluated 
that the most effective and least costly system is a hybrid credit system, which will 
be supported by the state. However, as mentioned in part 5.2, launching a fund, 
which will fulfil the functions of the state, would make the system more effective. 
Particularly with the help of this fund, the system becomes more sustainable since 
the basic finance is met from the sources of the fund. Thus, without an additional 
burden to the state budget, it specially helps collecting the repayments in time and 
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accurately, simplifying the follow-up of the loans. Therefore, it is vital to design such 
a system in order to create additional financing alternatives for the students. 
In such a system; the cost of credit for a thousand students is 0.015% of the 
budget expenditures transferred to the fund
31
. The factor that increases the cost most 
is the real interest subsidy support, which will encourage more students to participate 
in the system. Providing this support will eliminate the disincentives, which are 
based on unforeseen interest payments due to fluctuating market interest rates, about 
participation in the system. In this respect, providing 5% interest support for the 
credits by the fund in 0.007% of the budget expenditures can help a thousand 
students benefit from this fund. Providing debiting support for the students in case 
they fail to make the fixed repayments demanded by the banks encourages more 
banks to integrate into the system. Although providing debiting support for a 
thousand students (4-period-repayment-based) creates 0.006% incremental cost, it 
will encourage the banks, which will realize that the students can borrow from the 
state even if they cannot afford the fixed repayments, to participate in the system. 
That the debts of the students, who fail to make repayments financially and go into 
default, are guaranteed by the state is another factor enabling the banks and students 
to take part in the system. Even in case that the non-paying credit rate is 10% within 
all the credits, a thousand students go into default, and the fund makes their 
repayments, all of their cost is 0.002% of the budget expenditures. Moreover, this 
cost can even be reduced by regulations such as providing convenience in the 
repayments of the students, creating a regular follow-up system for an in-time and 
complete repayment of the debts, enhancing the demand and the salaries of skilled 
labor in labor market, etc. 
                                                          
31
 The calculations on Table 5.15. in part 5.2.c are grounded for the 0.015 % rate. 
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Along with this porposed system, alternative systems can be developed decreasing 
all the costs. However, providing support to a thousand students via such a fund at 
least helps the banks financially expand and students to become more qualified 
individuals, thus it can contribute to the growth and development of the country.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Observing the faster growth processes of the countries, where there is more 
investment in the human capital, the role of the education on the growth has been 
focused recently. The studies in recent years feature that education has been the 
decisive factor in the fast growth of the East Asian countries such as South Korea, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taivan. The most important reason is that the skilled 
human capital not only produces value added products but also uses high-tech 
products faster and more efficiently. The positive effect of education on the growth 
process of the countries is proved with theoretical and empirical research studies, and 
it was concluded that the differences in the human capital of the countries were 
important factors in the differences of the income per capita. The most important step 
for the human capital to gain more quality and participate in the workforce is the 
higher education process. Therefore, it is observed that many countries are investing 
more then ever in the higher education process. In this sense, it was studied in the 
world to develop credit mechanisms that would lend to the higher education students 
for education, preventing their financial limitations to be obstacles on their ways. In 
Turkey, Higher Education Credit and Hostels Institution was established with the 
1961 constitution. Thus, the state has provided education credit for the students in 
financial impossibility since 1962, contribution credits since 1985, and scholarship 
support since 2004 (Yurtkur). However, it is observed that there is not a private 
lending system in Turkey, providing finance support for the students with financial 
impossibility.    
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In this study, it was determined from the data provided by CoHE and supported 
via the survey study that the students, who had sufficient scores from the university 
exams conducted by the Student Selection and Placement Center (ÖSYM) for non-
scholarship, 25% scholarship, and 50% scholarship education in the best foundation 
universities, did not prefer education in these schools. Additionally, the best 
foundation universities in Turkey (Koç and Bilkent Universities) were determined on 
three criteria. The first one of these criteria was the preferences of the students 
according to the results of the university exams. According to this, full-scholarship 
program of Koç and Bilkent Universities were in the first five for the year 2016. In 
other words, the most successful students in Turkey prefer to be placed in Koç and 
Bilkent Universities. The second criterion is the university ranking list of the top ten 
university ranking institutions in the world. According to the rankings for the year 
2016, it was observed that these universities were among the top ten universities in 
Turkey. The third criterion is the survey study conducted on the higher education 
students. Among the eighteen universities addressed to the students for evaluation, 
the first two universities were Koç and Bilkent Unviersities. 
The motive behind the fact that although the students had sufficient scores for 
education in these schools with non-scholarship, 25% scholarship, or 50% 
scholarship, was evaluated to be financial shortage of the students to afford the paid 
education demanded by these schools. It was detected from their university exam 
results that the students with sufficient scores (to study at best foundation 
universities) preferred the state universities down on the ranking list determined by 
the top ten university ranking institutions. This case was also proven by the 
conducted field research. During the field research conducted on the students in the 
Economy, and Electric-Electronics Engineering Departments in the Çukurova, 
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Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt, Eskişehir Osmangazi Universities, the students were 
addressed questions regarding their demographic information, the basic factors in 
their university preferences, and their perceptions about the education quality of the 
universities and about lending mechanisms. As the conclusion of the field research, 
the students evaluated the education quality of Koç, Bilkent, Sabancı, Marmara, and 
TOBB universities as "very well", and evaluated the universities ranked down on the 
list or even not ranked at all by the university ranking institutions such as Uludağ, 
Selçuk, Sakarya, Erciyes, Eskişehir Osmangazi, Anadolu, Yıldırım Beyazıt as 
"medium". Accordingly, the rankings based on perceptions of the students about the 
education quality of the universities, and university ranking lists of the ranking 
institutions, and/or the student preferences in the unviersity placements overlap. 
However, the students preferred the state universities down on the list instead of the 
foundation universities that they evaluated as "very well". Furthermore, 253 students 
participating in the field research were asked whether they would choose Koç and 
Bilkent Universities if they had sufficient scores for full scholarship, and 87% of 
them mentioned that they would prefer these universities if they had sufficient 
scores, and 12,6% of the students stated that they would not, even if they had 
sufficient scores. As a reason, they stated that it was because they thought that they 
could not adapt to the social atmosphere, and if they had sufficient scores their 
priority would be for the best state universities. As the reason of their state university 
priority, the students at the least mentioned that, it was because the possibility of 
losing the scholarship due to being unsuccessful. 
Most of the students mentioned that they would prefer the Koç and Bilkent 
Universities with full scholarship and did not prefer these universities with payment, 
which showed that the students did not have sufficient finance to afford the education 
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fees. When the students were asked whether they would accept paid education in 
these universities if they had the chance of a credit system to afford the expenses, at 
least half of the students thought negative about financing their expenses via 
borrowing. These results show that at least half of the students did not want to 
establish a lien on the long term and made a short term preference instead. 
The motives behind the fact that the students do not prefer education via 
borrowing is that 30,8% of the students cannot predict their incomes in the first five 
years after graduation and 30% of them predicted to earn 2500-4000 TL per month. 
On the other hand, another reason for the students not to prefer education via 
borrowing can be the fact that 68,8% of them considered the employment 
opportunity in university preference. The fact that more than half of the students 
consider employment factor as the basic criterion in university preference, manifests 
the employment apprehensions after graduation. When the two possibilities are 
evaluated together, the uncertainties that the students face after graduation might be 
the cause for them to not prefer education via borrowing due to apprehension about 
being unable to make the repayments. However, if there is an opportunity for the 
students to postpone the repayments in case they cannot find a job after graduation, 
and another opportunity for the students with lower income to make the repayments 
in direct proportion to their incomes, might encourage most of them to finance their 
education via borrowing. Thus, the opportunity inequality that these students face 
can be prevented. 
When the credit systems in the other countries were examined in order to generate 
an effective and sustainable credit system, it was concluded that there were three 
types of credit systems in practice as mortgage-type, income-contingent type, and 
hybrid. The best application of the mortgage-type credit system was in the USA, 
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while the best implementation of the income-contingent credit system was in the 
Australia, and the only country that used the hybrid system was Iceland, which was 
explained in the fourth section with implementation details. In the mortgage-type 
credit system, which can be classified as a private student credit system, the loans 
have been provided by the private banks to the students in the USA since 1960s. 
However, since this system was indexed to high interest rates and includes 
repayment in fixed installments, it was resulted in an increase in the student debts 
and non-repayment problems. Therefore, government credits, which permits students 
to repay based on their incomes and takes their debts under the state guarantee, have 
been implemented by the US government for the students with lower incomes. As 
per the income-contingent credit system, it was firstly applied in Australia in 1989. 
Since it was used effectively, several other countries adopted income-contingent 
credit system, as well. These credits, which require income-contingent repayments 
after graduation, are generally provided by the governments. In this study, a hybrid 
system is suggested, in which the credits are generally provided by the banks, 
however, the students make repayments in direct proportion to their incomes 
(income-contingent loan system). 
The students are in high-risk group regarding the repayments. Therefore, it was 
supposed that the banks would be reluctant for participating in the system. It was also 
considered that the students, who could not predict their incomes after graduation, 
who had the apprehension of non-repayment, and who had insufficient collateral for 
borrowing, would not want to borrow from the banks. Accordingly, it was concluded 
that it should be the state, which will bring the students and the banks together. From 
this point of view, it was suggested in this study that firstly, the state generates an 
Education Guarantee Fund (EGF). Second, this fund provides collateral for the 
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students, who cannot use credit due to insufficient collateral. Third, the state pays for 
the real interest difference, in between the nominal interest rate demanded by the 
banks and the inflation rate, to the banks on behalf of the students. Lastly, the state 
provides lending support for the students, who cannot make repayments due to their 
low incomes. As the conclusion of the estimations, it is foreseen that in case a debt 
support is provided with 5% interest subsidy and repayments in four periods, and in 
case the cost of non-paying loans of 10% of the students is compensated, the share of 
its cost in the 2016 year budget expenditures is 0.015% for a thousand students. 
Moreover, it was concluded that generation of EGF will create the most effective and 
sustainable system among all of the existing credit systems. By generating EGF and 
abolishing the finance limitations of the higher education students, it is expected that 
the quality of the human capital will increase and it will accelerate the growth and 
development process of our country.  
In addition, there are also certain criteria for such a system such as fairness, 
sustainability, accessibility, determination of foundation universities and 
departments.  In this study, the best foundation universities and better performing 
students who cannot take education due to financial constraints in these schools are 
handled for fairness of the scheme. However, different mechanisms can be developed 
to encourage students to take part in a loan scheme: additional tax payments, other 
income-based systems etc. In addition, it was assumed that installments were paid in 
six years (2 years nonpayment and 4 years repayment). It is very short term in terms 
of repayments, but the reason for a determination is explaining basic functioning of 
the system. It should be also noted that as the repayment period increase, the cost of 
the system increases more. However, these are the subject of another study and have 
not been addressed in this study. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1. Education Attainment for Population Aged 15 and Over 
   
Educational Attainment for Total Population, 1950-2010 
  
 
          
Barro R. & J.W. Lee 
          
v. 2.1, Feb. 2016 
Country Year 
No 
Schooling 
Highest level attained 
Avg. 
Years of 
Total 
Schooling 
Avg. Years 
of Tertiary 
 Schooling 
Population 
(1000s) 
  
    
  
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Total Completed Total Completed Total Completed 
(% of population aged 15 and over) 
Australia 1950 1.3 44.8 28.7 43.2 21.3 10.8 6.2 8.04 0.34 6040 
 
1955 1.1 40.6 23.9 46.6 24.5 11.7 6.7 8.27 0.37 6533 
 
1960 1.0 36.5 19.9 49.9 28.0 12.6 7.3 8.53 0.40 7183 
 
1965 0.8 31.3 16.9 53.7 32.3 14.2 8.0 8.93 0.44 8105 
 
1970 0.8 23.7 12.7 56.3 36.6 19.3 10.8 9.70 0.60 9057 
 
1975 1.1 12.8 6.6 65.5 45.7 20.7 11.6 10.52 0.65 9865 
 
1980 0.8 6.1 3.2 69.9 51.8 23.2 13.1 11.20 0.73 10937 
 
1985 1.1 7.8 4.2 67.5 52.4 23.5 13.2 11.20 0.73 11973 
 
1990 1.1 9.3 5.2 65.3 52.8 24.3 13.9 11.18 0.76 13178 
 
1995 1.4 10.8 6.3 60.4 50.6 27.5 15.9 11.20 0.87 14009 
 
2000 1.1 11.2 6.8 65.3 57.0 22.4 13.2 11.07 0.71 15028 
 
2005 0.9 10.2 6.6 62.5 56.0 26.4 15.6 11.38 0.84 16199 
 
2010 0.7 7.6 5.2 60.7 38.5 31.0 18.5 11.54 0.99 17323 
Canada 1950 2.0 49.9 25.7 39.5 16.4 8.6 4.3 7.60 0.26 9660 
 
1955 1.7 47.1 24.8 40.3 17.1 10.9 5.6 7.93 0.33 10684 
 
1960 1.4 43.2 23.5 42.0 18.1 13.4 7.0 8.34 0.41 11901 
 
1965 1.3 38.3 21.4 45.1 16.7 15.3 7.9 8.65 0.46 13110 
 
1970 1.1 32.0 16.8 48.2 17.4 18.7 9.7 9.14 0.57 15179 
 
1975 1.4 24.3 10.8 51.6 18.9 22.7 12.7 9.70 0.71 17085 
 
1980 1.6 19.1 8.8 53.9 20.3 25.4 14.9 10.15 0.81 18942 
 
1985 1.0 16.7 6.8 63.9 24.7 18.4 8.1 9.94 0.53 20338 
 
1990 0.8 13.5 5.4 64.9 27.3 20.8 9.9 10.33 0.61 21968 
 
1995 0.9 11.4 5.0 63.6 29.4 24.2 11.5 10.71 0.71 23330 
 
2000 0.9 9.3 3.6 64.0 30.2 25.8 13.9 10.95 0.79 24830 
 
2005 0.8 6.0 2.7 53.1 32.1 40.1 20.5 12.03 1.21 26588 
 
2010 0.7 4.8 2.2 50.6 31.8 43.9 22.7 12.32 1.33 28292 
France 1950 0.3 89.4 40.0 8.7 2.3 1.6 0.9 4.33 0.05 32331 
 
1955 0.3 88.1 40.5 9.7 2.5 1.9 1.1 4.45 0.06 32807 
 
1960 0.3 89.8 33.3 7.7 2.9 2.2 1.3 4.20 0.07 33637 
 
1965 1.1 84.9 36.4 10.4 4.2 3.7 2.1 4.65 0.12 36274 
 
1970 1.1 83.8 39.2 12.4 5.1 2.7 1.5 4.75 0.08 38171 
 
1975 1.0 71.5 32.3 20.1 8.0 7.4 3.9 5.76 0.23 40105 
 
1980 1.0 67.6 27.8 23.8 9.2 7.7 3.7 5.96 0.23 41876 
 
1985 5.4 51.7 26.8 33.2 16.7 9.7 4.9 6.91 0.29 43562 
 
1990 8.0 39.8 23.8 40.3 21.6 11.9 5.8 7.65 0.35 45248 
 
1995 5.0 31.0 21.6 49.1 28.3 14.9 7.2 8.82 0.44 46961 
 
2000 2.7 23.7 18.2 55.9 33.8 17.8 8.4 9.75 0.52 48229 
 
2005 1.5 21.1 17.5 58.9 35.9 18.6 8.7 10.12 0.55 49502 
 
2010 1.5 16.6 15.3 59.0 38.2 23.0 10.6 10.68 0.67 50470 
Germany 1950 10.3 68.3 42.1 18.8 5.5 2.6 1.5 6.80 0.08 52523 
 
1955 2.7 74.3 46.6 20.2 6.7 2.9 1.6 7.43 0.09 55420 
 
1960 2.6 73.8 46.6 20.6 7.8 3.1 1.8 7.49 0.10 57323 
 
1965 2.5 73.7 48.8 20.6 8.9 3.2 1.9 7.43 0.10 58606 
 
1970 4.5 74.3 51.3 18.5 8.7 2.7 1.6 7.05 0.09 60020 
 
1975 5.0 72.6 51.1 17.7 9.1 4.7 2.7 6.98 0.15 61743 
 
1980 5.2 68.9 49.8 20.1 11.1 5.7 3.3 7.03 0.18 63814 
 
1985 5.1 65.2 48.0 23.4 13.9 6.4 3.7 7.18 0.20 65244 
 
1990 5.1 45.0 33.6 37.1 23.0 12.8 7.6 8.60 0.41 66657 
 
1995 5.5 33.3 25.6 45.6 30.2 15.6 9.3 9.44 0.50 68395 
 
2000 5.1 25.9 20.1 51.6 35.5 17.4 10.5 10.06 0.56 69490 
 
2005 4.6 5.3 4.2 72.1 51.2 18.0 10.9 11.65 0.58 70864 
 
2010 1.8 3.7 2.9 73.0 54.8 21.5 13.1 12.37 0.69 71607 
Italy 1950 14.2 73.9 44.5 10.7 4.1 1.2 0.7 4.21 0.04 34706 
 
1955 12.3 72.5 45.6 13.6 4.8 1.6 0.9 4.54 0.05 36453 
 
1960 10.6 70.8 46.7 16.9 5.9 1.7 1.0 4.86 0.05 37765 
 
1965 7.8 69.9 47.7 20.1 6.7 2.1 1.2 5.23 0.07 39450 
 
1970 5.9 67.0 47.8 24.9 8.3 2.2 1.3 5.63 0.07 40597 
 
1975 6.4 59.4 45.8 31.1 10.5 3.2 1.9 6.16 0.10 42004 
 
1980 6.4 50.6 41.6 39.7 13.9 3.3 1.9 6.71 0.10 43865 
 
1985 8.4 41.8 36.5 45.2 17.3 4.5 2.6 7.18 0.14 45512 
 
1990 8.3 35.7 32.4 50.1 20.2 6.1 3.5 7.70 0.19 47722 
 
1995 7.6 29.4 27.2 55.5 23.6 7.7 4.5 8.27 0.24 48732 
 
2000 7.0 24.4 22.9 60.4 28.5 8.3 5.0 8.78 0.27 49468 
 
2005 6.9 20.8 19.7 63.2 31.9 9.1 5.6 9.15 0.29 49948 
 
2010 5.6 17.7 16.4 65.6 34.5 11.1 6.8 9.63 0.36 50210 
Japan 1950 4.7 59.9 38.0 31.0 19.1 4.5 1.6 6.73 0.12 53981 
 
1955 3.5 55.3 35.6 36.0 22.8 5.3 2.1 7.19 0.15 59662 
 
1960 2.4 47.2 30.6 44.8 26.9 5.6 2.7 7.76 0.17 65669 
 
1965 1.5 52.6 35.9 40.6 19.6 5.4 2.3 7.48 0.15 73234 
 
1970 0.7 50.4 35.7 41.3 20.2 7.6 3.6 7.83 0.22 79260 
 
1975 0.4 44.8 32.0 43.4 22.2 11.5 5.7 8.38 0.34 84415 
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1980 0.3 38.7 28.2 45.1 31.0 15.9 5.0 9.10 0.42 89295 
 
1985 0.3 33.5 24.8 47.7 32.9 18.6 10.8 9.63 0.59 94840 
 
1990 0.2 32.1 24.1 46.1 29.7 21.5 12.5 9.82 0.68 100808 
 
1995 0.2 23.1 17.8 52.3 34.6 24.4 14.3 10.51 0.77 105454 
 
2000 0.2 18.9 14.7 53.8 37.4 27.1 16.2 10.94 0.86 108437 
 
2005 0.2 15.8 12.3 54.7 39.6 29.4 17.9 11.30 0.94 110156 
 
2010 0.1 11.7 9.1 57.6 41.0 30.6 18.9 11.60 0.99 110797 
Turkey 1950 78.8 16.2 7.9 4.2 1.9 0.8 0.4 1.11 0.03 12884 
 
1955 73.2 21.0 10.5 4.9 2.3 0.9 0.5 1.38 0.03 14559 
 
1960 66.1 26.9 14.9 6.1 2.9 1.0 0.5 1.76 0.03 16272 
 
1965 59.8 32.0 18.5 7.1 3.4 1.1 0.6 2.08 0.03 18276 
 
1970 54.8 34.8 21.3 9.0 4.2 1.4 0.7 2.45 0.04 21165 
 
1975 47.7 39.3 25.9 11.6 5.5 1.4 0.7 2.92 0.04 24152 
 
1980 40.8 42.1 29.3 14.1 6.9 3.0 1.6 3.55 0.09 27597 
 
1985 31.2 48.6 36.1 8.2 4.1 12.0 6.2 4.58 0.36 32081 
 
1990 27.4 47.3 37.0 14.3 7.3 11.0 5.8 5.01 0.34 36835 
 
1995 23.8 47.4 42.0 18.8 9.9 10.0 5.3 5.44 0.31 41989 
 
2000 15.3 48.9 40.9 26.7 14.8 9.1 4.9 6.10 0.28 47311 
 
2005 11.9 47.2 40.6 33.3 18.2 7.6 4.2 6.47 0.24 51830 
 
2010 9.2 43.0 36.6 38.6 20.5 9.3 5.3 7.05 0.29 56541 
USA 1950 2.2 41.7 19.7 42.9 24.6 13.1 6.3 8.40 0.39 115216 
 
1955 2.2 37.9 18.1 45.5 26.9 14.5 7.1 8.75 0.43 120600 
 
1960 2.0 33.5 16.3 48.8 30.3 15.7 8.5 9.17 0.48 128761 
 
1965 1.6 23.0 12.2 57.2 37.2 18.1 9.0 10.03 0.54 138996 
 
1970 1.4 15.2 8.6 62.5 42.8 20.9 11.4 10.78 0.65 150553 
 
1975 1.2 8.9 5.3 63.1 45.2 26.7 13.3 11.46 0.80 164741 
 
1980 0.8 5.0 3.2 64.3 49.0 29.9 16.7 12.03 0.93 179012 
 
1985 1.1 7.2 4.6 54.4 40.9 37.4 18.5 12.08 1.12 190451 
 
1990 1.2 8.6 5.6 47.2 36.0 43.1 20.7 12.20 1.28 199952 
 
1995 0.6 3.1 2.1 52.2 38.3 44.2 20.4 12.59 1.29 210111 
 
2000 0.4 2.8 2.0 48.3 30.2 48.5 23.0 12.64 1.43 222901 
 
2005 0.4 2.7 1.9 47.4 36.0 49.5 22.4 12.86 1.44 236267 
 
2010 0.4 2.8 2.0 43.0 36.2 53.9 26.8 13.18 1.61 249660 
United Kingdom 1950 2.2 72.9 44.9 23.4 2.0 1.5 0.9 6.39 0.05 38691 
 
1955 2.2 69.8 43.6 26.5 2.4 1.6 0.9 6.61 0.05 38870 
 
1960 2.1 66.1 41.6 30.4 2.6 1.5 0.9 6.86 0.05 39578 
 
1965 2.1 60.5 40.2 32.9 4.7 4.5 2.6 7.46 0.14 41112 
 
1970 2.2 55.7 38.5 34.5 5.6 7.6 4.4 7.91 0.24 41534 
 
1975 2.3 51.0 35.9 37.2 6.3 9.5 5.5 8.25 0.30 42490 
 
1980 3.3 45.7 33.0 41.5 7.1 9.6 5.5 8.41 0.30 43928 
 
1985 3.2 41.2 30.3 44.7 7.2 10.9 6.2 8.68 0.34 45230 
 
1990 3.2 37.5 28.0 44.0 7.1 15.4 9.0 9.10 0.49 45950 
 
1995 3.3 34.1 26.2 43.9 7.3 18.8 11.1 9.44 0.60 46576 
 
2000 2.9 28.8 22.4 46.7 9.5 21.6 12.8 9.92 0.69 47484 
 
2005 1.3 23.1 18.2 52.6 31.2 23.1 13.8 11.10 0.74 48969 
 
2010 0.2 14.9 11.8 59.5 47.3 25.5 15.3 12.24 0.82 50276 
China 1950 70.6 20.8 4.8 8.2 1.8 0.4 0.2 1.61 0.01 368715 
 
1955 64.1 26.0 6.4 9.4 2.1 0.5 0.3 1.96 0.02 383044 
 
1960 56.9 30.0 9.9 12.4 2.9 0.7 0.4 2.51 0.02 401694 
 
1965 48.5 34.9 13.4 15.8 3.7 0.9 0.5 3.11 0.03 436196 
 
1970 39.5 39.2 17.7 20.4 4.9 0.9 0.5 3.82 0.03 500636 
 
1975 33.0 39.7 19.3 26.4 6.5 0.9 0.5 4.48 0.03 561430 
 
1980 24.8 40.7 21.3 33.7 9.4 0.9 0.5 5.31 0.03 644245 
 
1985 22.6 38.4 21.3 37.6 14.3 1.4 0.8 5.72 0.04 745898 
 
1990 22.2 34.6 19.9 41.3 19.9 1.9 1.1 6.04 0.06 835430 
 
1995 16.0 32.9 19.4 47.9 25.2 3.3 1.9 6.79 0.10 896920 
 
2000 11.0 30.4 18.3 54.1 27.5 4.6 2.8 7.38 0.15 958307 
 
2005 7.7 27.1 16.8 60.4 26.9 4.8 2.8 7.69 0.15 1034076 
 
2010 5.4 23.7 14.8 66.5 22.9 4.5 2.7 7.95 0.14 1090693 
Indonesia 1950 76.1 21.7 7.3 2.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 1.09 0.00 48383 
 
1955 72.6 24.8 8.4 2.5 0.6 0.1 0.0 1.25 0.00 52856 
 
1960 67.4 29.0 11.3 3.5 0.9 0.1 0.0 1.57 0.00 57570 
 
1965 56.9 37.6 16.4 5.2 1.3 0.3 0.1 2.17 0.01 62448 
 
1970 45.4 46.5 21.1 7.8 2.1 0.4 0.2 2.84 0.01 69422 
 
1975 38.8 50.9 20.0 9.8 3.2 0.6 0.2 3.19 0.02 78808 
 
1980 31.9 55.1 20.6 12.4 5.2 0.6 0.3 3.63 0.02 89388 
 
1985 39.5 41.4 19.1 17.6 7.7 1.5 0.8 3.86 0.05 102445 
 
1990 43.6 30.4 16.6 24.2 10.9 1.8 1.0 4.18 0.06 116420 
 
1995 32.5 44.3 26.1 21.2 9.8 2.1 1.2 4.62 0.06 131181 
 
2000 22.6 54.8 35.2 20.4 9.7 2.1 1.2 5.15 0.07 146081 
 
2005 14.5 50.7 34.0 30.1 15.0 4.7 2.7 6.41 0.15 159726 
 
2010 7.5 44.2 29.3 41.9 22.1 6.4 3.7 7.61 0.20 172622 
Republic of Korea 1950 27.9 62.3 53.5 8.3 4.3 1.5 0.7 4.50 0.04 11003 
 
1955 22.8 62.7 55.1 12.7 6.4 1.8 0.8 5.02 0.05 12993 
 
1960 42.6 36.9 32.5 17.8 8.7 2.6 1.4 4.20 0.08 14518 
 
1965 31.7 39.6 37.7 24.8 11.0 4.0 2.2 5.32 0.12 16194 
 
1970 24.3 39.1 37.6 30.8 13.4 5.8 3.2 6.19 0.18 18495 
 
1975 17.2 36.4 35.0 39.9 18.7 6.6 3.5 7.12 0.20 21962 
 
1980 13.1 28.0 27.1 49.8 26.1 9.1 4.8 8.13 0.28 25163 
 
1985 10.9 20.9 20.2 54.7 32.2 13.5 7.2 9.00 0.41 28577 
 
1990 8.1 16.1 15.3 58.7 39.0 17.2 9.4 9.85 0.53 31793 
 
1995 6.7 13.9 13.2 57.2 42.9 22.2 12.9 10.49 0.70 34487 
 
2000 5.9 11.8 11.2 52.0 39.6 30.2 19.1 11.06 0.99 37028 
 
2005 5.9 12.0 9.8 49.6 42.9 32.5 22.1 11.46 1.07 38925 
 
2010 3.4 9.6 8.8 45.3 35.5 41.6 30.0 12.05 1.43 40868 
Russian Federation 1950 20.2 50.4 17.0 26.3 7.6 3.2 1.3 3.83 0.09 73427 
 
1955 11.3 53.3 18.5 31.9 9.6 3.6 1.4 4.41 0.10 81590 
 
1960 9.4 52.2 18.5 34.6 11.5 3.8 1.3 4.67 0.10 84140 
 
1965 7.5 45.0 16.8 41.6 14.6 5.9 2.3 5.34 0.16 88933 
 
1970 5.7 39.3 15.7 48.9 19.6 6.1 2.4 5.94 0.17 95753 
 
1975 6.4 31.0 13.2 52.2 24.1 10.3 4.0 6.69 0.29 102952 
 
1980 6.9 23.9 10.9 53.4 27.8 15.8 6.2 7.59 0.44 108505 
 
1985 7.0 17.7 8.5 50.4 28.9 24.9 9.8 8.57 0.69 110623 
 
1990 6.5 13.0 6.5 48.4 30.9 32.2 13.0 9.46 0.90 113952 
 
1995 4.3 10.0 5.3 48.7 28.5 37.0 13.3 9.94 1.01 116739 
 
2000 1.0 7.8 4.3 44.5 30.5 46.7 19.3 10.90 1.32 119858 
 
2005 0.9 7.0 4.0 39.4 27.7 52.8 21.8 11.20 1.49 121315 
 
2010 0.9 5.4 3.2 34.8 23.8 59.2 24.7 11.53 1.68 118489 
Argentina 1950 14.1 75.3 28.8 9.6 4.4 1.0 0.6 4.85 0.03 11915 
 
1955 12.3 73.9 29.0 11.9 5.7 1.9 1.2 5.20 0.06 13105 
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1960 10.2 71.8 29.7 14.8 7.3 3.2 2.0 5.67 0.10 14270 
 
1965 8.6 71.1 30.3 16.5 8.5 3.8 2.2 5.94 0.12 15553 
 
1970 7.0 69.2 30.8 19.4 10.1 4.4 2.5 6.31 0.14 16924 
 
1975 5.9 65.9 32.7 21.7 12.0 6.6 3.6 6.85 0.20 18437 
 
1980 4.9 62.0 32.6 25.7 15.9 7.4 3.4 7.30 0.22 19520 
 
1985 5.0 57.0 34.4 27.8 17.1 10.2 5.0 7.85 0.30 20911 
 
1990 4.8 51.3 33.0 30.7 19.4 13.2 5.8 8.37 0.38 22566 
 
1995 4.0 48.4 34.4 36.7 23.2 10.9 4.3 8.64 0.30 24666 
 
2000 3.5 46.5 34.1 41.3 24.5 8.7 3.1 8.73 0.24 26565 
 
2005 0.9 38.9 33.1 49.9 28.9 10.4 3.1 9.38 0.27 28509 
 
2010 0.9 39.2 31.9 48.7 31.1 11.2 2.9 9.51 0.28 30538 
Brazil 1950 62.8 31.7 14.4 4.8 3.2 0.7 0.4 2.08 0.02 31543 
 
1955 57.6 35.4 15.6 6.1 3.7 0.9 0.6 2.29 0.03 36440 
 
1960 52.0 39.1 17.0 7.6 4.2 1.2 0.8 2.55 0.04 41263 
 
1965 45.5 43.2 18.4 9.8 4.5 1.5 1.0 2.85 0.05 47487 
 
1970 37.8 47.1 20.6 13.3 4.8 1.7 1.2 3.29 0.06 55315 
 
1975 27.0 61.5 5.1 7.7 2.9 3.8 2.3 2.90 0.12 64538 
 
1980 27.4 59.0 6.2 9.3 3.6 4.3 2.8 3.04 0.14 75298 
 
1985 25.2 57.8 22.3 12.4 5.0 4.7 2.7 3.94 0.15 85749 
 
1990 22.3 57.0 29.7 15.6 6.7 5.2 3.0 4.69 0.16 96664 
 
1995 19.5 52.9 31.8 22.0 10.4 5.7 3.7 5.58 0.19 108886 
 
2000 16.0 45.0 28.9 32.6 16.6 6.4 3.7 6.52 0.20 122354 
 
2005 12.4 39.7 26.8 41.3 23.0 6.3 3.7 7.29 0.20 134481 
 
2010 9.6 35.6 25.6 45.5 26.4 9.4 5.6 7.89 0.30 145288 
Mexico 1950 45.4 49.0 10.6 4.3 1.5 1.3 0.9 2.19 0.04 16094 
 
1955 42.7 50.8 11.6 5.1 1.6 1.3 0.9 2.34 0.04 17911 
 
1960 40.1 52.2 12.0 6.5 1.9 1.3 0.9 2.52 0.04 20318 
 
1965 36.1 53.8 13.9 8.3 3.5 1.8 1.2 2.96 0.06 23293 
 
1970 31.8 55.8 16.8 10.1 4.1 2.2 1.6 3.39 0.07 27063 
 
1975 30.3 51.1 17.4 14.4 5.8 4.2 2.4 4.09 0.13 31594 
 
1980 27.5 46.5 18.9 20.4 8.1 5.6 3.4 4.90 0.18 37041 
 
1985 21.4 44.4 19.4 27.6 11.0 6.6 3.6 5.77 0.20 43477 
 
1990 16.6 42.0 19.3 34.2 13.4 7.2 3.9 6.47 0.22 51246 
 
1995 12.9 39.5 20.2 38.4 15.7 9.3 5.1 7.20 0.29 59036 
 
2000 10.3 37.5 19.1 41.2 16.6 11.0 6.8 7.66 0.36 66378 
 
2005 7.8 31.7 16.5 46.3 19.8 14.2 8.4 8.45 0.45 73868 
 
2010 7.2 28.9 16.1 47.3 19.4 16.6 9.8 8.79 0.53 81611 
Saudi Arabia 1950 64.0 25.8 10.8 6.9 2.9 3.3 1.8 2.31 0.10 1856 
 
1955 62.2 26.5 12.0 7.6 3.5 3.7 2.0 2.51 0.12 2061 
 
1960 60.5 26.8 12.7 8.4 4.1 4.2 2.3 2.71 0.13 2309 
 
1965 55.4 30.2 14.4 9.8 4.8 4.5 2.4 3.05 0.14 2683 
 
1970 54.2 29.7 14.1 11.2 5.5 4.9 2.6 3.22 0.15 3188 
 
1975 50.1 29.6 14.8 14.2 6.9 6.1 3.1 3.73 0.18 4041 
 
1980 45.7 29.5 15.0 17.6 8.6 7.3 3.7 4.26 0.22 5348 
 
1985 36.0 33.0 17.4 22.3 10.9 8.8 4.7 5.17 0.27 7421 
 
1990 29.1 34.9 18.7 26.0 12.8 10.0 5.5 5.84 0.31 9557 
 
1995 26.5 32.0 17.4 30.4 15.0 11.1 6.2 6.34 0.34 10959 
 
2000 21.2 30.4 17.2 36.0 18.1 12.4 6.9 7.08 0.39 12982 
 
2005 17.1 27.3 16.1 43.9 22.4 11.7 6.5 7.69 0.36 15413 
 
2010 12.7 23.1 15.0 52.3 29.1 12.0 6.7 8.53 0.37 18076 
India 1950 74.9 22.4 6.7 2.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.99 0.02 218405 
 
1955 73.5 23.6 7.3 2.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.06 0.02 240942 
 
1960 72.1 24.8 8.6 2.5 0.2 0.6 0.3 1.13 0.02 266423 
 
1965 70.8 24.4 9.4 3.9 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.30 0.03 295056 
 
1970 66.2 27.1 12.7 5.6 0.3 1.1 0.6 1.61 0.03 330552 
 
1975 65.9 20.4 11.3 11.9 0.4 1.8 1.0 2.01 0.06 373640 
 
1980 66.3 12.7 7.4 18.7 0.5 2.3 1.2 2.34 0.07 423306 
 
1985 58.5 16.7 11.1 21.6 0.6 3.2 1.7 2.89 0.10 478056 
 
1990 51.6 18.7 13.7 25.7 0.6 4.0 2.2 3.45 0.12 538715 
 
1995 47.8 18.4 14.5 27.9 6.9 6.0 3.4 4.12 0.19 600511 
 
2000 44.0 16.2 13.5 32.8 19.8 7.1 4.0 5.03 0.22 672684 
 
2005 38.0 17.5 15.2 36.9 21.8 7.7 4.4 5.63 0.24 749620 
 
2010 33.2 16.8 15.2 41.5 25.0 8.5 4.9 6.24 0.27 829075 
South Africa 1950 50.6 24.1 15.4 22.8 4.9 2.6 0.3 4.03 0.06 8403 
 
1955 47.6 24.7 15.7 24.9 5.3 2.8 0.3 4.32 0.06 9249 
 
1960 46.1 26.1 16.2 25.0 5.4 2.8 0.3 4.39 0.06 10273 
 
1965 42.1 28.3 9.9 26.5 5.8 3.2 0.3 4.45 0.07 11522 
 
1970 37.8 31.1 7.2 28.1 6.7 3.1 0.3 4.61 0.07 13035 
 
1975 32.1 38.0 10.8 27.8 7.6 2.1 0.2 4.83 0.05 14934 
 
1980 26.3 44.1 13.2 28.5 9.3 1.2 0.2 5.11 0.03 17085 
 
1985 19.1 50.2 6.8 29.0 4.8 1.7 0.2 5.11 0.04 19781 
 
1990 11.2 46.5 18.7 37.1 11.1 5.2 0.4 6.81 0.11 22633 
 
1995 5.2 40.5 21.2 47.4 26.3 6.9 0.5 8.29 0.15 26948 
 
2000 15.5 23.3 7.3 54.0 18.5 7.2 0.5 7.68 0.15 30319 
 
2005 10.4 20.1 7.1 63.3 31.0 6.3 0.4 8.65 0.13 31969 
 
2010 5.7 17.5 6.2 72.3 53.9 4.6 0.3 9.69 0.10 32760 
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Country Year 
No 
Schooling 
Highest level attained 
Avg. Years 
of Total 
Schooling 
Avg. Years 
of Tertiary 
 Schooling 
Population 
(1000s) 
  
    
  
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Total Completed Total Completed Total Completed 
(% of population aged 25 and over) 
Australia 1950 1.3 48.4 31.9 39.8 18.8 10.5 6.9 7.87 0.35 4837 
 
1955 1.2 44.9 27.4 42.7 21.5 11.3 7.3 8.05 0.37 5327 
 
1960 1.1 40.9 22.7 45.9 24.5 12.1 7.9 8.26 0.40 5742 
 
1965 1.0 37.1 20.0 48.9 27.8 13.0 8.5 8.53 0.43 6242 
 
1970 0.9 29.3 15.4 48.3 29.5 21.5 14.1 9.35 0.71 6834 
 
1975 1.0 16.4 8.4 63.3 41.7 19.3 12.6 10.04 0.64 7494 
 
1980 1.0 7.8 4.1 70.5 49.9 20.7 13.5 10.79 0.68 8382 
 
1985 1.2 7.8 3.9 67.8 50.9 23.1 14.9 11.02 0.76 9297 
 
1990 1.3 8.4 4.2 65.7 52.0 24.6 16.0 11.20 0.81 10445 
 
1995 1.4 9.6 5.0 63.1 52.2 26.0 16.9 11.31 0.86 11351 
 
2000 1.2 10.0 5.4 64.4 55.0 24.4 15.9 11.26 0.81 12409 
 
2005 1.1 9.1 5.3 60.3 53.0 29.5 19.5 11.54 0.98 13384 
 
2010 0.8 6.5 4.0 54.7 35.4 38.0 25.2 11.77 1.26 14424 
Canada 1950 2.4 52.6 25.2 36.1 15.9 8.8 5.0 7.39 0.28 7472 
 
1955 2.0 50.0 24.8 37.0 16.6 11.1 6.4 7.75 0.35 8420 
 
1960 1.7 47.2 24.1 37.9 17.5 13.1 7.7 8.06 0.42 9294 
 
1965 1.6 42.8 22.5 41.7 16.3 13.9 8.3 8.32 0.44 9956 
 
1970 1.4 38.4 20.0 44.3 16.9 15.9 9.6 8.66 0.51 11130 
 
1975 1.8 30.7 12.2 47.2 18.4 20.3 12.6 9.18 0.66 12547 
 
1980 2.0 23.7 9.5 49.4 19.8 24.9 15.7 9.84 0.81 14099 
 
1985 1.2 19.9 7.8 59.5 24.8 19.3 9.4 9.83 0.57 15822 
 
1990 1.0 15.7 6.0 62.0 27.7 21.4 11.2 10.28 0.65 17906 
 
1995 1.0 13.0 5.4 62.0 29.4 24.0 13.1 10.63 0.74 19341 
 
2000 1.0 10.6 4.0 61.4 31.0 26.9 15.6 10.98 0.85 20702 
 
2005 0.7 7.2 3.0 48.1 30.4 44.1 25.4 12.22 1.39 22247 
 
2010 0.6 5.5 2.4 46.3 31.0 47.7 27.7 12.56 1.51 23793 
France 1950 0.4 88.9 37.7 9.1 2.5 1.7 1.0 4.31 0.05 25976 
 
1955 0.4 87.6 38.6 10.3 2.6 1.8 1.1 4.43 0.06 26838 
 
1960 0.3 90.1 30.8 7.5 2.8 2.1 1.4 4.10 0.07 27972 
 
1965 0.6 87.1 35.9 9.3 4.1 3.0 1.9 4.49 0.10 29211 
 
1970 0.9 82.4 37.9 12.2 5.5 4.5 2.8 4.96 0.15 29853 
 
1975 1.2 75.2 33.3 16.9 7.4 6.7 4.0 5.47 0.21 31622 
 
1980 1.1 68.1 28.8 22.3 8.3 8.5 4.6 5.96 0.26 33349 
 
1985 6.3 55.1 29.2 29.2 15.1 9.4 5.2 6.61 0.29 34983 
 
1990 9.7 41.6 25.3 36.9 20.2 11.4 6.2 7.33 0.35 36731 
 
1995 5.8 33.8 23.9 46.7 27.2 13.8 7.3 8.54 0.42 39018 
 
2000 3.1 26.4 20.6 53.4 32.9 17.1 8.8 9.53 0.52 40546 
 
2005 1.7 24.2 20.4 54.3 35.9 19.8 10.0 10.05 0.60 41792 
 
2010 1.6 19.2 17.8 54.8 37.5 24.4 12.1 10.64 0.73 43012 
Germany 1950 10.3 69.9 41.8 17.1 5.0 2.8 1.9 6.71 0.09 42715 
 
1955 0.4 77.8 47.3 18.5 6.1 3.2 2.1 7.47 0.11 44310 
 
1960 0.4 77.4 47.3 19.0 7.1 3.3 2.2 7.53 0.11 45828 
 
1965 0.7 76.0 49.0 19.8 8.4 3.4 2.2 7.68 0.11 48618 
 
1970 0.8 77.1 51.8 19.0 9.1 3.1 2.0 7.71 0.10 50008 
 
1975 0.6 78.3 53.4 15.6 8.3 5.5 3.6 7.58 0.18 50352 
 
1980 0.2 75.4 52.7 17.5 10.1 6.9 4.5 7.63 0.23 51187 
 
1985 1.3 71.5 51.0 19.5 12.1 7.7 5.0 7.55 0.25 52402 
 
1990 3.3 47.8 34.8 35.9 22.9 13.1 8.5 8.77 0.43 55794 
 
1995 4.5 33.2 25.0 45.7 31.4 16.6 10.7 9.66 0.55 59169 
 
2000 5.4 21.1 16.1 53.7 38.8 19.7 12.9 10.51 0.65 60327 
 
2005 4.8 2.9 2.2 71.8 53.6 20.5 13.5 11.97 0.68 61065 
 
2010 1.8 1.6 1.3 72.3 56.9 24.3 16.1 12.69 0.81 62067 
Italy 1950 16.1 73.1 41.2 9.3 3.8 1.5 1.0 4.04 0.05 26679 
 
1955 14.3 72.2 43.3 11.7 4.5 1.7 1.1 4.33 0.06 28327 
 
1960 12.5 71.4 44.4 13.9 5.2 2.1 1.4 4.61 0.07 29966 
 
1965 9.5 72.7 47.3 15.6 5.5 2.2 1.4 4.88 0.07 31592 
 
1970 7.3 72.6 48.9 17.5 6.2 2.6 1.7 5.17 0.09 32643 
 
1975 7.5 65.7 48.2 23.8 8.6 3.1 2.0 5.68 0.10 34128 
 
1980 7.7 59.0 45.9 29.2 11.2 4.1 2.7 6.19 0.14 35253 
 
1985 10.2 48.2 40.5 36.8 14.9 4.8 3.1 6.69 0.16 36242 
 
1990 9.9 40.6 36.1 43.6 18.3 6.0 3.9 7.29 0.20 38898 
 
1995 9.0 33.6 30.7 49.7 21.4 7.8 5.1 7.93 0.26 40718 
 
2000 7.9 27.6 25.6 55.1 26.1 9.4 6.1 8.58 0.31 42782 
 
2005 7.8 23.5 22.0 58.7 30.4 10.1 6.6 9.00 0.33 44026 
 
2010 6.3 19.9 18.2 61.7 33.4 12.1 8.0 9.54 0.40 44510 
Japan 1950 5.7 71.7 43.5 18.2 11.0 4.5 1.8 5.91 0.13 37585 
 
1955 4.1 65.2 40.3 25.2 16.0 5.5 2.4 6.51 0.16 42508 
 
1960 2.9 59.9 37.4 30.9 20.3 6.3 3.0 6.97 0.19 47918 
 
1965 1.6 60.8 40.0 31.9 14.5 5.7 2.9 6.94 0.17 53289 
 
1970 0.9 60.6 41.4 33.0 14.0 5.5 3.0 7.08 0.17 59429 
 
1975 0.5 51.7 35.9 37.1 17.3 10.8 6.2 7.90 0.34 67253 
 
1980 0.3 45.4 32.3 39.9 27.7 14.4 9.0 8.71 0.47 73123 
 
1985 0.3 39.4 28.3 42.4 29.6 17.9 11.7 9.25 0.59 77682 
 
1990 0.3 34.2 24.9 44.5 27.0 21.1 13.8 9.61 0.70 82020 
 
1995 0.2 27.0 20.3 49.4 31.1 23.4 15.2 10.18 0.77 86996 
 
2000 0.2 21.6 16.4 51.9 35.0 26.4 17.2 10.73 0.87 92337 
 
2005 0.1 17.7 13.5 53.1 37.9 29.2 19.2 11.17 0.97 96046 
 
2010 0.1 12.7 9.7 57.0 40.2 30.1 19.9 11.52 1.00 98160 
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Turkey 1950 83.1 11.9 6.1 4.0 2.0 1.1 0.7 0.99 0.04 8507 
 
1955 76.4 18.4 9.7 4.3 2.2 1.0 0.6 1.24 0.03 9908 
 
1960 70.8 23.6 12.6 4.6 2.4 1.0 0.7 1.49 0.03 11586 
 
1965 62.8 30.6 17.6 5.4 2.9 1.1 0.7 1.88 0.04 12906 
 
1970 61.8 30.7 19.2 6.1 3.2 1.3 0.9 2.02 0.04 14433 
 
1975 59.0 31.9 21.5 7.3 3.8 1.8 1.2 2.29 0.06 16166 
 
1980 52.4 35.3 25.5 8.7 4.7 3.6 2.4 2.87 0.12 18480 
 
1985 40.0 44.4 34.0 4.6 2.6 10.9 7.0 3.97 0.36 21631 
 
1990 33.3 47.3 38.4 8.5 4.8 10.9 7.1 4.53 0.36 25165 
 
1995 30.6 47.2 40.6 12.3 7.0 9.9 6.5 4.81 0.33 29092 
 
2000 20.1 52.7 45.8 17.4 10.2 9.6 6.3 5.54 0.32 33704 
 
2005 14.4 53.9 47.6 23.2 14.7 8.5 5.6 6.06 0.28 38334 
 
2010 11.3 52.3 46.2 25.7 17.0 10.7 7.1 6.56 0.36 43034 
USA 1950 2.6 45.7 20.8 38.2 21.6 13.6 7.4 8.13 0.42 91749 
 
1955 2.5 41.6 19.4 41.0 24.2 14.9 8.3 8.50 0.46 98278 
 
1960 2.3 37.4 17.5 43.8 27.0 16.5 9.4 8.90 0.52 103461 
 
1965 1.9 26.5 13.6 52.7 34.5 18.7 10.9 9.82 0.59 107682 
 
1970 1.6 17.9 9.7 59.2 40.7 21.3 12.4 10.61 0.67 114024 
 
1975 1.3 10.9 6.3 60.6 44.0 27.1 16.2 11.40 0.87 123638 
 
1980 1.0 6.3 3.7 62.9 47.1 30.0 18.1 11.94 0.96 136033 
 
1985 1.1 8.3 5.1 51.8 39.7 38.8 22.4 12.14 1.22 149824 
 
1990 1.2 9.1 5.7 44.4 34.6 45.4 25.1 12.32 1.41 162655 
 
1995 0.6 3.5 2.3 49.4 35.6 46.5 24.7 12.69 1.42 173286 
 
2000 0.5 3.2 2.1 44.3 32.1 52.0 26.7 12.93 1.57 183747 
 
2005 0.5 3.0 2.0 43.4 36.1 53.1 27.9 13.13 1.62 193809 
 
2010 0.4 2.5 1.7 39.8 35.9 57.3 30.9 13.42 1.76 204924 
United Kingdom 1950 2.3 76.6 45.9 19.5 1.7 1.6 1.1 6.11 0.05 31916 
 
1955 2.4 74.1 45.1 21.8 2.1 1.6 1.1 6.28 0.05 32367 
 
1960 2.3 71.4 43.7 24.5 2.3 1.8 1.2 6.49 0.06 32720 
 
1965 2.1 67.4 43.4 26.2 4.0 4.3 2.8 6.98 0.14 33287 
 
1970 2.0 62.4 41.8 28.2 4.8 7.5 4.9 7.54 0.25 33474 
 
1975 1.9 58.1 39.6 30.3 5.4 9.7 6.3 7.95 0.32 34554 
 
1980 2.1 54.7 38.2 33.3 6.2 9.9 6.5 8.13 0.33 35330 
 
1985 3.3 48.6 34.6 36.9 6.5 11.3 7.3 8.39 0.37 36043 
 
1990 3.1 43.1 31.3 38.7 6.6 15.1 9.9 8.88 0.50 37978 
 
1995 3.0 38.3 28.7 40.4 6.8 18.3 11.9 9.29 0.60 39355 
 
2000 3.2 31.6 24.0 41.9 6.9 23.3 15.2 9.86 0.77 40348 
 
2005 1.5 25.2 19.3 49.4 29.6 23.9 15.8 11.03 0.79 41142 
 
2010 0.2 15.9 12.2 55.6 44.3 28.3 18.8 12.32 0.94 42166 
China 1950 86.8 10.3 1.7 2.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.65 0.01 267376 
 
1955 78.2 17.1 3.4 4.3 1.0 0.4 0.3 1.09 0.01 278134 
 
1960 69.4 24.2 5.6 5.8 1.4 0.6 0.4 1.55 0.02 296041 
 
1965 59.1 30.9 9.1 9.2 2.2 0.8 0.5 2.22 0.03 315190 
 
1970 50.8 36.3 12.4 11.9 2.9 1.0 0.7 2.77 0.03 342431 
 
1975 41.8 40.4 16.1 16.8 4.1 1.0 0.7 3.48 0.03 383913 
 
1980 33.1 44.2 18.7 21.7 5.6 1.0 0.6 4.16 0.03 449196 
 
1985 30.7 39.6 19.4 28.3 8.1 1.4 0.9 4.78 0.05 508243 
 
1990 29.3 34.3 18.0 34.4 12.1 2.0 1.3 5.34 0.07 584120 
 
1995 20.5 35.4 19.7 41.2 17.8 2.9 1.9 6.22 0.10 676038 
 
2000 13.5 34.3 19.8 48.0 21.9 4.3 2.9 7.00 0.14 759352 
 
2005 9.6 31.7 18.8 54.8 22.7 3.9 2.7 7.34 0.13 816727 
 
2010 6.6 28.1 17.0 61.8 18.7 3.6 2.4 7.53 0.12 872099 
Indonesia 1950 82.9 16.1 5.3 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.74 0.00 32442 
 
1955 79.4 19.2 6.3 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.91 0.00 35276 
 
1960 75.5 22.6 7.6 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.11 0.00 39014 
 
1965 66.7 29.7 12.0 3.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 1.62 0.01 43458 
 
1970 55.3 39.1 17.0 5.1 1.5 0.5 0.3 2.26 0.02 48183 
 
1975 48.6 43.4 15.0 7.4 2.7 0.6 0.3 2.58 0.02 53103 
 
1980 41.1 48.4 16.8 9.6 4.9 0.8 0.4 3.09 0.02 59820 
 
1985 46.1 39.6 16.3 13.0 6.4 1.3 0.8 3.23 0.04 68799 
 
1990 54.5 26.4 12.3 16.8 8.5 2.3 1.5 3.28 0.08 78871 
 
1995 39.8 37.8 19.8 20.1 10.4 2.3 1.6 4.21 0.08 91037 
 
2000 27.9 51.1 29.1 18.3 9.7 2.7 1.8 4.75 0.09 103854 
 
2005 18.6 51.5 31.7 25.5 14.0 4.4 2.9 5.88 0.15 117391 
 
2010 9.5 48.2 30.6 34.8 20.3 7.5 5.0 7.26 0.25 131196 
Republic of Korea 1950 33.9 59.3 49.3 5.6 3.0 1.2 1.0 3.98 0.04 7495 
 
1955 29.7 62.1 53.1 6.8 3.7 1.5 1.1 4.36 0.05 8584 
 
1960 56.9 29.6 26.2 10.9 5.8 2.6 1.9 3.12 0.09 9818 
 
1965 43.6 35.2 33.5 17.5 7.6 3.6 2.7 4.26 0.13 11282 
 
1970 34.3 38.1 36.5 21.8 9.9 5.7 4.3 5.20 0.20 12809 
 
1975 25.2 39.2 37.4 28.7 13.0 6.9 5.3 6.16 0.24 14462 
 
1980 19.7 34.5 33.0 36.9 18.7 8.9 6.6 7.09 0.31 16401 
 
1985 15.4 27.6 26.5 45.3 24.4 11.7 8.5 8.06 0.40 19973 
 
1990 11.0 21.7 20.9 51.4 30.8 16.0 11.5 9.11 0.55 23040 
 
1995 8.7 18.2 17.3 51.9 36.2 21.1 15.6 9.94 0.73 26171 
 
2000 7.5 14.8 14.0 50.9 36.7 26.8 20.8 10.59 0.95 29373 
 
2005 6.3 12.7 11.8 49.2 37.7 31.8 26.0 11.25 1.16 31973 
 
2010 4.1 11.5 10.5 44.6 34.4 39.8 34.8 11.89 1.49 34250 
Russian Federation 1950 25.1 55.6 17.0 16.2 5.1 3.3 1.5 3.16 0.10 51679 
 
1955 12.5 61.8 19.6 21.9 6.9 3.8 1.7 3.86 0.11 59456 
 
1960 10.4 59.8 19.7 25.6 8.3 4.2 1.7 4.17 0.12 64687 
 
1965 8.6 53.1 18.5 33.2 11.5 5.2 2.2 4.77 0.15 71822 
 
1970 7.4 47.7 17.5 38.4 14.1 6.6 2.8 5.26 0.19 73671 
 
1975 8.4 39.0 15.2 42.6 18.0 10.1 4.4 5.90 0.29 77915 
 
1980 8.7 30.3 12.7 45.8 21.9 15.3 6.6 6.75 0.44 84003 
 
1985 8.4 21.6 9.6 46.9 25.4 23.1 9.8 7.76 0.66 89642 
 
1990 7.7 15.2 7.2 43.1 25.7 34.0 14.3 8.91 0.97 94242 
 
1995 5.1 11.0 5.4 43.9 24.8 40.0 15.6 9.78 1.11 95609 
 
2000 1.1 8.8 4.5 39.0 28.5 51.1 20.9 11.13 1.44 96420 
 
2005 1.0 7.0 3.7 36.5 26.7 55.5 22.9 11.41 1.57 97012 
 
2010 0.9 5.6 3.1 31.8 22.6 62.0 25.9 11.73 1.76 98495 
Argentina 1950 15.9 75.8 28.0 7.1 3.5 1.2 1.0 4.60 0.04 8768 
 
1955 13.3 75.3 28.9 9.4 4.8 2.0 1.6 4.99 0.07 9874 
 
1960 12.0 73.4 28.8 11.6 6.1 3.0 2.3 5.32 0.11 10900 
 
1965 10.3 73.0 29.8 13.3 7.3 3.4 2.5 5.60 0.12 11848 
 
1970 8.3 72.4 30.6 15.3 8.4 4.0 2.9 5.92 0.14 12805 
 
1975 6.9 69.8 33.1 18.0 10.3 5.3 3.8 6.43 0.18 13954 
 
1980 7.1 66.4 33.0 20.4 13.8 6.1 3.7 6.72 0.20 14990 
 
1985 5.6 62.0 35.9 23.1 14.9 9.3 5.7 7.45 0.30 16122 
 
1990 5.7 56.9 34.6 25.3 16.8 12.0 6.6 7.88 0.37 17296 
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1995 4.9 53.3 36.4 29.1 19.8 12.6 6.2 8.34 0.38 18533 
 
2000 4.3 49.8 35.0 34.8 23.2 11.1 4.0 8.55 0.30 20007 
 
2005 1.1 42.5 35.0 42.7 26.8 13.7 4.0 9.26 0.33 21905 
 
2010 1.1 41.9 33.0 45.2 31.1 11.7 3.4 9.48 0.30 23710 
Brazil 1950 65.3 29.8 13.9 4.0 3.0 0.9 0.7 1.96 0.03 21122 
 
1955 61.3 32.9 14.4 4.9 3.3 1.0 0.9 2.18 0.04 24687 
 
1960 56.1 36.9 15.8 5.9 3.6 1.2 1.1 2.49 0.04 28077 
 
1965 49.6 41.4 17.5 7.5 3.8 1.5 1.4 2.77 0.06 32264 
 
1970 42.5 46.0 19.4 9.6 3.7 2.0 1.7 3.09 0.07 36766 
 
1975 32.7 57.3 4.3 5.7 2.3 4.3 3.5 2.82 0.16 42543 
 
1980 32.9 55.3 4.9 6.9 2.9 5.0 3.7 2.93 0.17 49764 
 
1985 28.9 55.4 19.6 10.2 4.5 5.5 4.1 3.59 0.19 57977 
 
1990 27.7 52.1 25.7 14.4 6.7 5.8 4.3 4.04 0.20 67758 
 
1995 24.1 50.2 28.4 19.3 9.8 6.5 4.6 4.84 0.22 77485 
 
2000 20.1 47.0 28.9 25.7 14.0 7.3 5.2 5.78 0.25 87733 
 
2005 15.7 41.8 26.5 34.2 21.3 8.1 5.8 6.75 0.28 99139 
 
2010 12.4 37.0 24.8 39.3 24.6 11.3 8.0 7.66 0.39 111561 
Mexico 1950 46.1 48.4 10.4 4.2 1.5 1.4 1.1 2.17 0.05 11088 
 
1955 46.0 48.3 10.4 4.3 1.5 1.4 1.1 2.18 0.05 12212 
 
1960 43.6 49.9 11.1 5.2 1.7 1.3 1.1 2.33 0.05 13701 
 
1965 41.1 51.5 12.1 5.7 2.4 1.7 1.4 2.54 0.06 15464 
 
1970 37.5 53.5 14.2 6.8 3.2 2.4 1.8 2.89 0.08 17661 
 
1975 36.1 51.2 15.6 9.1 3.7 3.6 2.7 3.33 0.13 20283 
 
1980 34.2 48.6 17.2 11.8 4.6 5.3 3.9 3.92 0.18 23688 
 
1985 27.6 48.4 18.7 17.5 6.9 6.6 4.9 4.80 0.23 27857 
 
1990 22.0 47.4 19.3 22.8 9.1 7.8 5.6 5.56 0.27 32758 
 
1995 17.2 44.6 20.4 28.2 12.0 10.1 7.6 6.48 0.35 38773 
 
2000 13.4 42.1 19.3 32.5 13.1 12.0 9.1 7.11 0.42 46203 
 
2005 10.2 38.0 19.0 36.9 15.4 14.9 11.2 7.89 0.52 53573 
 
2010 9.3 34.4 18.4 38.7 14.9 17.7 13.1 8.33 0.62 60528 
Saudi Arabia 1950 67.3 22.2 8.2 7.2 3.3 3.4 2.3 2.17 0.11 1267 
 
1955 64.7 23.2 9.7 8.2 4.2 3.9 2.6 2.45 0.13 1398 
 
1960 62.2 24.0 10.7 9.2 5.1 4.5 3.0 2.72 0.15 1557 
 
1965 59.9 24.6 11.1 10.3 5.8 5.1 3.4 2.96 0.17 1799 
 
1970 57.6 25.3 11.4 11.4 6.4 5.7 3.7 3.19 0.19 2123 
 
1975 56.1 25.6 11.7 12.2 6.7 6.1 3.9 3.35 0.20 2675 
 
1980 49.8 26.9 12.6 15.6 8.6 7.7 4.9 4.02 0.25 3567 
 
1985 43.7 28.0 13.7 18.9 10.6 9.4 6.2 4.71 0.31 4929 
 
1990 35.8 29.6 14.9 23.5 13.0 11.2 7.4 5.55 0.37 6519 
 
1995 31.2 30.3 15.5 26.4 14.6 12.2 8.1 6.05 0.41 7812 
 
2000 26.3 30.4 15.8 29.7 16.4 13.6 9.1 6.64 0.46 9082 
 
2005 22.2 29.0 15.4 33.9 19.2 14.9 10.0 7.25 0.50 10865 
 
2010 18.1 27.3 15.3 40.9 24.0 13.7 9.2 7.79 0.46 12696 
India 1950 77.3 19.6 5.0 2.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.92 0.02 149127 
 
1955 75.9 20.8 5.6 2.6 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.99 0.03 165769 
 
1960 75.5 22.1 6.2 1.9 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.94 0.02 185861 
 
1965 73.2 22.5 6.9 3.3 0.4 1.0 0.6 1.15 0.03 207231 
 
1970 72.2 22.7 7.7 3.9 0.3 1.1 0.7 1.24 0.04 230189 
 
1975 72.1 18.1 7.1 8.1 0.4 1.6 1.0 1.52 0.05 256651 
 
1980 72.5 11.3 4.9 13.7 0.4 2.5 1.6 1.87 0.08 289666 
 
1985 64.9 15.0 7.8 16.8 0.5 3.2 2.1 2.39 0.11 328487 
 
1990 57.6 18.3 11.3 19.6 0.5 4.4 3.0 2.96 0.15 373706 
 
1995 54.8 17.1 12.0 22.3 5.9 5.8 3.9 3.51 0.19 424889 
 
2000 50.8 14.6 11.2 26.8 16.8 7.8 5.3 4.41 0.26 481574 
 
2005 47.0 15.6 12.8 28.9 18.0 8.5 5.7 4.82 0.28 538366 
 
2010 42.3 15.6 13.6 33.0 20.8 9.1 6.1 5.39 0.30 604417 
South Africa 1950 54.8 20.9 13.0 21.5 5.1 2.8 0.4 3.75 0.06 5880 
 
1955 50.7 21.7 13.3 24.5 5.8 3.1 0.4 4.15 0.07 6466 
 
1960 49.6 23.2 14.2 24.0 5.7 3.1 0.4 4.17 0.07 7157 
 
1965 45.7 24.6 8.0 26.3 6.3 3.5 0.4 4.29 0.08 7967 
 
1970 41.9 26.9 5.4 27.5 6.7 3.7 0.5 4.44 0.08 8803 
 
1975 36.9 33.1 9.2 27.5 8.3 2.5 0.3 4.66 0.06 9898 
 
1980 31.7 40.1 11.9 26.9 10.0 1.4 0.2 4.82 0.03 11285 
 
1985 24.8 46.4 4.8 26.5 5.9 2.3 0.2 4.78 0.05 13097 
 
1990 14.2 47.0 17.8 33.6 11.5 5.3 0.5 6.49 0.12 15130 
 
1995 5.5 42.5 21.1 42.7 24.6 9.3 0.8 8.22 0.20 18426 
 
2000 20.2 24.2 6.7 46.7 18.1 8.9 0.7 7.23 0.19 21095 
 
2005 13.5 22.3 7.0 56.6 30.1 7.6 0.6 8.23 0.16 22345 
 
2010 7.8 19.1 6.0 67.0 52.9 6.1 0.5 9.43 0.13 22855 
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A.3. The Top 11 Universities For Turkey Listed By The Top 10 University Rating Institutions In 
The World 
University Rankings 
RANK THE WEBOMETRICS SCIMAGO 
US NEWS  
AND  
WORLD 
REPORT 
QS LEIDEN CWUR RUR ARWU URAP 
1 Koç Metu Istanbul  Boğaziçi  Bilkent  İstanbul  Metu Sabanci  İstanbul  İstanbul  
2 Sabanci  
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
Metu Metu Sabanci  Hacettepe  İstanbul  Metu 
 
Metu 
3 Bilkent Bogaziçi  
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
Koç  Ege  Hacettepe  Bilkent   Hacettepe  
4 
Atilim 
 
Bilkent  Hacettepe  Bilkent  Metu Metu 
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
 
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
5 Bogaziçi  Istanbul  Bilkent  Hacettepe  Boğaziçi  Gazi  Ankara  Boğaziçi   Ege  
6 
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
Ankara  Gazi  Ankara  
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
Istanbul 
Technical 
University 
Ege  Koç   Ankara  
7 Hacettepe  Hacettepe  
Çanakkale 18 
Mart  
Koç  Ankara  Ankara  Boğaziçi  İstanbul   Gazi  
8 Istanbul  Anadolu  Erciyes  Ege  Çukurova  Erciyes  Bilkent  Ankara   Boğaziçi  
9 
Izmir Institute 
 Of 
Technology 
Ege  Ankara  İstanbul  Gazi  
Dokuz 
Eylül   
Gazi  Hacettepe   Erciyes  
10 Metu Gazi  Ege  Çukurova  Hacettepe  Selçuk  Dokuz Eylül  Gazi   Bilkent  
 
11 
TOBB Koç  Bahçeşehir  Mersin  İstanbul  Atatürk  
 
Marmara   
Dokuz 
Eylül  
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A.4. Survey Allowance and Disallowance Presidency of Universities 
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A.5. SURVEY FORM 
Bu anket, TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi’nde yürütülen, öğrencilerin üniversite seçimi ile ilgili çalışmaları devam 
eden bir yüksek lisans tezinde kullanılmak üzere hazırlanmıştır. Vermiş olduğunuz bilgiler gizli kalacaktır. Çalışmaya 
katkınızdan dolayı teşekkür ederiz. Anket ile merak ettiğiniz hususlarda ttatoglu@etu.edu.tr adresinden bilgi alabilirsiniz. 
Tuğçe TATOĞLU, İktisat Bölümü Araştırma Görevlisi 
A. ÜNİVERSİTE SEÇİMİ 
1. Üniversite tercihi yaparken sıralamanızı belirleyen temel kriterleri 1’den 5’e kadar notlandırınız. (Her kriter için yalnızca bir 
seçenek işaretleyiniz.) 
 
1 
Tamamen 
önemsiz 
2 
Önemsiz 
3 
Orta 
derecede 
önemli 
4 
Önemli 
5 
Çok önemli 
Üniversitenin bulunduğu şehir      
Mezun olduktan sonra iş bulma olanağı      
Üniversitenin fiziki özellikleri (kampüs vb.)      
Yakın arkadaşların tercihleri      
Staj olanakları      
Eğitim dili      
Akademik kadronun yeterliliği      
Üniversitenin genel imajı      
Burs olanakları      
Eğitim ücretleri      
Yurt olanakları      
Yönetim kadrosunun ilgisi      
Mezuniyet sonrası iş imkanları      
Sosyal ve kültürel etkinlikler (Topluluklar vb.)      
 
Diğer:  
 
2. Üniversiteyi hangi şehirde okumayı tercih ederdiniz? Belirtiniz. 
 
 Tercih ederdim Tercih etmezdim 
İstanbul   
Ankara   
İzmir   
 
Diğer:  
 
3. Mezun olduktan sonra, ilk 5 yıl içinde, aylık ne kadar gelir elde edeceğinizi öngörüyorsunuz? 
 
……………………… TL 
 
Net aralık veremem    
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4. Aşağıdaki üniversitelerin eğitim kalitesi derecelerini 1’den 5’e kadar puanlandırınız. (Her üniversite için yalnızca bir 
seçeneği işaretleyiniz.) 
 
1 
Çok kötü 
2 
Kötü 
3 
Orta 
4 
İyi 
5 
Çok iyi 
Fikrim 
yok 
Sakarya Üniversitesi       
Çukurova Üniversitesi       
Koç Üniversitesi       
Ege Üniversitesi       
Gazi Üniversitesi       
Uludağ Üniversitesi       
Anadolu Üniversitesi       
Pamukkale Üniversitesi       
Bilkent Üniversitesi       
İstanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi       
Marmara Üniversitesi       
Sabancı Üniversitesi       
Erciyes Üniversitesi       
Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi       
TOBB Ek. ve Tekn. Üniversitesi       
Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi       
Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi       
Selçuk Üniversitesi       
Dünya genelinde başarılı üniversiteleri sıralayan en önemli 10 derecelendirme kuruluşunun yaptığı sıralamada, 2016 
yılında, Türkiye’nin en başarılı üniversiteleri aşağıda sıralanmıştır:  
1. ODTÜ  5. BİLKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ  9. EGE ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
2. İSTANBUL TEKNİK 
ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
6. ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ 10. KOÇ ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
3. İSTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ  7. BOĞAZİÇİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ   
4. HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ  8. GAZİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
 
5. Bu sıralamada yer alan Koç Üniversitesi ve Bilkent Üniversitesi’ne %100 burslu girme imkânınız olsaydı (eğitim ücreti 
ödemeseydiniz) bu okullardan birinde eğitim almayı tercih eder miydiniz? 
Evet            Hayır    
5.a. Cevabınız Hayır ise, lütfen nedenini belirtiniz. 
 
 
6. Bankadan öğrenim kredisi alabilme imkânınız olsaydı (borçlanabilseydiniz), şu anda eğitimini aldığınız bölümü KOÇ 
Üniversitesi ve BİLKENT Üniversitesi’nden herhangi birinde burssuz olarak okumayı (eğitim ücreti ödeyerek) tercih eder 
miydiniz? Tercihlerinizi belirterek,1’den 5’e kadar notlandırınız. (Geri ödeme şartlarını şu şekilde düşününüz: Yıllık geliriniz 
belli bir gelir eşiğinin üzerinde ise geri ödemelerinize başlayacaksınız. Geliriniz arttıkça aylık taksit ödemeleriniz de 
yükselecektir. Faizler borçlandığınız dönem için sabittir. 2017-2018 öğretim dönemi için Bilkent ve Koç Üniversitesi’nin 
eğitim ücretleri, sırasıyla, yaklaşık 30.000 TL ile 60.000 TL civarındadır.) 
 
 
1 
Kesinlikle 
tercih 
etmezdim 
2 
Tercih 
etmezdim 
3 
Kararsızım 
4 
Tercih 
ederdim 
5 
Kesinlikle 
tercih 
ederdim 
Koç Üniversitesi (ücretli)      
Bilkent Üniversitesi (ücretli)      
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B.DEMOGRAFİK BİLGİLER 
Yaşınız: 
18-23:    
24-29:    
30-35:    
35+:       
Cinsiyet: Kadın      Erkek  
Hane Geliri (Aylık):   
500-1000:      
1001-1500:    
1501-2000:    
2001-3000:    
3001-4000:  
4001-5000:   
5001+        :   
 
Aileniz hangi şehirde ikamet etmektedir? 
 
 
Okulunuz: 
 
Bölümünüz: 
 
Sınıfınız: 
 
Üniversiteye Giriş Yılınız: 
 
Üniversite Giriş Puanınız: 
 
Üniversite Giriş Sıralamanız: 
156 
 
A.6. Demographic Distribution Results of the Sample 
A.6.a General Information about the Sample  
Age Distribution 
Yaş Frequency Percent 
18-23 202 79,8 
24-29 50 19,8 
35+ 1 0,4 
Total 253 100,0 
  
Gender Distribution 
Cinsiyet Frequency Percent 
Kadın 112 44,3 
Erkek 141 55,7 
Total 253 100 
 
Monthly Household Income Distribution 
 
 
Universities where Students Take Education and Province where Students’ Families Reside 
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120
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Distribution of Students Classes According To  Universities and Department 
 
 
A.6.b. Crosstabs Analysis 
A.6.b.i. Crosstabs Concerning Receive Education via Borrowing Program 
Students’ Preferences at Koc University with Borrowing Program According To Gender 
 
Koç Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd not 
prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer I'd definitely prefer 
Gender 
Woman 22,3% 17,9% 19,6% 21,4% 18,8% 
Man 34,8% 20,6% 17,7% 12,1% 14,9% 
 
Total 29,2% 19,4% 18,6% 16,2% 16,6% 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7,599a 4 ,107 
 
Students’ Preferences at Bilkent University with Borrowing Program According To Gender 
 
Bilkent Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd not 
prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer I'd definitely prefer 
Gender 
Woman 25,9% 20,5% 24,1% 16,1% 13,4% 
Man 36,0% 22,3% 22,3% 10,1% 9,4% 
 
Total 31,5% 21,5% 23,1% 12,7% 11,2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4,838a 4 ,304 
 
0
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70
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Students’ Preferences at Koc University with Borrowing Program According To Department 
 
Koç Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd not 
prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer I'd definitely prefer 
Department 
Economics 26,6% 20,3% 17,2% 18,0% 18,0% 
Electric-
Electronics 
Engineering 
32,0% 18,4% 20,0% 14,4% 15,2% 
 
Total 29,2% 19,4% 18,6% 16,2% 16,6% 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1,817a 4 ,769 
 
Students’ Preferences at Bilkent University with Borrowing Program According To Department 
 
Bilkent Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd not 
prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer I'd definitely prefer 
Department 
Economics 31,7% 23,0% 26,2% 11,1% 7,9% 
Electric-
Electronics 
Engineering 
31,2% 20,0% 20,0% 14,4% 14,4% 
 
Total 31,5% 21,5% 23,1% 12,7% 11,2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4,194a 4 ,380 
 
Students’ Preferences at Koc University with Borrowing Program According To Classes 
Koç Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd not 
prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer I'd definitely prefer 
Class 
 
1 25,7% 19,8% 20,8% 13,9% 19,8% 
4 31,8% 19,2% 17,2% 17,2% 14,6% 
 
Total 29,4% 19,4% 18,7% 15,9% 16,7% 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2,603a 4 ,626 
 
Students’ Preferences at Bilkent University with Borrowing Program According To Classes 
Bilkent Paid Education 
  
Definitely I'd not 
prefer 
I'd not prefer I cannot decide I'd prefer I'd definitely prefer 
 
1 28,7% 20,8% 23,8% 13,9% 12,9% 
Class 
 
4 33,3% 22,0% 22,7% 12,0% 10,0% 
 
Total 31,5% 21,5% 23,1% 12,7% 11,2% 
 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1,092a 4 ,896 
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A.6.b.ii. Crosstabs Concerning Future Income Expectations  
Classes and Departments in which Students Are Taken Education for Monthly Income Expectations within the First 
Five Years after Graduation 
  Class  Department  
    
1 4 Economics 
Electric-Electronics 
Engineering 
 Future Income Expectations 
  
I cannot give a clear 
range 
48,1% 51,9% 56,4% 43,6% 
1500 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
1600 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
1800 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
2000 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
2250 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
2450 0,0% 100,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
2500 34,5% 65,5% 69,0% 31,0% 
2800 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
3000 33,3% 66,7% 42,9% 57,1% 
3500 33,3% 66,7% 40,7% 59,3% 
3800 100,0% 0,0% 50,0% 50,0% 
4000 38,5% 61,5% 50,0% 50,0% 
4500 28,6% 71,4% 14,3% 85,7% 
5000 40,9% 59,1% 40,9% 59,1% 
5500 66,7% 33,3% 66,7% 33,3% 
6000 55,6% 44,4% 22,2% 77,8% 
6500 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
7000 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 
7500 100,0% 0,0% 50,0% 50,0% 
8000 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
10000 75,0% 25,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
15000 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
17000 100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
 
Total 40,1% 59,9% 50,6% 49,4% 
 
 Chi-Square Tests for Classes and Monthly Income Expectations within the First Five Years after Graduation 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 29,319a 23 ,170 
 
Chi-Square Tests for Departments and Monthly Income Expectations within the First Five Years after Graduation 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 39,189a 23 ,019 
 
 
